Not to pick on you specifically, but just as a general comment, I'm getting a bit worried about the rationalist book review pipeline. It seems it usually goes like this: someone writes a book with an interesting idea -> a rationalist (like Scott) writes a review of it, maybe not knowing much about the topic but being intrigued by the idea -> lots of other rationalists get the idea cached in their minds. So maybe it'd be better if book reviews were written by people who know a lot about the topic, and can evaluate the book in context.
Like, a while ago someone on LW asked people to recommend textbooks on various topics, but you couldn't recommend a textbook if it was the only one you'd read on the topic, you had to read at least two and then recommend one. That seems on the right track to me, and requiring more knowledge of the topic would be better still.
Not to pick on you specifically, but just as a general comment, I'm getting a bit worried about the rationalist decontextualized content policing. It seems it usually goes like this: someone cultivates an epistemological practice (say how to extract conceptual insights from diverse practices) -> they decide to cross-post their thoughts on a community blog interested in epistemology -> somebody else unfamiliar with the former's body of work comes across it -> interprets it into a pattern they might rightfully have identified as critique-worthy -> dump the criticism there. So maybe it'd be better if comments were written by people who can click through the author's profile to interpret the post in the right context.
[Epistemic status of this comment: Performative, but not without substance.]
We have downvotes if a review is inane, and we have comments if an expert wants to correct something... And we could have a tag like "Expert Review" for reviews by people who know the topic.
I did not particularly intend to do a book review per say, and I don't claim to be an expert on the topic. So completely fine with tagging this in some way as "non-expert" if you wish.
Not planning to change how I wrote my posts based on this feedback, as I have no interest in following some arbitrary standard of epistemic expertise for a fun little blog post that will be read by 10 people max.
I’ve been reading Ada Palmer’s great “Inventing The Renaissance”, and it sparked a line of thinking about how to properly reveal hidden complexity.
As the name suggests, Palmer’s book explores how the historical period we call the Renaissance has been constructed by historians, nation-states, and the general public. Not in the sense that there is nothing distinctive or interesting in this (hard to pin down) span of history, but because the compressions that have most currency in people’s head are retroactive projections of what was considered good or important or even decadent about the time when the histories were written.
There’s a lot of fascinating historical details in the book, but what I want to single out is how Palmer goes about her deconstruction of histories of the Renaissance.
You see, a really big point in my model of epistemology and methodology is that humans are not that smart. We can’t understand and remember massively complex models of everything because our capacities are limited.
In practice, this means compression is not an option, it’s a necessity. We always compress everything, all the time — the only choice is the relative degrees of compression of different things. The fact that I care more about my wife than my banker manifests itself in my having a much less compressed model of my wife (though still throwing out a lot of details).
So when some extremely brilliant and knowledgeable expert like Ada Palmer comes and decompresses your existing simplified models of, say, the Renaissance, there is a really common failure mode: that you, the reader, end up automatically compressing back, following various easy heuristics:
Neither of them is fundamentally better than the other, because each of these heuristics is appropriate in different situations. The problem is that without investing quite a lot of effort into resolving the contradiction, we tend to choose based on the vibe we have.
As an example, I know I like the feeling of seeing an old model get deconstructed and corrected, which means that by default, I lean toward agreeing with statements of this shape.
How to mitigate this problem? By offering a new compression, which better addresses the original compression’s issues.
That’s what Ada Palmer does brilliantly. She doesn’t just criticize existing histories, she digs a bit into historiography, the study of historical methods. Instead of letting you with the messy ruins of your previous compression, she offers a model of why histories have traditionally represented and built the Renaissance in various (incoherent and insufficient) ways.
Some are straightforward, as in her point that the Renaissance, after being conceptualized as a Golden Age, could be used to bring legitimacy to any one who affiliated themselves with it.[1]
(Ada Palmer, Inventing The Renaissance, p.22-23)
Others are more subtle, as her point that because Renaissance can be claimed (when you squint) as the starting or inflection point of many aspects of modernity, what counts as the Renaissance and how events are framed depends on what you take to be THE thing Renaissance did particularly well.
(Ada Palmer, Inventing The Renaissance, p.24-25)
So the way a particular historical figure (Lorenzo The Magnificient) is treated in various histories, will heavily depend on what you most care about.[2]
(Ada Palmer, Inventing The Renaissance, p.79)
The new model Palmer offers even includes ways to think about how past histories affect what is sampled, maintained, and restored, which is the basis of future histories. Palmer gives the great example of Florence, which appears to the visiting scholar or tourist obviously more Renaissance than any other place in the world, and yet its place as exemplar comes from the bias of previous histories, and their consequences.
(Ada Palmer, Inventing The Renaissance, p.56-58)
Palmer’s model of historiography even explains why points where many histories of the Renaissance agree can be wrong too.
(Ada Palmer, Inventing The Renaissance, p.25)
(Ada Palmer, Inventing The Renaissance, p.102)
Of course, that Palmer offers a compressed alternative doesn’t mean that she’s right on everything. But it helps a lot with holding her takes in mind, and deciding whether it makes sense or not, which part to keep and which part to throw away.
And the very existence of this compression makes it much more feasible for future thinkers and scholars to dig into it, and turn the likely productive mistake into better histories.
Ironically, the vision of the Renaissance as a golden age stems in part from the Italian city-states strategy to get legitimacy from emulating the art, literature, and engineering of an earlier supposed golden age, the Roman Republic/Empire.
Note that Palmer is explicit about what most interests and excites her (intellectual history)