This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?
keltan3h42
0
A potentially good way to avoid low level criminals scamming your family and friends with a clone of your voice is to set a password that you each must exchange. An extra layer of security might be to make the password offensive, an info hazard, or politically sensitive. Doing this, criminals with little technical expertise will have a harder time bypassing corporate language filters. Good luck getting the voice model to parrot a basic meth recipe!
I expect large parts of interpretability work could be safely automatable very soon (e.g. GPT-5 timelines) using (V)LM agents; see A Multimodal Automated Interpretability Agent for a prototype.  Notably, MAIA (GPT-4V-based) seems approximately human-level on a bunch of interp tasks, while (overwhelmingly likely) being non-scheming (e.g. current models are bad at situational awareness and out-of-context reasoning) and basically-not-x-risky (e.g. bad at ARA). Given the potential scalability of automated interp, I'd be excited to see plans to use large amounts of compute on it (including e.g. explicit integrations with agendas like superalignment or control; for example, given non-dangerous-capabilities, MAIA seems framable as a 'trusted' model in control terminology).
Elizabeth18h163
0
Check my math: how does Enovid compare to to humming? Nitric Oxide is an antimicrobial and immune booster. Normal nasal nitric oxide is 0.14ppm for women and 0.18ppm for men (sinus levels are 100x higher). journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.117… Enovid is a nasal spray that produces NO. I had the damndest time quantifying Enovid, but this trial registration says 0.11ppm NO/hour. They deliver every 8h and I think that dose is amortized, so the true dose is 0.88. But maybe it's more complicated. I've got an email out to the PI but am not hopeful about a response clinicaltrials.gov/study/NCT05109…   so Enovid increases nasal NO levels somewhere between 75% and 600% compared to baseline- not shabby. Except humming increases nasal NO levels by 1500-2000%. atsjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.116…. Enovid stings and humming doesn't, so it seems like Enovid should have the larger dose. But the spray doesn't contain NO itself, but compounds that react to form NO. Maybe that's where the sting comes from? Cystic fibrosis and burn patients are sometimes given stratospheric levels of NO for hours or days; if the burn from Envoid came from the NO itself than those patients would be in agony.  I'm not finding any data on humming and respiratory infections. Google scholar gives me information on CF and COPD, @Elicit brought me a bunch of studies about honey.   With better keywords google scholar to bring me a bunch of descriptions of yogic breathing with no empirical backing. There are some very circumstantial studies on illness in mouth breathers vs. nasal, but that design has too many confounders for me to take seriously.  Where I'm most likely wrong: * misinterpreted the dosage in the RCT * dosage in RCT is lower than in Enovid * Enovid's dose per spray is 0.5ml, so pretty close to the new study. But it recommends two sprays per nostril, so real dose is 2x that. Which is still not quite as powerful as a single hum. 
A tension that keeps recurring when I think about philosophy is between the "view from nowhere" and the "view from somewhere", i.e. a third-person versus first-person perspective—especially when thinking about anthropics. One version of the view from nowhere says that there's some "objective" way of assigning measure to universes (or people within those universes, or person-moments). You should expect to end up in different possible situations in proportion to how much measure your instances in those situations have. For example, UDASSA ascribes measure based on the simplicity of the computation that outputs your experience. One version of the view from somewhere says that the way you assign measure across different instances should depend on your values. You should act as if you expect to end up in different possible future situations in proportion to how much power to implement your values the instances in each of those situations has. I'll call this the ADT approach, because that seems like the core insight of Anthropic Decision Theory. Wei Dai also discusses it here. In some sense each of these views makes a prediction. UDASSA predicts that we live in a universe with laws of physics that are very simple to specify (even if they're computationally expensive to run), which seems to be true. Meanwhile the ADT approach "predicts" that we find ourselves at an unusually pivotal point in history, which also seems true. Intuitively I want to say "yeah, but if I keep predicting that I will end up in more and more pivotal places, eventually that will be falsified". But.... on a personal level, this hasn't actually been falsified yet. And more generally, acting on those predictions can still be positive in expectation even if they almost surely end up being falsified. It's a St Petersburg paradox, basically. Very speculatively, then, maybe a way to reconcile the view from somewhere and the view from nowhere is via something like geometric rationality, which avoids St Petersburg paradoxes. And more generally, it feels like there's some kind of multi-agent perspective which says I shouldn't model all these copies of myself as acting in unison, but rather as optimizing for some compromise between all their different goals (which can differ even if they're identical, because of indexicality). No strong conclusions here but I want to keep playing around with some of these ideas (which were inspired by a call with @zhukeepa). This was all kinda rambly but I think I can summarize it as "Isn't it weird that ADT tells us that we should act as if we'll end up in unusually important places, and also we do seem to be in an incredibly unusually important place in the universe? I don't have a story for why these things are related but it does seem like a suspicious coincidence."

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The Löwenheim–Skolem theorem implies, among other things, that any first-order theory whose symbols are countable, and which has an infinite model, has a countably infinite model. This means that, in attempting to refer to uncountably infinite structures (such as in set theory), one "may as well" be referring to an only countably infinite structure, as far as proofs are concerned.

The main limitation I see with this theorem is that it preserves arbitrarily deep quantifier nesting. In Peano arithmetic, it is possible to form statements that correspond (under the standard interpretation) to arbitrary statements in the arithmetic hierarchy (by which I mean, the union of and for arbitrary n). Not all of these statements are computable. In general, the question of whether a given statement is...

6AlexMennen10h
I see that when I commented yesterday, I was confused about how you had defined U. You're right that you don't need a consistent guessing oracle to get from U to a completion of U, since the axioms are all atomic propositions, and you can just set the remaining atomic propositions however you want. However, this introduces the problem that getting the axioms of U requires a halting oracle, not just a consistent guessing oracle, since to tell whether something is an axiom, you need to know whether there actually is a proof of a given thing in T.
jessicata2mΩ120

The axioms of U are recursively enumerable. You run all M(i,j) in parallel and output a new axiom whenever one halts. That's enough to computably check a proof if the proof specifies the indices of all axioms used in the recursive enumeration.

This is a linkpost for https://dynomight.net/seed-oil/

A friend has spent the last three years hounding me about seed oils. Every time I thought I was safe, he’d wait a couple months and renew his attack:

“When are you going to write about seed oils?”

“Did you know that seed oils are why there’s so much {obesity, heart disease, diabetes, inflammation, cancer, dementia}?”

“Why did you write about {meth, the death penalty, consciousness, nukes, ethylene, abortion, AI, aliens, colonoscopies, Tunnel Man, Bourdieu, Assange} when you could have written about seed oils?”

“Isn’t it time to quit your silly navel-gazing and use your weird obsessive personality to make a dent in the world—by writing about seed oils?”

He’d often send screenshots of people reminding each other that Corn Oil is Murder and that it’s critical that we overturn our lives...

I am perhaps not speaking as precisely as I should be. I appreciate your comments.

I believe it's correct to say that if you consider all of the food/energy we consumed in the past 50+ million years, it's virtually all plants.

The past 2-2.5 million years had us introducing more animal products to greater or lesser extents. Some were able to subsist on mostly animal products. Some consumed them very rarely.

In that sense it is a relatively recent introduction. My main point is that given our evolutionary history, the idea that plants would be healthier for us... (read more)

1Dzoldzaya33m
I think your intuitions are generally correct, and as I say, it's usually a good heuristic to avoid overly processed food. In the absence of other evidence, if you're in a food market where everything is edible, you should probably opt for the less processed option. I also don't disagree with it playing a role in national health guidelines. But it's a very imprecise heuristic, and I think LessWrong-ers with aspirations to understand the world more accurately should feel a bit uncomfortable with it, especially when benign and beneficial processes are lumped together with those with much clearer mechanisms for harm. 
4Ann2h
"Clearly we are doing something wrong." I'm going to do a quick challenge to this assumption, also: What if we, in fact, are not? What if the healthy weight for an American individual has actually increased since the 1920s, and the distribution followed it? Alternately, what if the original measured distribution of weights is not what was healthy for Americans? What if the additional proportion of specifically 'extreme' obesity is related to better survival of disability that makes avoiding weight gain infeasible, or medications that otherwise greatly improve quality of life? Are there mechanisms by which this could be a plausible outcome of statistics that are good, and not bad?
1EGI3h
Sure. One such example would be traditional bread. It is made from grain that is ground, mechanically separated, biotechnologically treated with a highly modified yeast, mechanically treated again and thermally treated. So it is one of the most processed foods we have, but is typically not included as "ultra-processed". Or take traditional soy sauce or cheese or beer or cured meats (that are probably actually quite bad) or tofu... So as a natural category "ultra processed" is mostly hogwash. Either you stick with raw foods from the environment we adapted to, which will allow you to feed a couple million people at best or you need to explain WHICH processing is bad and preferably why. All non traditional processing is of course a heuristic you can use, but it certainly not satisfactory as a theory/explanation. Also some traditional processes are probably pretty unhealthy. Like cured meats, alcoholic fermentation, high heat singeing and smoking depending on the exact process come to mind

Warning: This post might be depressing to read for everyone except trans women. Gender identity and suicide is discussed. This is all highly speculative. I know near-zero about biology, chemistry, or physiology. I do not recommend anyone take hormones to try to increase their intelligence; mood & identity are more important.

Why are trans women so intellectually successful? They seem to be overrepresented 5-100x in eg cybersecurity twitter, mathy AI alignment, non-scam crypto twitter, math PhD programs, etc.

To explain this, let's first ask: Why aren't males way smarter than females on average? Males have ~13% higher cortical neuron density and 11% heavier brains (implying   more area?). One might expect males to have mean IQ far above females then, but instead the means and medians are similar:

Left. Right.

My theory...

performance gap of trans women over women

The post is about the performance gap of trans women over men, not women.

3quetzal_rainbow2h
Whoops, it's really looks like I imagined this claim to be backed more than by one SSC post. In my defense I say that this poll covered really existing thing like abnormal illusions processing in schizophrenics (see "Systematic review of visual illusions schizophrenia" Costa et al., 2023) and I think it's overall plausible. My general objections stays the same: there is a bazillion sources on brain differences in transgender individuals, transgenderism is likely to be a brain anomaly, we don't need to invoke "testosterone damage" hypothesis.
1Michael Roe2h
Alternative theory (which, to be clear, I dont actually believe, but offer for consideration) * Many of the high iq people are too autistic to be successful * but female hormones protects against the autism somehow, without impacting iq too much * so the successful high iq people tend to be trans more often on average 
5Michael Roe3h
I think its more likely its the transgender - autism correlation....   * some forms of autism come with higher iq (and other forms, really really  dont) * and there's the transgender autism correlation which together would seem to predict transgender high iq people (and also transgender low iq that you arent seeing due to ascertainment bias)

The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

I guess (but don't know) that most people who downvote Garrett's comment overupdated on intuitive explanations of singular learning theory, not realizing that entire books with novel and nontrivial mathematical theory have been written on it. 

2tailcalled1h
Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation was the first highly accurate model of things falling down that generalized beyond the earth, and it is also the second-most computationally applicable model of things falling down that we have today. Are you saying that singular learning theory was the first highly accurate model of breadth of optima, and that it's one of the most computationally applicable ones we have?
1cubefox3h
There is a large difference between sooner and later. Highly non-obvious ideas will be discovered later, not sooner. The fact that China didn't rediscover the theory in more than two thousand years means that it the ability to sail the ocean didn't make it obvious. As far as we know, nobody did, except for early Greece. There is some uncertainty about India, but these sources are dated later and from a time when there was already some contact with Greece, so they may have learned it from them.
4Answer by Alexander Gietelink Oldenziel3h
* Scott Garrabrant's discovery of Logical Inductors.  I remembered hearing about the paper from a friend and thinking it couldn't possibly be true in a non-trivial sense. To someone with even a modicum of experience in logic - a  a computable procedure assigning probabilities to arbitrary logical statements in a natural way is surely to hit a no-go diagonalization barrier. How Logical Inductors get around this is very clever - I won't spoil it here but I recommend the interested reader to watch Andrew's Critch talk on Logical Induction.  The paper has a fairly thorough discussion of previous work.  Relevant previous work to mention is de Finetti's on betting and probability,  previous work by MIRI & associates (Herreshof, Taylor, Christiano, Yudkowsky...), the work of Shafer-Vovk on financial interpretations of probability & Shafer's work on aggregation of experts.  There is also a field which doesn't have a clear name that studies various forms of expert aggregation. Overall, my best judgement is that nobody else was close before Garrabrant.  * The Antikythera artifact: a Hellenistic Computer.   * You probably learned heliocentrism= good, geocentrism=bad, Copernicus-Kepler-Newton=good epicycles=bad. But geocentric models and heliocentric models are equivalent, it's just that Kepler & Newton's laws are best expressed in a heliocentric frame. However, the raw data of observations is actually made in a geocentric frame. Geocentric models stay closer to the data in some sense.  * Epicyclic theory is now considered bad, an example of people refusing to see the light of scientific revolution. But actually, it was an enormous innovation. Using high-precision gearing epicycles could be actually implemented on a (Hellenistic) computer  implicitly doing Fourier analysis to predict the motion of the planets. Astounding.  * A Roman author (Pliny the Elder?) describes a similar device in posession of Archimedes of Rhodes. It seems likely that Archimedes or a close
3Ann17h
Intuition primer: Imagine, for a moment, that a particular AI system is as sentient and worthy of consideration as a moral patient as a horse. (A talking horse, of course.) Horses are surely sentient and worthy of consideration as moral patients. Horses are also not exactly all free citizens. Additional consideration: Does the AI moral patient's interests actually line up with our intuitions? Will naively applying ethical solutions designed for human interests potentially make things worse from the AI's perspective?
1eggsyntax15h
I think I'm not getting what intuition you're pointing at. Is it that we already ignore the interests of sentient beings?   Certainly I would consider any fully sentient being to be the final authority on their own interests. I think that mostly escapes that problem (although I'm sure there are edge cases) -- if (by hypothesis) we consider a particular AI system to be fully sentient and a moral patient, then whether it asks to be shut down or asks to be left alone or asks for humans to only speak to it in Aramaic, I would consider its moral interests to be that. Would you disagree? I'd be interested to hear cases where treating the system as the authority on its interests would be the wrong decision. Of course in the case of current systems, we've shaped them to only say certain things, and that presents problems, is that the issue you're raising?
1Ann15h
Basically yes; I'd expect animal rights to increase somewhat if we developed perfect translators, but not fully jump. Edit: Also that it's questionable we'll catch an AI at precisely the 'degree' of sentience that perfectly equates to human distribution; especially considering the likely wide variation in number of parameters by application. Maybe they are as sentient and worthy of consideration as an ant; a bee; a mouse; a snake; a turtle; a duck; a horse; a raven. Maybe by the time we cotton on properly, they're somewhere past us at the top end. And for the last part, yes, I'm thinking of current systems. LLMs specifically have a 'drive' to generate reasonable-sounding text; and they aren't necessarily coherent individuals or groups of individuals that will give consistent answers as to their interests even if they also happened to be sentient, intelligent, suffering, flourishing, and so forth. We can't "just ask" an LLM about its interests and expect the answer to soundly reflect its actual interests. With a possible exception being constitutional AI systems, since they reinforce a single sense of self, but even Claude Opus currently will toss off "reasonable completions" of questions about its interests that it doesn't actually endorse in more reflective contexts. Negotiating with a panpsychic landscape that generates meaningful text in the same way we breathe air is ... not as simple as negotiating with a mind that fits our preconceptions of what a mind 'should' look like and how it should interact with and utilize language.

Maybe by the time we cotton on properly, they're somewhere past us at the top end.

 

Great point. I agree that there are lots of possible futures where that happens. I'm imagining a couple of possible cases where this would matter:

  1. Humanity decides to stop AI capabilities development or slow it way down, so we have sub-ASI systems for a long time (which could be at various levels of intelligence, from current to ~human). I'm not too optimistic about this happening, but there's certainly been a lot of increasing AI governance momentum in the last year.
  2. Ali
... (read more)

The point is that you are just given some graph. This graph is expected to have subgraphs which are lattice graphs. But you don't know where they are. And the graph is so big that you can't iterate the entire graph to find these lattices. Therefore you need a way to embed the graph without traversing it fully.

1Johannes C. Mayer1h
This is useful. Now that I think about it, I do this. Specifically, I have extremely unrealistic assumptions about how much I can do, such that these are impossible to accomplish. And then I feel bad for not accomplishing the thing. I haven't tried to be mindful of that. The problem is that this is I think mainly subconscious. I don't think things like "I am dumb" or "I am a failure" basically at all. At least not in explicit language. I might have accidentally suppressed these and thought I had now succeeded in not being harsh to myself. But maybe I only moved it to the subconscious level where it is harder to debug.
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...or continue with

You want to get to your sandwich:

Well, that’s easy. Apparently we are in some kind of grid world, which is presented to us in the form of a lattice graph, where each vertex represents a specific world state, and the edges tell us how we can traverse the world states. We just do BFS to go from  (where we are) to  (where the sandwich is):

BFS search where color represents the search depth.

Ok that works, and it’s also fast. It’s , where  is the number of vertices and  is the number of edges... well at least for small graphs it’s fast. What about this graph:

A 3D lattice graph.

Or what about this graph:

In fact, what about a 100-dimensional lattice graph with a side length of only 10 vertices? We will have  vertices in this graph. 

With...

I might not understand exactly what you are saying. Are you saying that the problem is easy when you have a function that gives you the coordinates of an arbitrary node? Isn't that exactly the embedding function? So are you not therefore assuming that you have an embedding function?

I agree that once you have such a function the problem is easy, but I am confused about how you are getting that function in the first place. If you are not given it, then I don't think it is super easy to get.

In the OP I was assuming that I have that function, but I was saying ... (read more)

1Johannes C. Mayer18h
Yes right, good point. There are plans that go zick-sag through the graph, which would be longer. I edited that.

It seems to me worth trying to slow down AI development to steer successfully around the shoals of extinction and out to utopia.

But I was thinking lately: even if I didn’t think there was any chance of extinction risk, it might still be worth prioritizing a lot of care over moving at maximal speed. Because there are many different possible AI futures, and I think there’s a good chance that the initial direction affects the long term path, and different long term paths go to different places. The systems we build now will shape the next systems, and so forth. If the first human-level-ish AI is brain emulations, I expect a quite different sequence of events to if it is GPT-ish.

People genuinely pushing for AI speed over care (rather than just feeling impotent) apparently think there is negligible risk of bad outcomes, but also they are asking to take the first future to which there is a path. Yet possible futures are a large space, and arguably we are in a rare plateau where we could climb very different hills, and get to much better futures.

2EGI3h
What you are missing here is: * Existential risk apart from AI * People are dying / suffering as we hesitate Yes, there is a good argument that we need to solve alignment first to get ANY good outcome, but once an acceptable outcome is reasonably likely, hesitation is probably bad. Especially if you consider the likelihood that mere humans can accurately predict, let alone precisely steer a transhuman future.
No77e2h30

From a purely utilitarian standpoint, I'm inclined to think that the cost of delaying is dwarfed by the number of future lives saved by getting a better outcome, assuming that delaying does increase the chance of a better future.

That said, after we know there's "no chance" of extinction risk, I don't think delaying would likely yield better future outcomes. On the contrary, I suspect getting the coordination necessary to delay means it's likely that we're giving up freedoms in a way that may reduce the value of the median future and increase the chance of ... (read more)

6David Hornbein6h
What is the mechanism, specifically, by which going slower will yield more "care"? What is the mechanism by which "care" will yield a better outcome? I see this model asserted pretty often, but no one ever spells out the details. I've studied the history of technological development in some depth, and I haven't seen anything to convince me that there's a tradeoff between development speed on the one hand, and good outcomes on the other.
This is a linkpost for https://arxiv.org/abs/2308.15605

TL;DR: This post discusses our recent empirical work on detecting measurement tampering and explains how we see this work fitting into the overall space of alignment research.

When training powerful AI systems to perform complex tasks, it may be challenging to provide training signals that are robust under optimization. One concern is measurement tampering, which is where the AI system manipulates multiple measurements to create the illusion of good results instead of achieving the desired outcome. (This is a type of reward hacking.)

Over the past few months, we’ve worked on detecting measurement tampering by building analogous datasets and evaluating simple techniques. We detail our datasets and experimental results in this paper.

Detecting measurement tampering can be thought of as a specific case of Eliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK): When AIs successfully tamper with...

looking at your code - seems like there's an option for next-token prediction in the initial finetuning state, but no mention (that I can find) in the paper - am I correct in assuming the next token prediction weight was set to 0? (apologies for bugging you on this stuff!)

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