This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

Eric Neyman10h12-8
1
I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?
I expect large parts of interpretability work could be safely automatable very soon (e.g. GPT-5 timelines) using (V)LM agents; see A Multimodal Automated Interpretability Agent for a prototype.  Notably, MAIA (GPT-4V-based) seems approximately human-level on a bunch of interp tasks, while (overwhelmingly likely) being non-scheming (e.g. current models are bad at situational awareness and out-of-context reasoning) and basically-not-x-risky (e.g. bad at ARA). Given the potential scalability of automated interp, I'd be excited to see plans to use large amounts of compute on it (including e.g. explicit integrations with agendas like superalignment or control; for example, given non-dangerous-capabilities, MAIA seems framable as a 'trusted' model in control terminology).
Elizabeth19h183
0
Check my math: how does Enovid compare to to humming? Nitric Oxide is an antimicrobial and immune booster. Normal nasal nitric oxide is 0.14ppm for women and 0.18ppm for men (sinus levels are 100x higher). journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.117… Enovid is a nasal spray that produces NO. I had the damndest time quantifying Enovid, but this trial registration says 0.11ppm NO/hour. They deliver every 8h and I think that dose is amortized, so the true dose is 0.88. But maybe it's more complicated. I've got an email out to the PI but am not hopeful about a response clinicaltrials.gov/study/NCT05109…   so Enovid increases nasal NO levels somewhere between 75% and 600% compared to baseline- not shabby. Except humming increases nasal NO levels by 1500-2000%. atsjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.116…. Enovid stings and humming doesn't, so it seems like Enovid should have the larger dose. But the spray doesn't contain NO itself, but compounds that react to form NO. Maybe that's where the sting comes from? Cystic fibrosis and burn patients are sometimes given stratospheric levels of NO for hours or days; if the burn from Envoid came from the NO itself than those patients would be in agony.  I'm not finding any data on humming and respiratory infections. Google scholar gives me information on CF and COPD, @Elicit brought me a bunch of studies about honey.   With better keywords google scholar to bring me a bunch of descriptions of yogic breathing with no empirical backing. There are some very circumstantial studies on illness in mouth breathers vs. nasal, but that design has too many confounders for me to take seriously.  Where I'm most likely wrong: * misinterpreted the dosage in the RCT * dosage in RCT is lower than in Enovid * Enovid's dose per spray is 0.5ml, so pretty close to the new study. But it recommends two sprays per nostril, so real dose is 2x that. Which is still not quite as powerful as a single hum. 
keltan4h42
0
A potentially good way to avoid low level criminals scamming your family and friends with a clone of your voice is to set a password that you each must exchange. An extra layer of security might be to make the password offensive, an info hazard, or politically sensitive. Doing this, criminals with little technical expertise will have a harder time bypassing corporate language filters. Good luck getting the voice model to parrot a basic meth recipe!
A tension that keeps recurring when I think about philosophy is between the "view from nowhere" and the "view from somewhere", i.e. a third-person versus first-person perspective—especially when thinking about anthropics. One version of the view from nowhere says that there's some "objective" way of assigning measure to universes (or people within those universes, or person-moments). You should expect to end up in different possible situations in proportion to how much measure your instances in those situations have. For example, UDASSA ascribes measure based on the simplicity of the computation that outputs your experience. One version of the view from somewhere says that the way you assign measure across different instances should depend on your values. You should act as if you expect to end up in different possible future situations in proportion to how much power to implement your values the instances in each of those situations has. I'll call this the ADT approach, because that seems like the core insight of Anthropic Decision Theory. Wei Dai also discusses it here. In some sense each of these views makes a prediction. UDASSA predicts that we live in a universe with laws of physics that are very simple to specify (even if they're computationally expensive to run), which seems to be true. Meanwhile the ADT approach "predicts" that we find ourselves at an unusually pivotal point in history, which also seems true. Intuitively I want to say "yeah, but if I keep predicting that I will end up in more and more pivotal places, eventually that will be falsified". But.... on a personal level, this hasn't actually been falsified yet. And more generally, acting on those predictions can still be positive in expectation even if they almost surely end up being falsified. It's a St Petersburg paradox, basically. Very speculatively, then, maybe a way to reconcile the view from somewhere and the view from nowhere is via something like geometric rationality, which avoids St Petersburg paradoxes. And more generally, it feels like there's some kind of multi-agent perspective which says I shouldn't model all these copies of myself as acting in unison, but rather as optimizing for some compromise between all their different goals (which can differ even if they're identical, because of indexicality). No strong conclusions here but I want to keep playing around with some of these ideas (which were inspired by a call with @zhukeepa). This was all kinda rambly but I think I can summarize it as "Isn't it weird that ADT tells us that we should act as if we'll end up in unusually important places, and also we do seem to be in an incredibly unusually important place in the universe? I don't have a story for why these things are related but it does seem like a suspicious coincidence."

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Epistemic – this post is more suitable for LW as it was 10 years ago

 

Thought experiment with curing a disease by forgetting

Imagine I have a bad but rare disease X. I may try to escape it in the following way:

1. I enter the blank state of mind and forget that I had X.

2. Now I in some sense merge with a very large number of my (semi)copies in parallel worlds who do the same. I will be in the same state of mind as other my copies, some of them have disease X, but most don’t.  

3. Now I can use self-sampling assumption for observer-moments (Strong SSA) and think that I am randomly selected from all these exactly the same observer-moments. 

4. Based on this, the chances that my next observer-moment after...

Presumably in deep meditation people becomes disconnected from reality.

2avturchin2m
Yes it is easy to forget something if it does become a part of your personality. So a new bad thing is easier to forget.
2avturchin4m
The number of poor people is much larger than billionairs. So in most cases you will fail to wake up as a billionaire. But sometimes it will work and it is similar to law of attraction. But formulation via forgetting is more beautiful. You forget that you are poor.
2avturchin12m
I can forget one particular thing, but preserve most of my selfidentification information

Epistemic status: party trick

Why remove the prior

One famed feature of Bayesian inference is that it involves prior probability distributions. Given an exhaustive collection of mutually exclusive ways the world could be (hereafter called ‘hypotheses’), one starts with a sense of how likely the world is to be described by each hypothesis, in the absence of any contingent relevant evidence. One then combines this prior with a likelihood distribution, which for each hypothesis gives the probability that one would see any particular set of evidence, to get a posterior distribution of how likely each hypothesis is to be true given observed evidence. The prior and the likelihood seem pretty different: the prior is looking at the probability of the hypotheses in question, whereas the likelihood is looking at...

I don't see how this helps. You can have a 1:1 prior over the question you're interested in (like U1), however, to compute the likelihood ratios, it seems you would need a joint prior over everything of interest (including LL and E). There are specific cases where you can get a likelihood ratio without a joint prior (such as, likelihood of seeing some coin flips conditional on coin biases) but this doesn't seem like a case where this is feasible.

2Razied6h
Most of the weird stuff involving priors comes into being when you want posteriors over a continuous hypothesis space, where you get in trouble because reparametrizing your space changes the form of your prior, so a uniform "natural" prior is really a particular choice of parametrization. Using a discrete hypothesis space avoids big parts of the problem.
2Richard_Kennaway1h
Only if there is a "natural" discretisation of the hypothesis space. It's fine for coin tosses and die rolls, but if the problem itself is continuous, different discretisations will give the same problems that different continuous parameterisations do. In general, when infinities naturally arise but cause problems, decreeing that everything must be finite does not solve those problems, and introduces problems of its own.
9Jsevillamol10h
I've been tempted to do this sometime, but I fear the prior is performing one very important role you are not making explicit: defining the universe of possible hypothesis you consider. In turn, defining that universe of probabilities defines how bayesian updates look like. Here is a problem that arises when you ignore this: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/R28ppqby8zftndDAM/a-bayesian-aggregation-paradox

I refuse to join any club that would have me as a member.

— Groucho Marx

Alice and Carol are walking on the sidewalk in a large city, and end up together for a while.

"Hi, I'm Alice! What's your name?"

Carol thinks:

If Alice is trying to meet people this way, that means she doesn't have a much better option for meeting people, which reduces my estimate of the value of knowing Alice. That makes me skeptical of this whole interaction, which reduces the value of approaching me like this, and Alice should know this, which further reduces my estimate of Alice's other social options, which makes me even less interested in meeting Alice like this.

Carol might not think all of that consciously, but that's how human social reasoning tends to...

4gjm6h
It looks to me as if, of the four "root causes of social relationships becoming more of a lemon market" listed in the OP, only one is actually anything to do with lemon-market-ness as such. The dynamic in a lemon market is that you have some initial fraction of lemons but it hardly matters what that is because the fraction of lemons quickly increases until there's nothing else, because buyers can't tell what they're getting. It's that last feature that makes the lemon market, not the initial fraction of lemons. And I think three of the four proposed "root causes" are about the initial fraction of lemons, not the difficulty of telling lemons from peaches. * urbanization: this one does seem to fit: it means that the people you're interacting with are much less likely to be ones you already know about, so you can't tell lemons from peaches. * drugs: this one is all about there being more lemons, because some people are addicts who just want to steal your stuff. * MLM schemes: again, this is "more lemons" rather than "less-discernible lemons". * screens: this is about raising the threshold below which any given potential interaction/relationship becomes a lemon (i.e., worse than the available alternative), so again it's "more lemons" not "less-discernible lemons". Note that I'm not saying that "drugs", "MLM", and "screens" aren't causes of increased social isolation, only that if they are the way they're doing it isn't quite by making social interactions more of a lemon market. (I think "screens" plausibly is a cause of increased social isolation. I'm not sure I buy that "drugs" and "MLM" are large enough effects to make much difference, but I could be convinced.) I like the "possible solutions" part of the article better than the section that tries to fit everything into the "lemon market" category, because it engages in more detail with the actual processes involved by actual considering possible scenarios in which acquaintances or friendships begin. When I th
bhauth4m20

You're mistaken about lemon markets: the initial fraction of lemons does matter. The number of lemon cars is fixed, and it imposes a sort of tax on transactions, but if that tax is low enough, it's still worth selling good cars. There's a threshold effect, a point at which most of the good items are suddenly driven out.

People have been posting great essays so that they're "fed through the standard LessWrong algorithm." This essay is in the public domain in the UK but not the US.


From a very early age, perhaps the age of five or six, I knew that when I grew up I should be a writer. Between the ages of about seventeen and twenty-four I tried to abandon this idea, but I did so with the consciousness that I was outraging my true nature and that sooner or later I should have to settle down and write books.

I was the middle child of three, but there was a gap of five years on either side, and I barely saw my father before I was eight. For this and other reasons I...

TL;DR

Tacit knowledge is extremely valuable. Unfortunately, developing tacit knowledge is usually bottlenecked by apprentice-master relationships. Tacit Knowledge Videos could widen this bottleneck. This post is a Schelling point for aggregating these videos—aiming to be The Best Textbooks on Every Subject for Tacit Knowledge Videos. Scroll down to the list if that's what you're here for. Post videos that highlight tacit knowledge in the comments and I’ll add them to the post. Experts in the videos include Stephen Wolfram, Holden Karnofsky, Andy Matuschak, Jonathan Blow, Tyler Cowen, George Hotz, and others. 

What are Tacit Knowledge Videos?

Samo Burja claims YouTube has opened the gates for a revolution in tacit knowledge transfer. Burja defines tacit knowledge as follows:

Tacit knowledge is knowledge that can’t properly be transmitted via verbal or written instruction, like the ability to create

...

Networking, Relationship building, both professional and personal, I'm sure there are overlaps. And echoing another request: Sales

The discussion is:

The difference between EU and US healthcare systems

 

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The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

3Leon Lang2h
I guess (but don't know) that most people who downvote Garrett's comment overupdated on intuitive explanations of singular learning theory, not realizing that entire books with novel and nontrivial mathematical theory have been written on it. 
2tailcalled3h
Newton's Universal Law of Gravitation was the first highly accurate model of things falling down that generalized beyond the earth, and it is also the second-most computationally applicable model of things falling down that we have today. Are you saying that singular learning theory was the first highly accurate model of breadth of optima, and that it's one of the most computationally applicable ones we have?

Did I just say SLT is the Newtonian gravity of deep learning? Hubris of the highest order!

But also yes... I think I am saying that

  • Singular Learning Theory is the first highly accurate model of breath of optima.
    •  SLT tells us to look at a quantity Watanabe calls , which has the highly-technical name 'real log canonical threshold (RLCT). He proves several equivalent ways to describe it one of which is as the (fractal) volume scaling dimension around the optima.
    • By computing simple examples (see Shaowei's guide in the links below) you can check for y
... (read more)
1cubefox4h
There is a large difference between sooner and later. Highly non-obvious ideas will be discovered later, not sooner. The fact that China didn't rediscover the theory in more than two thousand years means that it the ability to sail the ocean didn't make it obvious. As far as we know, nobody did, except for early Greece. There is some uncertainty about India, but these sources are dated later and from a time when there was already some contact with Greece, so they may have learned it from them.

Text of post based on our blog post as a linkpost for the full paper which is considerably longer and more detailed.

Neural networks are trained on data, not programmed to follow rules. We understand the math of the trained network exactly – each neuron in a neural network performs simple arithmetic – but we don't understand why those mathematical operations result in the behaviors we see. This makes it hard to diagnose failure modes, hard to know how to fix them, and hard to certify that a model is truly safe.

Luckily for those of us trying to understand artificial neural networks, we can simultaneously record the activation of every neuron in the network, intervene by silencing or stimulating them, and test the network's response to any possible...

1Rosco-Hunter4h
This was a really interesting paper; however, I was left with one question. Can anyone argue why exactly the model is motivated to learn a much more complex function than the identity map? An auto-encoder whose latent space is much smaller than the input is forced to learn an interesting map; however, I can't see why a highly over-parameterised auto-encoder wouldn't simply learn something close to an identity map. Is it somehow the regularisation or the bias terms? I'd love to hear an argument for why the auto-encoder is likely to learn these mono-semantic features as opposed to an identity map.

It's a sparse autoencoder because part of the loss function is an L1 penalty encouraging sparsity in the hidden layer. Otherwise, it would indeed learn a simple identity map!

This is a linkpost for https://dynomight.net/seed-oil/

A friend has spent the last three years hounding me about seed oils. Every time I thought I was safe, he’d wait a couple months and renew his attack:

“When are you going to write about seed oils?”

“Did you know that seed oils are why there’s so much {obesity, heart disease, diabetes, inflammation, cancer, dementia}?”

“Why did you write about {meth, the death penalty, consciousness, nukes, ethylene, abortion, AI, aliens, colonoscopies, Tunnel Man, Bourdieu, Assange} when you could have written about seed oils?”

“Isn’t it time to quit your silly navel-gazing and use your weird obsessive personality to make a dent in the world—by writing about seed oils?”

He’d often send screenshots of people reminding each other that Corn Oil is Murder and that it’s critical that we overturn our lives...

1Slapstick1h
I would consider most bread sold in stores to be processed or ultra processed and I think that's a pretty standard view but it's true there might be some confusion. I would consider all of those to be processed and unhealthy and I think thats a pretty standard view, but fair enough if there's some confusion around those things. I guess my view is that it's mostly not hogwash? The least healthy things are clearly and broadly much more processed than the healthiest things.
1Slapstick1h
I typically consume my greens with ground flax seeds in a smoothie. I feel very confident that adding refined oil to vegetables shouldn't be considered healthy, in the sense that the opportunity cost of 1 Tablespoon of olive oil is 120 calories, which is over a pound of spinach for example. Certainly it's difficult to eat that much spinach and it's probably unwise, but I just say that to illustrate that you can get a lot more nutrition from 120 calories than the oil will be adding, even if it makes the greens more bioavailable. That said "healthy" is a complicated concept. If adding some oil to greens helps something eat greens they otherwise wouldn't eat for example, that's great.
Ann1h10

Raw spinach in particular also has high levels of oxalic acid, which can interfere with the absorption of other nutrients, and cause kidney stones when binding with calcium. Processing it by cooking can reduce its concentration and impact significantly without reducing other nutrients in the spinach as much.

Grinding and blending foods is itself processing. I don't know what impact it has on nutrition, but mechanically speaking, you can imagine digestion proceeding differently depending on how much of it has already been done.

You do need a certain amount of... (read more)

1Slapstick2h
I am perhaps not speaking as precisely as I should be. I appreciate your comments. I believe it's correct to say that if you consider all of the food/energy we consumed in the past 50+ million years, it's virtually all plants. The past 2-2.5 million years had us introducing more animal products to greater or lesser extents. Some were able to subsist on mostly animal products. Some consumed them very rarely. In that sense it is a relatively recent introduction. My main point is that given our evolutionary history, the idea that plants would be healthier for us than animal products when we have both in abundance, and the idea that plants are more suitable to maintaining health long past reproductive age, aren't immediately/obviously unreasonable ideas.

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