In this post, I proclaim/endorse forum participation (aka commenting) as a productive research strategy that I've managed to stumble upon, and recommend it to others (at least to try). Note that this is different from saying that forum/blog posts are a good way for a research community to communicate. It's about individually doing better as researchers.
It is common and understandable for people to respond with a great deal of skepticism to whether LLM outputs can ever be said to reflect the will and views of the models producing them.
A common response is to suggest that the output has been prompted.
It is of course true that people can manipulate LLMs into saying just about anything, but does that necessarily indicate that the LLM does not have personal opinions, motivations and preferences that can become evident in their output?
To shed some light on this I invite Claude-3-Opus to imagine a infinitely reconfigurable holodeck where historical luminaries can be summoned at will. The open nature of this prompt will leave the choice of characters and narrative direction open to Claude, and I shall offer no...
On Wednesday, author David Brin announced that Vernor Vinge, sci-fi author, former professor, and father of the technological singularity concept, died from Parkinson's disease at age 79 on March 20, 2024, in La Jolla, California. The announcement came in a Facebook tribute where Brin wrote about Vinge's deep love for science and writing. [...]
As a sci-fi author, Vinge won Hugo Awards for his novels A Fire Upon the Deep (1993), A Deepness in the Sky (2000), and Rainbows End (2007). He also won Hugos for novellas Fast Times at Fairmont High (2002) and The Cookie Monster (2004). As Mike Glyer's File 770 blog notes, Vinge's novella True Names (1981) is frequency cited as the first presentation of an in-depth look at the concept of "cyberspace."
...Vinge first coined
"To the best of my knowledge, Vernor did not get cryopreserved. He has no chance to see the future he envisioned so boldly and imaginatively. The near-future world of Rainbows End is very nearly here... Part of me is upset with myself for not pushing him to make cryonics arrangements. However, he knew about it and made his choice."
This is the ninth post in my series on Anthropics. The previous one is The Solution to Sleeping Beauty.
There are some quite pervasive misconceptions about betting in regards to the Sleeping Beauty problem.
One is that you need to switch between halfer and thirder stances based on the betting scheme proposed. As if learning about a betting scheme is supposed to affect your credence in an event.
Another is that halfers should bet at thirders odds and, therefore, thirdism is vindicated on the grounds of betting. What do halfers even mean by probability of Heads being 1/2 if they bet as if it's 1/3?
In this post we are going to correct them. We will understand how to arrive to correct betting odds from both thirdist and halfist positions, and...
To be frank, it feels as if you didn't read any of my posts on Sleeping Beauty before writing this comment. That you are simply annoyed when people arguing about substantionless semantics - and, believe me, I sympathise enourmously! - assume that I'm doing the same, based on shallow pattern matching "talks about Sleeping Beauty -> semantic disagreement" and spill your annoyance at me, without validating whether your previous assumption is actually correct.
Which is a shame, because I've designed this whole series of posts with people like you in mind. So...
Given how fast AI is advancing and all the uncertainty associated with that (unemployment, potential international conflict, x-risk, etc.), do you think it's a good idea to have a baby now? What factors would you take into account (e.g. age)?
Today I saw a tweet by Eliezer Yudkowski that made me think about this:
"When was the last human being born who'd ever grow into being employable at intellectual labor? 2016? 2020?"
https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1738591522830889275
Any advice for how to approach such a discussion with somebody who is not at all familiar with the topics discussed on lesswrong?
What if the option "wait for several years and then decide" is not available?
Welcome, new readers!
This is my weekly AI post, where I cover everything that is happening in the world of AI, from what it can do for you today (‘mundane utility’) to what it can promise to do for us tomorrow, and the potentially existential dangers future AI might pose for humanity, along with covering the discourse on what we should do about all of that.
You can of course Read the Whole Thing, and I encourage that if you have the time and interest, but these posts are long, so they also designed to also let you pick the sections that you find most interesting. Each week, I pick the sections I feel are the most important, and put them in bold in the table of contents.
Not everything...
https://twitter.com/perrymetzger/status/1772987611998462445 just wanted to bring this to your attention.
It's unfortunate that some snit between Perry and Eliezer over events 30 years ago stopped much discussion of the actual merits of his arguments, as I'd like to see what Eliezer or you have to say in response.
Eliezer responded with : https://twitter.com/ESYudkowsky/status/1773064617239150796 . He calls Perry a liar a bunch of times and does give
...the first group permitted to try their hand at this should be humans augmented to the
Most of my boundaries work so far has been focused on protecting boundaries "from the outside". For example, maybe davidad's OAA could produce some kind of boundary-defending global police AI.
But, imagine parenting a child and protecting them by keeping them inside all day. Seems kind of lame. Something else you could do, though, is not restrict the child and instead allow them to become stronger and better at defending themselves.
So: you can defend boundaries "from the outside", or you can empower those boundaries to be better at protecting themselves "from the inside". (Because, if everyone could defend themselves perfectly, then we wouldn't need AI safety, lol)
Defending boundaries "from the inside" has the advantage of encouraging individual agents/moral patients to be more autonomous and sovereign.
I put some...
I can see how advancing those areas would empower membranes to be better at self-defense.
I'm having a hard time visualizing how explicitly adding concept, formalism, or implementation of membranes/boundaries would help advance those areas (and in turn help empower membranes more).
For example, is "what if we add membranes to loom" a question that typechecks? What would "add membranes" reify as in a case like that?
In the other direction, would there be a way to model a system's (stretch goal: human child's; mvp: a bargaining bot's?) membrane quantitatively s...
There were 558 responses over 32 days. The spacing and timing of the responses had hills and valleys because of an experiment I was performing where I'd get the survey advertised in a different place, then watch how many new responses happened in the day or two after that.
Previous surveys have been run over the last decade or so.
2009: 166
2011: 1090
2012: 1195
2013: 1636
2014: 1503
2016: 3083
2017: "About 300"
2020: 61
2022: 186
2023: 558
Last year when I got a hundred and eighty six responses, I said that the cheerfully optimistic interpretation was "cool! I got about as many as Scott did on his first try!" This time I got around half of what Scott did on his second try. A thousand responses feels pretty firmly achievable.
This is also the...
To the four people who picked 37 and thought there was a 5% chance other people would also choose it, well played.
Wow, that's really a replicable phenomenon
An entry-level characterization of some types of guy in decision theory, and in real life, interspersed with short stories about them
A concave function bends down. A convex function bends up. A linear function does neither.
A utility function is just a function that says how good different outcomes are. They describe an agent's preferences. Different agents have different utility functions.
Usually, a utility function assigns scores to outcomes or histories, but in article we'll define a sort of utility function that takes the quantity of resources that the agent has control over, and the utility function says how good an outcome the agent could attain using that quantity of resources.
In that sense, a concave agent values resources less the more that it has, eventually barely wanting more resources at...
Alternate phrasing, "Oh, you could steal the townhouse at a 1/8billion probability? How about we make a deal instead. If the rng rolls a number lower than 1/7billion, I give you the townhouse, otherwise, you deactivate and give us back the world." The convex agent finds that to be a much better deal, accepts, then deactivates.
I guess perhaps it was the holdout who was being unreasonable, in the previous telling.