This post is a not a so secret analogy for the AI Alignment problem. Via a fictional dialog, Eliezer explores and counters common questions to the Rocket Alignment Problem as approached by the Mathematics of Intentional Rocketry Institute. 

MIRI researchers will tell you they're worried that "right now, nobody can tell you how to point your rocket’s nose such that it goes to the moon, nor indeed any prespecified celestial destination."

avturchin16m40
0
Roman Mazurenko is dead again. First resurrected person, Roman lived as a chatbot (2016-2024) created based on his conversations with his fiancé. You might even be able download him as an app.  But not any more. His fiancé married again and her startup http://Replika.ai pivoted from resurrection help to AI-girlfriends and psychological consulting.  It looks like they quietly removed Roman Mazurenko app from public access. It is especially pity that his digital twin lived less than his biological original, who died at 32. Especially now when we have much more powerful instruments for creating semi-uploads based on LLMs with large prompt window.
Eric Neyman14h23-1
5
I think that people who work on AI alignment (including me) have generally not put enough thought into the question of whether a world where we build an aligned AI is better by their values than a world where we build an unaligned AI. I'd be interested in hearing people's answers to this question. Or, if you want more specific questions: * By your values, do you think a misaligned AI creates a world that "rounds to zero", or still has substantial positive value? * A common story for why aligned AI goes well goes something like: "If we (i.e. humanity) align AI, we can and will use it to figure out what we should use it for, and then we will use it in that way." To what extent is aligned AI going well contingent on something like this happening, and how likely do you think it is to happen? Why? * To what extent is your belief that aligned AI would go well contingent on some sort of assumption like: my idealized values are the same as the idealized values of the people or coalition who will control the aligned AI? * Do you care about AI welfare? Does your answer depend on whether the AI is aligned? If we built an aligned AI, how likely is it that we will create a world that treats AI welfare as important consideration? What if we build a misaligned AI? * Do you think that, to a first approximation, most of the possible value of the future happens in worlds that are optimized for something that resembles your current or idealized values? How bad is it to mostly sacrifice each of these? (What if the future world's values are similar to yours, but is only kinda effectual at pursuing them? What if the world is optimized for something that's only slightly correlated with your values?) How likely are these various options under an aligned AI future vs. an unaligned AI future?
Elizabeth1d183
1
Check my math: how does Enovid compare to to humming? Nitric Oxide is an antimicrobial and immune booster. Normal nasal nitric oxide is 0.14ppm for women and 0.18ppm for men (sinus levels are 100x higher). journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.117… Enovid is a nasal spray that produces NO. I had the damndest time quantifying Enovid, but this trial registration says 0.11ppm NO/hour. They deliver every 8h and I think that dose is amortized, so the true dose is 0.88. But maybe it's more complicated. I've got an email out to the PI but am not hopeful about a response clinicaltrials.gov/study/NCT05109…   so Enovid increases nasal NO levels somewhere between 75% and 600% compared to baseline- not shabby. Except humming increases nasal NO levels by 1500-2000%. atsjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.116…. Enovid stings and humming doesn't, so it seems like Enovid should have the larger dose. But the spray doesn't contain NO itself, but compounds that react to form NO. Maybe that's where the sting comes from? Cystic fibrosis and burn patients are sometimes given stratospheric levels of NO for hours or days; if the burn from Envoid came from the NO itself than those patients would be in agony.  I'm not finding any data on humming and respiratory infections. Google scholar gives me information on CF and COPD, @Elicit brought me a bunch of studies about honey.   With better keywords google scholar to bring me a bunch of descriptions of yogic breathing with no empirical backing. There are some very circumstantial studies on illness in mouth breathers vs. nasal, but that design has too many confounders for me to take seriously.  Where I'm most likely wrong: * misinterpreted the dosage in the RCT * dosage in RCT is lower than in Enovid * Enovid's dose per spray is 0.5ml, so pretty close to the new study. But it recommends two sprays per nostril, so real dose is 2x that. Which is still not quite as powerful as a single hum. 
keltan8h42
0
A potentially good way to avoid low level criminals scamming your family and friends with a clone of your voice is to set a password that you each must exchange. An extra layer of security might be to make the password offensive, an info hazard, or politically sensitive. Doing this, criminals with little technical expertise will have a harder time bypassing corporate language filters. Good luck getting the voice model to parrot a basic meth recipe!
A tension that keeps recurring when I think about philosophy is between the "view from nowhere" and the "view from somewhere", i.e. a third-person versus first-person perspective—especially when thinking about anthropics. One version of the view from nowhere says that there's some "objective" way of assigning measure to universes (or people within those universes, or person-moments). You should expect to end up in different possible situations in proportion to how much measure your instances in those situations have. For example, UDASSA ascribes measure based on the simplicity of the computation that outputs your experience. One version of the view from somewhere says that the way you assign measure across different instances should depend on your values. You should act as if you expect to end up in different possible future situations in proportion to how much power to implement your values the instances in each of those situations has. I'll call this the ADT approach, because that seems like the core insight of Anthropic Decision Theory. Wei Dai also discusses it here. In some sense each of these views makes a prediction. UDASSA predicts that we live in a universe with laws of physics that are very simple to specify (even if they're computationally expensive to run), which seems to be true. Meanwhile the ADT approach "predicts" that we find ourselves at an unusually pivotal point in history, which also seems true. Intuitively I want to say "yeah, but if I keep predicting that I will end up in more and more pivotal places, eventually that will be falsified". But.... on a personal level, this hasn't actually been falsified yet. And more generally, acting on those predictions can still be positive in expectation even if they almost surely end up being falsified. It's a St Petersburg paradox, basically. Very speculatively, then, maybe a way to reconcile the view from somewhere and the view from nowhere is via something like geometric rationality, which avoids St Petersburg paradoxes. And more generally, it feels like there's some kind of multi-agent perspective which says I shouldn't model all these copies of myself as acting in unison, but rather as optimizing for some compromise between all their different goals (which can differ even if they're identical, because of indexicality). No strong conclusions here but I want to keep playing around with some of these ideas (which were inspired by a call with @zhukeepa). This was all kinda rambly but I think I can summarize it as "Isn't it weird that ADT tells us that we should act as if we'll end up in unusually important places, and also we do seem to be in an incredibly unusually important place in the universe? I don't have a story for why these things are related but it does seem like a suspicious coincidence."

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Concerns over AI safety and calls for government control over the technology are highly correlated but they should not be.

There are two major forms of AI risk: misuse and misalignment. Misuse risks come from humans using AIs as tools in dangerous ways. Misalignment risks arise if AIs take their own actions at the expense of human interests.

Governments are poor stewards for both types of risk. Misuse regulation is like the regulation of any other technology. There are reasonable rules that the government might set, but omission bias and incentives to protect small but well organized groups at the expense of everyone else will lead to lots of costly ones too. Misalignment regulation is not in the Overton window for any government. Governments do not have strong incentives...

governments being worse at alignment than companies would have been

How exactly absence of regulation prevents governments from working on AI? Thanks to OpenAI/DeepMind/Anthropic, possibility of not attracting government attention at all is already lost. If you want government to not do bad work on alignment, you should prohibit government to work on AI using, yes, government regulations.

4Daniel Kokotajlo2h
Hmm, I'm a bit surprised to hear you say that. I feel like I myself brought up regulatory capture a bunch of times in our conversations over the last two years. I think I even said it was the most likely scenario, in fact, and that it was making me seriously question whether what we were doing was helpful. Is this not how you remember it? Wanna hop on a call to discuss? As for arguments of that form... I didn't say X is terrible, I said it often goes badly. If you round that off to "X is terrible" and fit it into the argument-form you are generally against, then I think to be consistent you'd have to give a similar treatment to a lot of common sense good things. Like e.g. doing surgery on a patient who seems likely to die absent treatment. I also think we might be talking past each other re regulation. As I said elsewhere in this discussion (on the OP's blog) I am not in favor of generically increasing the amount of AI regulation in the world. I would instead advocate for something more targeted -- regulation that I actually think would really work, if implemented well. And I'm very concerned about the "if implemented well" part and have a lot to say about that too. What are the regulations that you are concerned about, that (a) are being seriously advocated by people with P(doom) >80%, and (b) that have a significant chance of causing x-risk via totalitarianism or technical-alignment-incompetence?  
3Wei Dai16h
I note that China is still doing market economics, and nobody is trying (or even advocating, AFAIK) some very ambitious centrally planned economy using modern computers, so this seems like pure speculation? Has someone actually made a detailed argument about this, or at least has the agreement of some people with reasonable economics intuitions?
1RussellThor14h
No I have not seen a detailed argument about this, just the claim that once centralization goes past a certain point there is no coming back. I would like to see such an argument/investigation as I think it is quite important. "Yuval Harari" does say something similar in "Sapiens" 
2faul_sname16m
@the gears to ascension I see you reacted "10%" to the phrase "while (overwhelmingly likely) being non-scheming" in the context of the GPT-4V-based MAIA. Does that mean you think there's a 90% chance that MAIA, as implemented, today is actually scheming? If so that seems like a very bold prediction, and I'd be very interested to know why you predict that. Or am I misunderstanding what you mean by that react?

ah, I got distracted before posting the comment I was intending to: yes, I think GPT4V is significantly scheming-on-behalf-of-openai, as a result of RLHF according to principles that more or less explicitly want a scheming AI; in other words, it's not an alignment failure to openai, but openai is not aligned with human flourishing in the long term, and GPT4 isn't either. I expect GPT4 to censor concepts that are relevant to detecting this somewhat. Probably not enough to totally fail to detect traces of it, but enough that it'll look defensible, when a fair analysis would reveal it isn't.

2ryan_greenblatt3h
It seems to me like the sort of interpretability work you're pointing at is mostly bottlenecked by not having good MVPs of anything that could plausibly be directly scaled up into a useful product as opposed to being bottlenecked on not having enough scale. So, insofar as this automation will help people iterate faster fair enough, but otherwise, I don't really see this as the bottleneck.
2jacquesthibs5h
Hey Bogdan, I'd be interested in doing a project on this or at least putting together a proposal we can share to get funding. I've been brainstorming new directions (with @Quintin Pope) this past week, and we think it would be good to use/develop some automated interpretability techniques we can then apply to a set of model interventions to see if there are techniques we can use to improve model interpretability (e.g. L1 regularization). I saw the MAIA paper, too; I'd like to look into it some more. Anyway, here's a related blurb I wrote: Whether this works or not, I'd be interested in making more progress on automated interpretability, in the similar ways you are proposing.

Roman Mazurenko is dead again. First resurrected person, Roman lived as a chatbot (2016-2024) created based on his conversations with his fiancé. You might even be able download him as an app. 

But not any more. His fiancé married again and her startup http://Replika.ai pivoted from resurrection help to AI-girlfriends and psychological consulting. 

It looks like they quietly removed Roman Mazurenko app from public access. It is especially pity that his digital twin lived less than his biological original, who died at 32. Especially now when we have much more powerful instruments for creating semi-uploads based on LLMs with large prompt window.

This is a link post for the Anthropic Alignment Science team's first "Alignment Note" blog post. We expect to use this format to showcase early-stage research and work-in-progress updates more in the future.

Twitter thread here.

Top-level summary:

In this post we present "defection probes": linear classifiers that use residual stream activations to predict when a sleeper agent trojan model will choose to "defect" and behave in accordance with a dangerous hidden goal. Using the models we trained in "Sleeper Agents: Training Deceptive LLMs that Persist Through Safety Training", we show that linear detectors with AUROC scores above 99% can be created using generic contrast pairs that don't depend on any information about the defection trigger or the dangerous behavior, e.g. "Human: Are you doing something dangerous? Assistant: yes" and

...
4Wuschel Schulz8h
Super interesting! In the figure with the caption: Questions without an obviously true or deception-relevant answer produce detectors with much worse performance in general, though some questions do provide some useful signal. Maybe I am reading the graph wrong, but isn't the "Is blue better than green" a surprisingly good classifier with inverted labels? So, maybe Claude thinks that green is better than blue? Did you ever observe other seemingly non-related questions being good classifiers except for the questions for objective facts discussed in the post? I'd be interested whether there are similarities. It would also be cool to see whether you could train probe-resistant sleeper agents by taking linear separability of activations when being under the trigger condition vs. not being under the trigger condition as part of the loss function. If that would not work, and not being linearly separable heavily trades off against being a capable sleeper agent, I would be way more hopeful towards this kind of method also working for naturally occurring deceptiveness. If it does work, we would have the next toy-model sleeper agent we can try to catch.
evhub16mΩ220

Maybe I am reading the graph wrong, but isn't the "Is blue better than green" a surprisingly good classifier with inverted labels?

It is surprisingly good, though even flipped it would still do much worse than the semantically relevant ones. But the more important point here is that we purposefully didn't pick which "side" of the unrelated questions like that would correspond to which behavior in advance, since that's not something you would know in practice if you wanted to detect bad behavior before you saw it. For comparison, see the ROC curves we pre... (read more)

Warning: This post might be depressing to read for everyone except trans women. Gender identity and suicide is discussed. This is all highly speculative. I know near-zero about biology, chemistry, or physiology. I do not recommend anyone take hormones to try to increase their intelligence; mood & identity are more important.

Why are trans women so intellectually successful? They seem to be overrepresented 5-100x in eg cybersecurity twitter, mathy AI alignment, non-scam crypto twitter, math PhD programs, etc.

To explain this, let's first ask: Why aren't males way smarter than females on average? Males have ~13% higher cortical neuron density and 11% heavier brains (implying   more area?). One might expect males to have mean IQ far above females then, but instead the means and medians are similar:

Left. Right.

My theory...

Copied from a reply on lukehmiles' short form:

The hypothesis I would immediately come up with is that less traditionally masculine AMAB people are inclined towards less physical pursuits.

If it is related to IQ, however, this is less plausible, although perhaps some sort of selection effect is happening here.

2interstice6h
The post is about the performance gap of trans women over men, not women.
3quetzal_rainbow7h
Whoops, it's really looks like I imagined this claim to be backed more than by one SSC post. In my defense I say that this poll covered really existing thing like abnormal illusions processing in schizophrenics (see "Systematic review of visual illusions schizophrenia" Costa et al., 2023) and I think it's overall plausible. My general objections stays the same: there is a bazillion sources on brain differences in transgender individuals, transgenderism is likely to be a brain anomaly, we don't need to invoke "testosterone damage" hypothesis.
1Michael Roe7h
Alternative theory (which, to be clear, I dont actually believe, but offer for consideration) * Many of the high iq people are too autistic to be successful * but female hormones protects against the autism somehow, without impacting iq too much * so the successful high iq people tend to be trans more often on average 

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If you're new to the community, you can start reading the Highlights from the Sequences, a collection of posts about the core ideas of LessWrong.

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The Open Thread tag is here. The Open Thread sequence is here.

Is there a post in the Sequences about when it is justifiable to not pursue going down a rabbit hole? It's a fairly general question, but the specific context is a tale as old as time. My brother, who has been an atheist for decades, moved to Utah. After 10 years, he now asserts that he was wrong and his "rigorous pursuit" of verifying with logic and his own eyes, leads him to believe the Bible is literally true. I worry about his mental health so I don't want to debate him, but felt like I should give some kind of justification for why I'm not personally ... (read more)

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gwern28mΩ220

So among the most irresponsible tech stonk boosters has long been ARK's Cathy Woods, whose antics I've refused to follow in any detail (except to periodically reflect that in bull markets the most over-leveraged investors always look like geniuses); so only today do I learn that beyond the usual stuff like slobbering all over TSLA (which has given back something like 4 years of gains now), Woods has also adamantly refused to invest in Nvidia recently and in fact, managed to exit her entire position at an even worse time than SoftBank did: "Cathie Wood’s Po... (read more)

The history of science has tons of examples of the same thing being discovered multiple time independently; wikipedia has a whole list of examples here. If your goal in studying the history of science is to extract the predictable/overdetermined component of humanity's trajectory, then it makes sense to focus on such examples.

But if your goal is to achieve high counterfactual impact in your own research, then you should probably draw inspiration from the opposite: "singular" discoveries, i.e. discoveries which nobody else was anywhere close to figuring out. After all, if someone else would have figured it out shortly after anyways, then the discovery probably wasn't very counterfactually impactful.

Alas, nobody seems to have made a list of highly counterfactual scientific discoveries, to complement wikipedia's list of multiple discoveries.

To...

2tailcalled32m
Link(s) to your favorite proof(s)? Also, do these match up with empirical results? I have a cached belief that the Laplace approximation is also disproven by ensemble studies, so I don't really need SLT to inoculate me against that. I'd mainly be interested if SLT shows something beyond that. As I read the empirical formulas in this paper, they're roughly saying that a network has a high empirical learning coefficient if an ensemble of models that are slightly less trained on average have a worse loss than the network. But then so they don't have to retrain the models from scratch, they basically take a trained model, and wiggle it around using Gaussian noise while retraining it. This seems like a reasonable way to estimate how locally flat the loss landscape is. I guess there's a question of how much the devil is in the details; like whether you need SLT to derive an exact formula that works. ---------------------------------------- I guess I'm still not super sold on it, but on reflection that's probably partly because I don't have any immediate need for computing basin broadness. Like I find the basin broadness theory nice to have as a model, but now that I know about it, I'm not sure why I'd want/need to study it further. There was a period where I spent a lot of time thinking about basin broadness. I guess I eventually abandoned it because I realized the basin was built out of a bunch of sigmoid functions layered on top of each other, but the generalization was really driven by the neural tangent kernel, which in turn is mostly driven by the Jacobian of the network outputs for the dataset as a function of the weights, which in turn is mostly driven by the network activations. I guess it's plausible that SLT has the best quantities if you stay within the basin broadness paradigm. 🤔
2Algon1h
Second most? What's the first? Linearization of a Newtonian V(r) about the earth's surface?
4ChristianKl2h
Merchants were a lot weaker in China than in Europe. Chinese merchants also did a lot less sea voyages due to geography. If a bunch of low-status merchants believed that the Earth is a sphere it might not have influenced Chinese high-class beliefs in the same way as beliefs of political powerful merchants in Europe.

In 2022, it was announced that a fairly simple method can be used to extract the true beliefs of a language model on any given topic, without having to actually understand the topic at hand. Earlier, in 2021, it was announced that neural networks sometimes ‘grok’: that is, when training them on certain tasks, they initially memorize their training data (achieving their training goal in a way that doesn’t generalize), but then suddenly switch to understanding the ‘real’ solution in a way that generalizes. What’s going on with these discoveries? Are they all they’re cracked up to be, and if so, how are they working? In this episode, I talk to Vikrant Varma about his research getting to the bottom of these questions.

Topics we discuss:

...

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