More precisely, though, I thought the subject was worth your consideration, because I hadn't seen you in decision theory discussion. (Sorry, I don't mean to be or come across as defensive here. I'm a little surprised your model of me doesn't predict me asking those as trick questions. But only a little.)

Re deeper problems, there are metaphysical problems that are deeper and should be obvious, but the tack I wanted to take was purely epistemological, such that there's less wiggle room. Many people reject UDT because "values shouldn't affect anticipatio... (read more)

Compensating over duplicitous behavior in models can tend to clog up simulations and lead to processing halting.

I generally would take all statements as reflective of exactly what some one means if at all possible.

Its also great fun to short circuit sarcasm in a similar way.

This post is for sacrificing my credibility!

by Will_Newsome 1 min read2nd Jun 2012347 comments


Thank you for your cooperation and understanding. Don't worry, there won't be future posts like this, so you don't have to delete my LessWrong account, and anyway I could make another, and another.

But since you've dared to read this far:

Credibility. Should you maximize it, or minimize it? Have I made an error?


Don't be shallow, don't just consider the obvious points. Consider that I've thought about this for many, many hours, and that you don't have any privileged information. Whence our disagreement, if one exists?