So the second factor is that most people are rational enough for their own purposes. Oh, they go on wild flights of fancy when discussing politics or religion or philosophy, but when it comes to business they suddenly become cold and calculating. This relates to Robin Hanson on Near and Far modes of thinking. Near Mode thinking is actually pretty good at a lot of things, and Near Mode thinking is the thinking whose accuracy gives us practical benefits.
Seems to me that most of us make predictably dumb decisions in quite a variety of contexts, and that by becoming extra bonus sane (more sane/rational than your average “intelligent science-literate person without formal rationalist training”), we really should be able to do better.
Some examples of the “predictably dumb decisions” that an art of rationality should let us improve on:
I don't think you need the art of rationality much for that stuff. I think just being reminded is almost as good, if not better. Who do you think would do better on them: someone who read all of LW/OB except this post, or someone who read this post only? Now consider that reading all of LW/OB would take at least 256 times longer.
Learning about rationality won't necessarily help you realize where you're being irrational. If you've got a general method for doing that, I'd be interested, but I don't think it's been discussed much on this blog.
Don't try this on a date! (no lukeprog allowed)
Why not? Lukeprog's mistake, assuming you're talking about what I think you're talking about, seems to have been quite the opposite of trying to explain the benefits of an option from the other person's point of view:
So I broke up with Alice over a long conversation that included an hour-long primer on evolutionary psychology in which I explained how natural selection had built me to be attracted to certain features that she lacked.
I imagine he'd have had better luck, or at least not become the butt of quite so many relationship jokes on LW, if he'd gone with something like "you deserve someone who appreciates you better". Notice that from Alice's perspective, this describes exactly the same situation -- but in terms of what it means to her.
Imagine a world where the only way to become really rich is to win the lottery (and everybody is either risk averse or at least risk neutral). With an expected return of less than $1 per $1 spent on tickets, rational people don't buy lottery tickets. Only irrational people do that. As a result, all the really rich people in this world must be irrational.
In other words, it is possible to have situations where being rational increases your expected performance, but at the same time reduces your changes of being a super achiever. Thus, the claim that "rationalists should win" is not necessarily true, even in theory, if "winning" is taken to mean being among the top performers. A more accurate statement would be, "In a world with both rational and irrational agents, the rational agents should perform better on average than the population average."
There's an extent to which we live in such a world. Many people believe you can achieve your wildest dreams if you only try hard enough, because by golly, all those people on the TV did it!
But many poor/middle-class people also believe that they can never become rich (except for the lottery) because the only ways to become rich are crime, fraud, or inheritance. And this leads them to underestimate the value of hard work, education, and risk-taking.
The median rationalist will perform better than these cynics. But his average wealth will also be higher, assuming he accurately observes his chances at becoming succesful.
And this is why I am not so impressed by Eliezer's claim that an x-rationality instructor should be successful in their non-rationality life. Yes, there probably are some x-rationalists who will also be successful people. But again, correlation 0.1. Stop saying only practically successful people could be good x-rationality teachers! Stop saying we need to start having huge real-life victories or our art is useless! Stop calling x-rationality the Art of Winning! Stop saying I must be engaged in some sort of weird signalling effort for saying I'm here because I like mental clarity instead of because I want to be the next Bill Gates! It trivializes the very virtues that brought most of us to Overcoming Bias, and replaces them with what sounds a lot like a pitch for some weird self-help cult...
I think the truth is non-symmetrical: rationalism is the art of not failing, of not being stupid. I agree with you that "rationalists should win big" is not true in the sense Eliezer claims. However, rationalists should be generally above average by virtue of never failing big, never losing too much, e.g. not buying every vitamin at the health food store, not in cults, not bemoaning ancient relationships, etc.
I'm not sure if it was your intent to point this out by contrast, but I would like to point out that a reasonable art of "kicking" would not rely on you making conscious decisions, let alone explicitly rational ones. Rather, it would rely on you ensuring that your subconscious has been freed from sources of bias ahead of time, and is therefore able to safely leap to conclusions in its usual fashion. An art that requires you to think at the time things are actually happening is not much of an art.
Case in point: when reading "Stuck In The Middle With Bruce", I became aware of a subconsciously self-sabotaging behavior I'd done recently. So I "kicked" it out by crosslinking the behavior with its goal-satisfaction state. It would be crazy to wait until the next occasion for that behavior to strike, and then try to reason my way around it, when I can just fix the bloody thing in the first place. (Interestingly, I mentioned the story to my wife, and described how it related to my own behavior... and she thought of a different sort of self-sabotage she was doing, and applied the same mindhack. So, as of now, I'd say that story was one of the top 5 most ...
I voted this up, but I'm replying because I think it's a critical point.
Our brains are NOT designed to make conscious decisions about every thing that crosses our path. Trying to do that is like trying to walk everywhere instead of driving: it's technically possible, but it will take you forever and will be exhausting.
Our brains seem to work more like this: our brains process whatever it is we're doing at the time, and then feed that processed data into our subconscious for use later. Sure it jumps in every once in a while for something important, but generally it sits back and lets your subconscious do the driving.
Rationality should be about putting the best processed information down into your subconscious, so it works the way you'd like it too. Trying to do everything consciously is a poor use of your brain, as it 1) ignores the way your brain is designed to function and 2) forgoes the use of the powerful subconscious circuitry that makes up an enormous part of it.
What does "crosslinking the behavior with its goal-satisfaction state" mean? Specifically, I'm unable to guess what you mean by "crosslinking" and "the goal-satisfaction state" (of a behavior).
The fact that everything I can find on the web carefully avoids giving details and instead takes the form "We have these fantastic techniques that can solve most of your problems; sign up for our seminars and we'll teach them to you" is ... not promising.
Promising the world, giving few details, and insisting on being paid before saying anything more, seems to me to be strongly correlated with dishonesty and cultishness. Since pjeby seems like a valuable member of this community, I hope this case happens to be different; but I'd like to see some evidence.
And for this post, I use "benefits" or "practical benefits" to mean anything not relating to philosophy, truth, winning debates, or a sense of personal satisfaction from understanding things better. Money, status, popularity, and scientific discovery all count.
In my life, I've used rationality to tackle some pretty tough practical problems. The type of rationality I have been successful with hasn't been the debiasing program of Overcoming Bias, yet I have been employing scientific thinking, induction, and heuristic to certain problems in ways that are atypical for the category of people you are calling normal rationalists. I don't know whether to call this "x-rationality" or not, partly because I'm not sure the boundaries between rationality and x-rationality are always obvious, but it's certainly more advanced rationality than what people usually apply in the domains below.
On a general level, I've been studying how to get good (or at least, dramatically better) at things. Here are some areas where I've been successful using rationality:
I am highly familiar with the seduction community, and I've learned a lot from it. It's like extra-systemized folk psychology. It has certain elements of a scientific community, yet it is vulnerable to ideologies developing out of:
(a) bastardized versions of evolutionary psychology being thrown around like the proven truth, often leading to cynical and overgeneralized views of female behavior and preferences and/or overly narrow views of what works,
(b) financial biases,
(c) lack of rigor, because controlled experiments are not yet possible in this field (though I would never suggest that people wait until science catches up and gives us rigorous empirical knowledge before trying to improve their dating lives... who knows how long we will have to wait).
Yet there is promise for the community, because it's beholden to real world results. Its descriptions and prescriptions seems to have been improving, and it has gone through a couple paradigm shirts since the mid 80's.
Or from the general OB/LW picture, where inference is a thing that happens in material systems, and that yields true conclusions, when it does, for non-mysterious reasons that we can investigate and can troubleshoot?
One problem with interfacing formal/mathematical rationality with any "art that works", whether it's self-help or dating, is that when people are involved, there are feed-forward and feed-back effects, similar to Newcomb's problem, in a sense. What you predict will happen makes a difference to the outcome.
One of the recent paradigm shifts that's been happening in the last few years in the "seduction community" is the realization that using routines and patterns leads to state-dependence: that is, to a guy's self-esteem depending on the reactions of the women he's talked to on a given night. This has led to the rise of the "natural" movement: copying the beliefs and mindsets of guys who are naturally good with women, rather than the external behaviors of guys who are good with women.
Now, I'm not actually involved in the community; I'm quite happily married. However, I pay attention to developments in that field because it has huge over...
I'm not sure it's about being an epistemic vs. an instrumental rationalist, vs. about tagging your words so we follow what you mean.
Both people interested in deep truths, and people interested in immediate practical mileage, can make use of both "true models" and "models that are pragmatically useful but that probably aren't fully true".
You know how a map of north America gives you good guidance for inferences about where cities are, and yet you shouldn't interpret its color scheme as implying that the land mass of Canada is uniformly purple? Different kinds of models/maps are built to allow different kinds of conclusions to be drawn. Models come with implicit or explicit use-guidelines. And the use-guidelines of “scientific generalizations that have been established for all humans” are different than the use-guidelines of “pragmatically useful self-models, whose theoretical components haven’t been carefully and separately tested”. Mistake the latter for the former, and you’ll end up concluding that Canada is purple.
When you try to share techniques with LW, and LW balks... part of the problem is that most of us LW-ers aren’t as practiced in contact-with-th...
One common theme is recognizing when your theories aren't working and updating in light of new evidence. Many people are so sure that their beliefs about what 'should' work when it comes to dating are correct that they will keep trying and failing without ever considering that maybe their underlying theory is wrong. A common exercise used in the community to break out of these incorrect beliefs is to force yourself to go out and try things that 'can't possibly work' 10 times in a day, and then every day for a week or a month, until the false belief is banished.
I actually think the LW crowd could learn something from this approach - sometimes all the argument in the world is not as convincing as repeated confrontations with real world results. When it comes to changing behaviour (a key aspect of allowing rationality to improve results in our lives), rational argument is not usually the most effective technique. Rational argument may establish the need for change and the pattern for new behaviour but the most effective way to change behavioural habits is to just start consciously doing the new behaviour until it becomes a habit.
In any rational art of dating in which I would be interested, "winning" would be defined to include, indeed to require, respect for the happiness, well-being, and autonomy of the pursued. I don't know enough about these sub-communities to say whether they share that concern -- what is the impression you've gotten?
roland:
So you have to be aware that there is a fundamental difference in the objectives of the two which will make it extremely difficult or impossible to make BOTH happy at the same time.
ciphergoth:
my experience very much contradicts what you say here.
That's because it's a great example of theory being used to persuade people to take a certain set of "actions that work". There are other theories that contradict those theories, that are used to get other people to take action... even though the specific actions taken may be quite similar!
People self-select their schools of dating and self-help based on what theories appeal to them, not on the actual actions those schools recommend taking. ;-)
In this case, the theory roland is talking about isn't theory at all: it's a sales pitch, that attracts people who feel that dating is an unfair situation. They like what they hear, and they want to hear more. So they read more and maybe buy a product. The writer or speaker then gradually moves from this ev-psych "hook" to other theories that guide the reader to take the actions the author recommends.
That people confuse these sales pitches with actual theory is...
If in 1660 you'd asked the first members of the Royal Society to list the ways in which natural philosophy had tangibly improved their lives, you probably wouldn't have gotten a very impressive list.
Looking over history, you would not have found any tendency for successful people to have made a formal study of natural philosophy.
It would be overconfident for me to say rationality could never become useful. My point is just that we are acting like it's practically useful right now, without very much evidence for this beyond our hopes and dreams. Thus my last sentence - that "crossing the Pacific" isn't impossible, but it's going to take a different level of effort.
If in 1660, Robert Boyle had gone around saying that, now that we knew Boyle's Law of gas behavior, we should be able to predict the weather, and that that was the only point of discovering Boyle's Law and that furthermore we should never trust a so-called chemist or physicist except insofar as he successfully predicted the weather - then I think the Royal Society would be making the same mistake we are.
Boyle's Law is sort of helpful in understanding the weather, sort of. But it's step one of ten million steps, used alone it doesn't work nearly as well as just eyeballing the weather and looking for patterns, and any attempt to judge applicants to the Royal Society on their weather prediction abilities would have excluded some excellent scientists. Any attempt to restrict gas physics itself to things that were directly helpful in predicti...
I'm confused about this article. I agree with most you've said, but I'm not sure the point is exactly. I thought the entire premise of this community was that more is possible, but we're only "less wrong" at the moment. I didn't think there was any promise of results for the current state of the art. Is this post a warning, or am I overlooking this trend?
I agree we shouldn't see x-rationality as practically useful now. You don't rule out rationality becoming the superpower Eliezer portrays in his fiction. That is certainly a long ways off. Boyle's Law and weather prediction is an apt analogy. Just trying harder to apply our current knowledge won't go very far, but there should be some productive avenues.
I think I'd understand your purpose better if you could answer these questions: In your mind, how likely is it that x-rationality could be practically useful in, say, 50 years? What approaches are most likely to get us to a useful practice of rationality? Or is your point that any advances that are made will be radically different from our current lines of investigation?
Just trying to understand.
The above would be component 1 of my own reply.
Component 2 would be (to say it again) that I developed the particular techniques that are to be found in my essays, in the course of solving my problem. And if you were to try to attack that or a similar problem you would suddenly find many more OB posts to be of immensely greater use and indeed necessity. The Eliezer of 2000 and earlier was not remotely capable of getting his job done.
What you're seeing here is the backwash of techniques that seem like they ought to have some general applicability (e.g. Crisis of Faith) but which are not really a whole developed rationalist art, nor made for the purpose of optimizing everyday life.
Someone faced with the epic Challenge Of Changing Their Mind may use the full-fledged Crisis of Faith technique once that year. How much benefit is this really? That's the question, but I'm not sure the cynical answer is the right one.
What I am hoping to see here is others, having been given a piece of the art, taking that art and extending it to cover their own problems, then coming back and describing what they've learned in a sufficiently general sense (informed by relevant science) that I can actually absorb it. For that which has been developed to address e.g. akrasia outside the rationalist line, I have found myself unable to absorb.
But you're not a good test case to see whether rationality is useful in everyday life. Your job description is to fully understand and then create a rational and moral agent. This is the exceptional case where the fuzzy philosophical benefits of rationality suddenly become practical.
One of the fundamental lessons of Overcoming Bias was "All this stuff philosophers have been debating fruitlessly for centuries actually becomes a whole lot clearer when we consider it in terms of actually designing a mind." This isn't surprising; you're the first person who's really gotten to use Near Mode thought on a problem previously considered only in Far Mode. So you've been thinking "Here's this nice practical stuff about thinking that's completely applicable to my goal of building a thinking machine", and we've been thinking, "Oh, wow, this helps solve all of these complicated philosophical issues we've been worrying about for so long."
But in other fields, the rationality is domain-specific and already exists, albeit without the same thunderbolt of enlightenment and awesomeness. Doctors, for example, have a tremendous literature on evidence and decision-making as t...
An x-rationalist who becomes a doctor would not, I think, necessarily be a significantly better doctor than the rest of the medical world, because the rest of the medical world already has an overabundance of great rationality techniques and methods of improving care that the majority of doctors just don't use
Evidence-based medicine was developed by x-rationalists. And to this day, many doctors ignore it because they are not x-rationalists.
...huh. That comment was probably more helpful than you expected it to be. I'm pretty sure I've identified part of my problem as having too high a standard for what makes an x-rationalist. If you let the doctors who developed evidence-based medicine in...yes, that clears a few things up.
One thinks particularly of Robyn Dawes - I don't know him from "evidence-based medicine" per se, but I know he was fighting the battle to get doctors to acknowledge that their "clinical experience" wasn't better than simple linear models, and he was on the front lines against psychotherapy shown to perform no better than talking to any bright person.
If you read "Rational Choice in an Uncertain World" you will see that Dawes is pretty definitely on the level of "integrate Bayes into everyday life", not just Traditional Rationality. I don't know about the historical origins of evidence-based medicine, so it's possible that a bunch of Traditional Rationalists invented it; but one does get the impression that probability theorists trying to get people to listen to the research about the limits of their own minds, were involved.
Related to: Individual Rationality is a Matter of Life and Death, The Benefits of Rationality, Rationality is Systematized Winning
But I finally snapped after reading: Mandatory Secret Identities
Okay, the title was for shock value. Rationality is pretty great. Just not quite as great as everyone here seems to think it is.
For this post, I will be using "extreme rationality" or "x-rationality" in the sense of "techniques and theories from Overcoming Bias, Less Wrong, or similar deliberate formal rationality study programs, above and beyond the standard level of rationality possessed by an intelligent science-literate person without formal rationalist training." It seems pretty uncontroversial that there are massive benefits from going from a completely irrational moron to the average intelligent person's level. I'm coining this new term so there's no temptation to confuse x-rationality with normal, lower-level rationality.
And for this post, I use "benefits" or "practical benefits" to mean anything not relating to philosophy, truth, winning debates, or a sense of personal satisfaction from understanding things better. Money, status, popularity, and scientific discovery all count.
So, what are these "benefits" of "x-rationality"?
A while back, Vladimir Nesov asked exactly that, and made a thread for people to list all of the positive effects x-rationality had on their lives. Only a handful responded, and most responses weren't very practical. Anna Salamon, one of the few people to give a really impressive list of benefits, wrote:
There have since been a few more people claiming practical benefits from x-rationality, but we should generally expect more people to claim benefits than to actually experience them. Anna mentions the placebo effect, and to that I would add cognitive dissonance - people spent all this time learning x-rationality, so it MUST have helped them! - and the same sort of confirmation bias that makes Christians swear that their prayers really work.
I find my personal experience in accord with the evidence from Vladimir's thread. I've gotten countless clarity-of-mind benefits from Overcoming Bias' x-rationality, but practical benefits? Aside from some peripheral disciplines1, I can't think of any.
Looking over history, I do not find any tendency for successful people to have made a formal study of x-rationality. This isn't entirely fair, because the discipline has expanded vastly over the past fifty years, but the basics - syllogisms, fallacies, and the like - have been around much longer. The few groups who made a concerted effort to study x-rationality didn't shoot off an unusual number of geniuses - the Korzybskians are a good example. In fact as far as I know the only follower of Korzybski to turn his ideas into a vast personal empire of fame and fortune was (ironically!) L. Ron Hubbard, who took the basic concept of techniques to purge confusions from the mind, replaced the substance with a bunch of attractive flim-flam, and founded Scientology. And like Hubbard's superstar followers, many of this century's most successful people have been notably irrational.
There seems to me to be approximately zero empirical evidence that x-rationality has a large effect on your practical success, and some anecdotal empirical evidence against it. The evidence in favor of the proposition right now seems to be its sheer obviousness. Rationality is the study of knowing the truth and making good decisions. How the heck could knowing more than everyone else and making better decisions than them not make you more successful?!?
This is a difficult question, but I think it has an answer. A complex, multifactorial answer, but an answer.
One factor we have to once again come back to is akrasia2. I find akrasia in myself and others to be the most important limiting factor to our success. Think of that phrase "limiting factor" formally, the way you'd think of the limiting reagent in chemistry. When there's a limiting reagent, it doesn't matter how much more of the other reagents you add, the reaction's not going to make any more product. Rational decisions are practically useless without the willpower to carry them out. If our limiting reagent is willpower and not rationality, throwing truckloads of rationality into our brains isn't going to increase success very much.
This is a very large part of the story, but not the whole story. If I was rational enough to pick only stocks that would go up, I'd become successful regardless of how little willpower I had, as long as it was enough to pick up the phone and call my broker.
So the second factor is that most people are rational enough for their own purposes. Oh, they go on wild flights of fancy when discussing politics or religion or philosophy, but when it comes to business they suddenly become cold and calculating. This relates to Robin Hanson on Near and Far modes of thinking. Near Mode thinking is actually pretty good at a lot of things, and Near Mode thinking is the thinking whose accuracy gives us practical benefits.
And - when I was young, I used to watch The Journey of Allen Strange on Nickleodeon. It was a children's show about this alien who came to Earth and lived with these kids. I remember one scene where Allen the Alien was watching the kids play pool. "That's amazing," Allen told them. "I could never calculate differential equations in my head that quickly." The kids had to convince him that "it's in the arm, not the head" - that even though the movement of the balls is governed by differential equations, humans don't actually calculate the equations each time they play. They just move their arm in a way that feels right. If Allen had been smarter, he could have explained that the kids were doing some very impressive mathematics on a subconscious level that produced their arm's perception of "feeling right". But the kids' point still stands; even though in theory explicit mathematics will produce better results than eyeballing it, in practice you can't become a good pool player just by studying calculus.
A lot of human rationality follows the same pattern. Isaac Newton is frequently named as a guy who knew no formal theories of science or rationality, who was hopelessly irrational in his philosophical beliefs and his personal life, but who is still widely and justifiably considered the greatest scientist who ever lived. Would Newton have gone even further if he'd known Bayes theory? Probably it would've been like telling the world pool champion to try using more calculus in his shots: not a pretty sight.
Yes, yes, beisutsukai should be able to develop quantum gravity in a month and so on. But until someone on Less Wrong actually goes and does it, that story sounds a lot like when Alfred Korzybski claimed that World War Two could have been prevented if everyone had just used more General Semantics.
And then there's just plain noise. Your success in the world depends on things ranging from your hairstyle to your height to your social skills to your IQ score to cognitive constructs psychologists don't even have names for yet. X-Rationality can help you succeed. But so can excellent fashion sense. It's not clear in real-world terms that x-rationality has more of an effect than fashion. And don't dismiss that with "A good x-rationalist will know if fashion is important, and study fashion." A good normal rationalist could do that too; it's not a specific advantage of x-rationalism, just of having a general rational outlook. And having a general rational outlook, as I mentioned before, is limited in its effectiveness by poor application and akrasia.
I no longer believe mastering all these Overcoming Bias and Less Wrong techniques will turn me into Anasûrimbor Kellhus or John Galt. I no longer even believe mastering all these Overcoming Bias techniques will turn me into Eliezer Yudkowsky (who, as his writings from 2001 indicate, had developed his characteristic level of awesomeness before he became interested in x-rationality at all)3. I think it may help me succeed in life a little, but I think the correlation between x-rationality and success is probably closer to 0.1 than to 1. Maybe 0.2 in some businesses like finance, but people in finance tend to know this and use specially developed x-rationalist techniques on the job already without making it a lifestyle commitment. I think it was primarily a Happy Death Spiral around how wonderfully super-awesome x-rationality was that made me once think otherwise.
And this is why I am not so impressed by Eliezer's claim that an x-rationality instructor should be successful in their non-rationality life. Yes, there probably are some x-rationalists who will also be successful people. But again, correlation 0.1. Stop saying only practically successful people could be good x-rationality teachers! Stop saying we need to start having huge real-life victories or our art is useless! Stop calling x-rationality the Art of Winning! Stop saying I must be engaged in some sort of weird signalling effort for saying I'm here because I like mental clarity instead of because I want to be the next Bill Gates! It trivializes the very virtues that brought most of us to Overcoming Bias, and replaces them with what sounds a lot like a pitch for some weird self-help cult...
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...but you will disagree with me. And we are both aspiring rationalists, and therefore we resolve disagreements by experiments. I propose one.
For the next time period - a week, a month, whatever - take special note of every decision you make. By "decision", I don't mean the decision to get up in the morning, I mean the sort that's made on a conscious level and requires at least a few seconds' serious thought. Make a tick mark, literal or mental, so you can count how many of these there are.
Then note whether you make that decision rationally. If yes, also record whether you made that decision x-rationally. I don't just mean you spent a brief second thinking about whether any biases might have affected your choice. I mean one where you think there's a serious (let's arbitrarily say 33%) chance that using x-rationality instead of normal rationality actually changed the result of your decision.
Finally, note whether, once you came to the rational conclusion, you actually followed it. This is not a trivial matter. For example, before writing this blog post I wondered briefly whether I should use the time studying instead, used normal (but not x-) rationality to determine that yes, I should, and then proceeded to write this anyway. And if you get that far, note whether your x-rational decisions tend to turn out particularly well.
This experiment seems easy to rig4; merely doing it should increase your level of conscious rational decisions quite a bit. And yet I have been trying it for the past few days, and the results have not been pretty. Not pretty at all. Not only do I make fewer conscious decisions than I thought, but the ones I do make I rarely apply even the slightest modicum of rationality to, and the ones I apply rationality to it's practically never x-rationality, and when I do apply everything I've got I don't seem to follow those decisions too consistently.
I'm not so great a rationalist anyway, and I may be especially bad at this. So I'm interested in hearing how different your results are. Just don't rig it. If you find yourself using x-rationality twenty times more often than you were when you weren't performing the experiment, you're rigging it, consciously or otherwise5.
Eliezer writes:
Yet one way to fail your Art is to expect more of it than it can deliver. No matter how good a swimmer you are, you will not be able to cross the Pacific. This is not to say crossing the Pacific is impossible. It just means it will require a different sort of thinking than the one you've been using thus far. Perhaps there are developments of the Art of Rationality or its associated Arts that can turn us into a Kellhus or a Galt, but they will not be reached by trying to overcome biases really really hard.
Footnotes:
1: Specifically, reading Overcoming Bias convinced me to study evolutionary psychology in some depth, which has been useful in social situations. As far as I know. I'd probably be biased into thinking it had been even if it hadn't, because I like evo psych and it's very hard to measure.
2: Eliezer considers fighting akrasia to be part of the art of rationality; he compares it to "kicking" to our "punching". I'm not sure why he considers them to be the same Art rather than two related Arts.
3: This is actually an important point. I think there are probably quite a few smart, successful people who develop an interest in x-rationality, but I can't think of any people who started out merely above-average, developed an interest in x-rationality, and then became smart and successful because of that x-rationality.
4: This is a terribly controlled experiment, and the only way its data can be meaningfully interpreted at all is through what one of my professors called the "ocular trauma test" - when the data hits you between the eyes. If people claim they always follow their rational decisions, I think I will be more likely to interpret it as lack of enough cognitive self-consciousness to notice when they're doing something irrational than an honest lack of irrationality.
5: In which case it will have ceased to be an experiment and become a technique instead. I've noticed this happening a lot over the past few days, and I may continue doing it.