I suspect that achieving a clear mental picture of the sheer depth and breadth of the mind projection fallacy is a powerful mental tool. It's hard for me to state this in clearer terms, though, because I don't have a wide collection of good examples of the mind projection fallacy.
In a discussion yesterday, we all had trouble finding actual example of the mind projection fallacy. Overall, we had essentially two examples:
- Taste. People frequently confuse "I like this" and "this is good." (This really subsumes the attractiveness example.)
- Probability. This seems like a pretty good just-so-story for where frequentist probability comes from, as opposed to Bayesian probability.
Searching for "mind projection fallacy" on Less Wrong, I also see:
- Thinking that purpose is an inherent property of something, instead of it having been placed there by someone for some reason. (here)
- Mulling or arguing over definitions to solve object-level problems. (actually, most the ways words can be wrong sequence)
References are irritatingly difficult to find. Many papers mention this result or seek to explain it, but I just can't find a reference to an actual experiment. This paper is close though: "Factors underlying individual differences in the color matches of normal observers"