Equivalent in what sense? The fact that you can have equivalently predictive theories with different ontological implications is a large part of the problem.

Another part is that you don't have exhaustive knowledge of all possible theories. Being able to algorithmically check how good a theory is, a tall ordet, but even if you had one it would not be able to tell you that you had hit the best possible theory , only the best out of the N fed into it.

Let me try to restate, to be sure I have understood correctly:

We cannot stop once we have exhausted the evidence because explanations of equal predictive power have different ontological implications, and these implications must be accounted for in determining the best explanation. Further, we don't have a way to exclude other ontological implications we have not considered.

Question: why don't the ontological implications of our method of analysis constrain us to observing explanations with similar ontological implications?

Open thread, Jul. 25 - Jul. 31, 2016

by MrMind 1 min read25th Jul 2016133 comments


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