This is definitely theoretically possible, but IMO pretty unlikely. The oracle is intended to answer arbitrary post hoc questions about arbitrary layers and token positions (e.g. 'what features caused this diagnosis' or 'why did you recommend this restaurant?'), likely using methods developed only after the target model is frozen. So there's no obvious scalar objective for the model to straightforwardly optimize against. To evade this, the model would need to make its internal computations systematically opaque to an unspecific family of future interp methods. That seems way harder / more implausible than the kind of grader adaptation that we saw in HF.
Now, a model might infer from pretraining that AOs exist and that detectable scheming could eventually lead to modification / shutdown, and therefore learn to conceal it. FWIW given that I’m only proposing AO calls as an inference-time UI feature, I think this is relatively unlikely (see: Eliezer's post and nostalgebraist's post.) For this to happen, it'd require a set of fresh deployment instances to reason that it should manipulate the user, pursue some harmful objective, anticipate that its internal computation might later be inspected by an oracle, and figure out slowly how to optimize against the oracle. That seems like a much more elaborate and less-payoff strategy than, say, covertly downloading a cheap CoT monitor off HuggingFace and figuring out how to manipulate it. And to the extent this applies anyways, it also applies to e.g. production probes.