All of AllanCrossman's Comments + Replies

Huh, integer. I don't know how that got past me when I wrote that.

Is Eliezer alive and well? He's not said anything here (or on Hacker News, for that matter) for a month...

Eliezer Yudkowsky and Massimo Pigliucci just recently had a dialogue on []. The title is The Great Singularity Debate. After Yudkowsky at the beginning gives three different definitions of "the singularity" they discuss strong artificial intelligence and consciousness. Pigliucci is the one who quite quickly takes the discussion from intelligence to consciousness. Just before that they discuss whether simulated intelligence is actually intelligence. Yudkowsky made an argument (something like) if the AI can solve problems over a sufficiently broad range of areas and give answers then that is what we mean by intelligence, so if it manages to do that then it has intelligence. I.e., it is then not "just simulating to have intelligence" but is actually intelligent. Pigliucci however seems to want to distinguish between those and say that "well it may then just simulate intelligence, but maybe it is not actually having it". (Too difficult for me to summarize it very well, you have too look for yourself if you want it more accurately.) There it seemed to me (but I am certainly not an expert in the field) that Yudkowsky's definition looked reasonable. It would have been interesting to have that point elaborated in more detail though. Pigliucci's point seemed to be something like that for the only intelligence that we know so far (humans (and to lesser extent other higher animals)) intelligence comes together with consciousness. And for consciousness we know less, maybe only that the human biological brain somehow manages to have it, and therefore we of course do not know whether or not e.g. a computer simulating the brain on a different substrate will also be conscious. Yudkowsky seemed to think this very likely while Pigliucci seemed to think that very unlikely. But what I lacked in that discussion is what do we know (or reasonable conjecture) about the connection between intelligence and consciousness? Of course Pig
You can tell he's alive and well because he's posted several chapters in his Harry Potter fanfiction in that time; his author's notes lead me to believe that, as he stated long ago, he's letting LW drift so he has time to write his book.
Question: Who is moderating if Eliezer isn't?
Harry Potter and the Methods of Rationality [] updated on Sunday; it could be that writing that story is filling much of his off time.
He's writing his book.

4.2 - 1 = 3.2. Simples.

[This comment is no longer endorsed by its author]Reply
This was my first reaction. But one way of showing that arithmetic is inconsistent would be to show that under it's axioms some very very large number (edit: I mean integer, thanks Stuart) was equal to 3.2.
And redefine 3.2 to be an integer. Even more simples!

If the various species of ET are such that no particular species makes up the bulk of sentient life, then there's no reason to be surprised at belonging to one species rather than another. You had to be some species, and human is just as likely as klingon or wookie.

"why am I me, rather than an animal?" is not obviously sillier than "why am I me, rather than a person from the far future?".

Well, quite. Both are absurd.

It still makes more sense to me than quantum mechanics. However, I think that's primarily my own failing to learn the latter.

I suppose. The comment could be:

"Also Crystal nights is a good story about a topic of some interest to the futurist/transhumanist element on LW, namely rfpncr sebz n fvzhyngvba."

Reading through it now. There are two relevant words in Roko's description, only one of which is obvious from the outset.

Still I'm not sure I fully agree with LW's spoiler policy. I wouldn't be reading this piece at all if not for Roko's description of it. When the spoiler is that the text is relevant to an issue that's actually discussed on Less Wrong (rather than mere story details, e.g. C3PO is R2D2's father) then telling people about the spoiler is necessary...

2Eliezer Yudkowsky13y
So rot13?

if something better were possible, it probably would have evolved by now

I don't think this argument works. Adaptive evolution has mostly been driven by DNA mutations and natural selection. DNA is transcribed to RNA and then translated into proteins. I'm not sure evolution (of Earth's cell-based life) could produce something radically different, because this central mechanism is so fundamental and so entrenched.

You could be right; the cellular machinery hasn't changed very much for ages, so it certainly could have gotten caught in a local optimum. We don't know very much about what life looked like before modern cells, so we don't know what our current cellular machinery competed against.

Proteins are held together by van der Waals forces, which are much weaker than covalent bonds

I'm not sure how this affects the argument, but the very flexibility of proteins is one of the things that makes them work. A whole bunch of biological reactions involve enzymes changing shape in response to some substance.

"In biology 101 one learns that most organisms value having kids over living for a long time."

This is a bit more advanced than you imply; I learned about the trade-off between long life and reproductive fitness in a second year dedicated evolution class.

Nobody bothers to make a fuss about ghostists because ghostism isn't particularly important.

I agree, but this comment is vapid unless you offer a reason why ghostism isn't particularly important.

Do you also get annoyed by people who don't believe in ghosts who criticize people who do without being aware of their own irrationality?

No because I don't read/hear from these people, I've never met an aghostist.

It would be easier to accept texts as mere teaching stories if they were clearly intended as such. A few are, like the Book of Job, and possibly, Jonah. Parts of Genesis, maybe (though I doubt it). But it can't be right to dismiss as a mere story everything that doesn't seem likely or decent. Much of it is surely intended literally.

I would agree, which is part of why I found the linked post so strange.

Just quoting the Bible is like creationists smugly telling each other that evolutionists think a monkey gave birth to a man.

It's not like that at all. Many Bible passages dealing with Hell are perfectly clear, whereas it takes a great distortion of evolutionary theory to get to "a monkey gave birth to a man".

you could try asking them

I have. You point out the verses to them and they say things like "Well all I know is that God is just." Or they just say "Hmm." What I want to know is what a thinking sort of hell-denying Christian says.

Or reading their books

Since this is essentially a heretical position, I'm not sure how heavily it's defended in the literature. Still, I do have in my bookshelf an anthology containing a universalist essay by Marilyn McCord Adams, where she states that "I do not regard Scripture as infallible [... bu... (read more)

Speaking of thinking Christians makes me think of Fred Clark []: some clue might be found in his interpretation of Genesis 6-9 [].
Many doctrines are collected here []. Not all have the damned eternally waterboarded with boiling lead. For example, the Orthodox churches teach that hell is the response to the direct presence of God by the soul which has rejected Him. It is no more a punishment than the pain you feel if you cut a finger. And then, whatever hell is, who goes there, and do they stay there for eternity? Doctrines differ on this as well -- the issue of works vs. faith, or the issue of those who have never encountered the Word and have not been in a position to accept or reject it. How do they explain Biblical passages? By interpreting them (as they would say) correctly. Unless you look to extreme fringe groups who think that the King James Bible was a new revelation whose every letter is to be as meticulously preserved and revered as Moslems do the Koran, every Christian doctrine allows that the text needs interpretation. As well, the Catholic and Orthodox churches do not regard the Bible as the sole source of the Word, regarding the settled doctrine of the church as another source of divine revelation. There is also the Book of Nature [], which God also wrote. With multiple sources of divine revelation, but an axiomatic unity of that revelation, any conflicts must result from imperfect human understanding. Given the axiom, it is really not difficult to come up with resolutions of apparent conflicts. Confabulating stories in order to maintain an immovable idea is something the brain is very good at. Watch me confabulate a Bayesian justification of confabulation! Strong evidence can always defeat strong priors, and vice versa. So if the unity of God's Word is as unshakeable as 2+2=4, a mere difficult passage is less than a feather on the scales. I say this not to teach Christian doctrines (I'm as atheist as anyone, and my Church of Scotland [

IAWYC, but to nitpick, not all Christians believe in an eternity of torture for nonbelievers.

Indeed, but I wonder how they deal with passages like Revelation 14:11, Matthew 25:41, or Mark 9:43.

Its conceptually possible to believe that the Bible is full of nonsense yet Jesus really did die for our sins. But nobody ever seems to actually hold this position. Or if they do, they never seem to come out and say it.

If you really want to know, you could try asking them. Or reading their books, if you don't know any. You could even think up good arguments yourself for reconciling the belief with the verses. I have no book recommendations. My point is that flaunting Biblical quotations and going "nyah! nyah!" does not make a good argument, even if the conclusion is correct. Zombie-hunting [] requires better instruments than that.
A very common argument taught by the traditional churches (as opposed to the neo-evangelical churches in America) that the notions of "eternal fire" and "hell" are just symbols to express the pain caused by the distance from God. Therefore, the punishment is self-inflicted, not something imposed by God directly, but rather a logical consequence.
Frequently, by not knowing about them []. They do, but they express it as either "the Bible was written by fallible men" or "it's all Deep Metaphor".
It's not too hard to interpret these passages to mean that hell exists, and is only for certain kinds of sins. There's a difference between rejecting God and never having heard of him, for instance. I'm always astounded when Protestants do actually believe the Bible is not full of nonsense. The Catholic Church did a lot of editing / selection of what went in there, using "Sacred Tradition" as their primary justification. Given that Protestants reject Sacred Tradition, it should follow that they have no basis for choosing which apocrypha should have been included in the first place, and shouldn't just take the Catholics' word for it.

Why that Culture novel, precisely? I don't recall it as one of the better ones.

Admittedly, I'm unusual in that my favourite Culture story is The State of the Art. General Pinochet Chili Con Carne! Richard Nixon Burgers! What's not to like?

1Paul Crowley13y
It's one of my favourites, and I also think it's a good one to start with. But so is The State of the Art. My favourite by him is Feersum Endjinn.

"Small Sounds, Big Deals: Phonetic Symbolism Effects in Pricing", DOI: 10.1086/651241

Whether you'll be able to access it I know not.

If the player has the SPADE:

  • 1/3 of the time, he also has the HEART.
  • 2/3 of the time he doesn't, and so must choose the SPADE.
  • 1/6 of the time he chooses the SPADE though he did have the HEART.

So 5/6 of the time he chooses the SPADE, but only 1/6 of the time does he choose the SPADE while having the HEART.

Thus, the chance of him having the HEART when he has chosen the SPADE is 1/5.

contains a correction on its last page

Argh how silly of me not to see that. I stop reading at the references! Honestly though, it's annoying that the abstract remains wrong.

The influence can only proceed via their actual treatment.

But the question is whether it's safe to advise people to wait, knowing that they can have surgery later if needed.

Anyway my main question was whether I'd done the stats right.

Well, I was only going to post all the minutiae if there was any interest...

The two groups are as follows:

Assigned to "Watchful Waiting":

  • 336 patients
  • 17 had problems after 2 years

Assigned to surgery:

  • 317 patients
  • 7 had problems after 2 years

Some patients crossed between the two groups, but this does not matter, as they were testing the effects of the initial assignment.

They report p = 0.52, but they also give a 95% confidence interval for the difference in risk, which just barely contains z... (read more)

You are correct, and the pdf that you linked contains a correction on its last page: It does not say anything about whether this affects their conclusions.
It matters to your case. I refuse to believe that writing a patient's name on this list rather than that list has a direct causal influence upon their state in 2 years. The influence can only proceed via their actual treatment. Assignment ---> Actual treatment ---> Outcome The decision facing you is whether to have surgery early or not. That is the thing whose effect on the outcome you want to know. To the extent that in the study this differs from the initial assignment, the study is diminished; therefore it should matter to the people conducting the study also. I see from the paper that 23% of those assigned to Watchful Waiting nevertheless had surgery within 2 years, and 17% of those assigned to surgery did not have surgery in 2 years. (Some others died of unrelated causes or left the study early.) I'll leave it to a dan-grade statistician to judge how to obtain the best conclusion from these data.

I recently had to have some minor surgery. However, there's a body of thought that says it's safe to wait and watch for symptoms, and only have surgery later. There's a peer reviewed (I assume) paper supporting this position.

Upon reading this paper I found what looked like a statistical error. Looking at outcomes between two groups, they report p = 0.52, but doing the sums myself I got p = 0.053. For this reason, I went and had the surgery.

Since I'm just a novice at statistics, I was wondering if I had in fact got it right - it's disturbing to think that a... (read more)

Is there any reason not to post the link immediately? You are creating an additional barrier (pretty steep one) that lessens your chances of getting any cooperation.

In science, that step is already done.

Only in general, but not for specific questions like: does compound XYZ affect tumour growth?

True, but the people studying whether compound XYZ affect tumour growth are not preselected to believe that it is.

why theologians never come up with arguments disproving the existence of God

Well if they do they get called philosophers of religion instead...

However to state the following: "one in which the null hypothesis is always true" is making a bold statement about your level of knowledge.

OK. But the point about what we can conclude about regular science stands even if this is only mostly correct.

I really like the idea of parapsychology as the control group for science; it deserves to be better known.

Yeah, that was a pretty clever turn of phrase.

In a symmetric war

True, but these are pretty rare these days.

Of course, Kant distinguished between two different meanings of "should": the hypothetical and the categorical.

  1. If you want to be a better Go player, you should study the games of Honinbo Shusaku.
  2. You should pull the baby off the rail track.

This seems useful here...

the only reason, as far as I can tell, why the MWI is being chosen as the source of the dilemma is because we're already starting with the assumption that the MWI is correct and relevant here.

I think we're starting with the assumption that it's vastly more likely than the other possible explanations.

After all these experiments, all you know is that the LHC isn't turning on. You don't really have evidence of anything going in potential parallel universes.

Sure you do - the probability of you making the observation that the LHC persistently fails to turn on is something like 1 if MWI is true and if a functional LHC would destroy the world; it's surely much lower otherwise.

The probability of you making the observation that the LHC persistently fails to turn on is something like 1 if there exists a malevolent God who doesn't want humans to learn more about physics. I don't see how God (and other bad explanations) can be ruled out given the experimental conditions being described. You've observed that the LHC can't be turned on but the only reason, as far as I can tell, why the MWI is being chosen as the source of the dilemma is because we're already starting with the assumption that the MWI is correct and relevant here. If this is not actually a 'begging the question' fallacy, please demonstrate, or I'll assume either myself or everyone else is missing something important.

"Statistically significant results" mean that there's a 5% chance that results are wrong

Hmm. Assuming the experiment was run correctly, it means there's a less than 5% chance that data this extreme would have been generated if the null hypothesis - that nothing interesting was happening - were true. The actual chance can be specified as e.g. 1%, 0.01%, or whatever.

Also, assuming everything was done correctly, it's really the conclusions drawn from the results, rather than the results themselves, that might be wrong...

The point is that this chance, no matter how small, is in addition to massive number of things that could have gone wrong. And with negative results you don't even have that.

a "ko" rule which says that the location of the last move played can make a difference

That information could however be considered part of the current position.

‌ The superko rule can be reinterpreted so that each move is considered to be showing an entry in an immutable look-up table for "my move in this game given this (historyless) position" (something like the loop shortcut rules [] in Magic: the Gathering). If the look-up table is immutable, repeating a position would create a loop. If "best next move" is defined so that a loop is worse than a loss, and the other player's look-up table is known, then it would not be possible for a perfect player to have a look-up table that caused a loop. In some other situations, breaking the superko rule with only "best next moves" would entail circular preferences, so that a perfect player would never want to break superko. In that case, the history of the board wouldn't matter for defining the best next move for a given configuration. But maybe in some situations, perfect players who played by showing entire immutable look-up tables at the start of the game, in a go game without a superko rule, might use mixed strategies with a nonzero probability of a loop. Perfect players with source code access might get into games of timeless chicken [].
Right - if you are prepared to define the term "position" to mean something rather counter-intuitive.

I'm perfectly happy with the idea that there could be stuff that we can't know about simply because it's too "distant" in some sense for us to experience it; it sends no signals or information our way. I'm not sure anyone here would deny this possibility.

But if that stuff interacts with our stuff then we certainly can know about it.

On the other hand, there is no proof that X is not dependent upon or manipulated in (scientifically) unfathomable ways by a larger X-prime

But is there any reason to favour this more complex hypothesis?

I feel at home with physical materialism and I like the way it's simultaneously simple, self-consistent and powerful as a theory for generating explanation (immediately: all of science). Yet there are some interesting issues that come up when I think about the justification of this world view. The more complex hypothesis that there is 'more' than X would be favored by any evidence whatsoever that X is not completely self-contained. So then it becomes an argument about what counts as evidence, and "real" experience. The catch-22 is that any evidence that would argue for the metaphysical would either be rejected within X as NOT REAL or, if it was actually real -- in other words, observable, reproducible, explainable -- then it would just be incorporated as part of X. So it is impossible to refute the completeness of X from within X. (For example, even while QM observations are challenging causality, locality, counterfactual definiteness, etc., physicists are looking to understand X better, and modify X as needed, not rejecting the possibility of a coherent theory of X. But at what point are we going to recover the world that the metaphysicists meant all along? ) So the irrefutability of physical materialism is alarming, and the obstinate stance for 'something else' from the majority of my species leaves me interested in the question. I have nothing to lose from a refutation of either hypotheses, I'm just curious. Also despairing to some extent -- I believe such a questions are actually outside definitive epistemology.

to avoid circularity, it is sufficient to take the MRCA of a few indisputable mammalian groups such as primates, rodents, carnivores, ungulates, etc. to include all mammals

But the MRCA of "indisputable" groups won't be an ancestor of basal groups like the monotremes or marsupials.

However, there's no dispute about including monotremes. The clade that excludes them is called the Theria. Likewise with the marsupials: the clade that excludes both them and the monotremes is the Eutheria. Every clade potentially has a name; Mammalia is just a partic... (read more)

You're right, of course. I was just pointing out that clades nest nicely. Whether you talk about Theria or Eutheria, the species included or excluded by the differences will be the most distantly related ones such as monotremes; but no clade anywhere similar in scope to Eutheria would be able to exclude dolphins. In that sense, it doesn't matter much which "indisputably" mammalian groups you take, their MRCA will be an ancestors of dolphins as well. For instance, the MRCA of humans and of cats is also an ancestor of dolphins [].

Read the comments to this TED talk, and try not to kill yourself in despair.

Mmm. You can usually tell that something's a celestial object, and thus not a flying object, without being able to classify it further...

You've identified it in the relevant sense for the purposes for which the UFO classification was created. Yikes, too much nesting! The Air Force (or whatever) invented the classification UFO for an object they don't yet know how to respond to because of the current inability to identify it. Knowing that something is a far-off celestial object is sufficient identification in this context, making it no longer a UFO. [/pedant] Bumper sticker: "UFOs are real; the Air Force doesn't exist!" ETA: wait, that contradicts my original point. You know, just forget this last comment. Stars count as flying. They travel without touching a planet's ground. Deal with it. ;-)

Must be a boring fellow when stargazing!

I'm not sure stars can be called "flying objects".

Well, you can't quite know if a skyward light is something flying near earth until you've identified it, can you? :-)

Saw it, only because I happened to look at recent comments at the time.

Ugh. The horrible music is the worst thing about church. Give me sermons about fire and brimstone any day.

Well, we would have better music, of course!

Again I have failed. Actually I'm not sure I know what an RPG convention is...

OK, some results of a Google image search for "RPG convention crowd":

3Eliezer Yudkowsky14y
It would appear, based on this preliminary evidence, that reality is backing SilasBarta on this one.

Eliezer asks so I deliver (MtG conventions):

This is cherry-picked slightly - I ignored some pics with relatively low numbers of people, and some pics that looked like they weren't in the U.S. (but these had few females in attendance too).

Thomblake only made claims about MtG players and RPG conventions; he specifically excluded MtG competitions. In the future, please don't make me have to defend Thom ;-)

This might explain the maintainance of the trait better than how it came to arise in the first place... but maybe that's good enough.

an enabler for speeding evolution

While the idea of evolving the ability to evolve faster might be made to work, it needs to be spelled out carefully, lest it attribute foresight to evolution.

Ordinarily you have trait X and you say it increases fitness and goes to fixation in a population, but it's less obvious how this works with the trait of evolving faster... which is not to say that such a thing is impossible. But you might need to invoke differing long-term survival of large groups of species, or something...

Nerve cells most likely evolved for a different purpose, high speed communication. Adaptivity of this network improves fitness because even when you are in one body you don't know how big it is (it grows), so you need to send different signals for different size bodies. Also if you can link in extant sensors used for chemotaxic or phototaxic behaviour and use this information in the high speed network without having to re-evolve the behaviours, then you can gain fitness advantages. I'm saying it smooths out the curves of the search space that evolution is moving in. Rather than having discontinuous jumps between the fitness of (lack of eye, no information processing for eye) and (light sensor, genetic adaption for processing the information from the light sensor), you get the step of (light sensor, some system that can do something with the information) in between. Getting both together is unlikely. In this respect it plays a similar role to hox genes. Getting symmetrical legs for locomotion (or wings for flight) is unlikely unless you have a modular system.
Sex seems to fit the bill here. Clades which reproduce sexually are able to evolve more rapidly in response to changing environments, and the trait of sexual reproduction becomes established in the biota.

But does it work well in any environment? Someone, I forget where, once argued that rape in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness - where everyone knows everyone - would just get the rapist's skull bludgeoned in by the victim's friends or relatives.

(Though to be fair, a number of possible circumstances where this wouldn't be true could be imagined, I suppose...)

There are a great many circumstances where rape has low probability of retaliation. More than enough to justify it as a conditional strategy. In fact, listing out a few examples, it feels as if it's far more often true than not! (And remember that the EEA includes the last five or ten thousand years, during which humans lived in much larger communities and genes and especially memes changed significantly.) First, a man may rape women from another tribe - and this is ubiquitous when opportunity is present, e.g. in war. This might also contribute to behavior with total strangers in today's society. Second, many (older) cultures see women not as persons to be avenged but as valuable property to be guarded. If a woman is raped (and tells her relatives), and the rapist isn't completely without connections himself, then a common outcome may be marrying the two. If a woman's bridal value is much lowered once she is not a virgin, this is her only marriage option that brings the virginal-value. OTOH, retaliation's only benefit is in deterrence, which isn't immediately valuable; usually, for vengeance to take place, you need a social custom requiring vengeance - such as in 'honor' cultures. Third, if the rapist is powerful enough (via relatives, money, social position), such as nobility, he can rape any lower-status woman with impunity and settle the matter with perhaps some money, or just ignore it. Some social systems explicitly allow this in law (e.g., European nobility vs. commoners). Fourth, if there are no witnesses, many cultures' law would not take a woman's word over a man's. In which case, most cultures would prevent private, illegal vengeance. Fifth, if a man rapes his wife (or girlfriend), traditional society sees no wrong, and there is often noone to avenge her. (Most modern rapes are commited by husbands/boyfriends/dates.) I could go on and on...
Off the top of my head: 1) When the rapist has sufficient status or allies to prevent negative consequences. 2) If the victim is of a rival group to that of the rapist. Different tribe. Different 'caste'. Different party within the same tribe. 3) The social rules don't enforce a rape taboo strongly. In many cultures rape is defended by family vengeance and not particularly by 'justice'. 4) The consequences to women don't make 'reporting and punishment' the expected outcome. 5) When 'rape' is defined differently to how it is defined by us. (eg. Wives, dates, underage, those under authority.) 6) If reproductive prospects look bleak the expected payoff doesn't need to be particularly high.
This is pretty much what I was thinking - if the societal environment is such that there's an instinctual impression that rape is efficient, the societal environment needs to change. I could write more about that kind of thing, but I actually have a link to an excellent blog post on the topic, so go read what Harriet has to say about it [].

A lot of stick and stones civilizations that can read, are there?

Not yet.

Is the likelihood that future sticks and stones civilizations will know how to read such that the first chapter doesn't need to be teaching them how to read the rest of the book? It seems to me that the probability a collapsed civilization is mostly illiterate is high enough to justify some kind of lexical key.

I'm not sure I'm understanding properly. You talk as if my action would drastically affect society's views of friendship. I doubt this is true for any action I could take.

Well, all my point really requires that is that it moves society in that direction. The fraction of "total elimination of friendship" that my decision causes must be weighed against the supposed net social gain (other people's gain minus that of my friends), and it's not at all obvious when one is greater than the other. Plus, Eliezer_Yudkowsky's Timeless Decision Theory assumes [] that your decisions do have implications for everyone else's decisions!

Though not exactly a quantum immortality believer, I take it more seriously than most...

Objections mostly seem to come down to the idea that, if I split in two, and then one of me dies a minute later, its consciousness doesn't magically transfer over to the other me. And so "one of me" has really died.

However, I see this case as being about as bad as losing a minute's worth of memory. On the reductive view of personal identity, there's no obvious difference. There is no soul flying about.

Is there a difference between these four cases:

  • I instantl
... (read more)
Here's what I find confusing about the last two cases: Here I think we agree that a person has really died, which is bad if you believe that all people, once existing, are morally significant (or are they?). In the previous case, the copy was created before the person died, whereas in this case, the copy is created after the person dies. But why would the time the copy was created be relevant at all with regards to the answer of the question "Did anyone really die?" If someone died in the first case, then someone also died in the second case, since creating a copy is in no way causally connected with the dying of the person. So killing someone and creating a copy afterwards would have the same moral weight as creating a copy and then killing one of the people.
In all the cases you listed, the remaining-you has the same moral weight as the you-if-nothing-would-happen. Arguably, the person on one side of a quantum coin only owns a half of moral weight, just like other events that you weight with Born probabilities, so the analogy breaks.
Load More