All of c.trout's Comments + Replies

Narrative Syncing

Yes, such sentences are a thing. Kendall Walton calls them "principles of generation" because, according to his analysis, they generate fictional truths (see his Mimesis as Make-Believe). Pointing at the sand and shouting "There is lava there!" we have said something fictionally true, in virtue of the game rule pronounced earlier.  "Narrative syncing" sounds like a broader set of practices that generate and sustain such truths – I like it! (I must say "principles of generation" is a bit clunky anyway – but it's also more specific. Maybe "rule decreein... (read more)

Morality is Scary

I don't follow the reasoning. How do you get from "most people's moral behaviour is explainable in terms of them 'playing' a status game" to "solving (some versions of) the alignment problem probably won't be enough to ensure a future that's free from astronomical waste or astronomical suffering"?

More specifics:
Regarding the quote from The Status Game: I have not read the book, so I'm not sure what the intended message is but this sounds like some sort of unwarranted pessimism about ppl's moral standing (something like a claim like "the vast majority of pp... (read more)

How dath ilan coordinates around solving alignment

I'm not down or upvoting, but I will say, I hope you're not taking this exercise too seriously...

Are we really going to analyze one person's fiction (even if rationalist, it's still fiction), in an attempt to gain insight into this one person's attempt to model an entire society and its market predictions – and all of this in order to try and better judge the probability of certain futures under a number of counterfactual assumptions? Could be fun, but I wouldn't give its results much credence.

Don't forget Yudkowsky's own advice about not generalizing from... (read more)

2Thomas Kwa4mo
Yeah, I think the level of seriousness is basically the same as if someone asked Eliezer "what's a plausible world where humanity solves alignment?" to which the reply would be something like "none unless my assumptions about alignment are wrong, but here's an implausible world where alignment is solved despite my assumptions being right!" The implausible world is sketched out in way too much detail, but lots of usefulness points are lost by its being implausible. The useful kernel remaining is something like "with infinite coordination capacity we could probably solve alignment" plus a bit because Eliezer fiction is substantially better for your epistemics than other fiction. Maybe there's an argument for taking it even less seriously? That said, I've definitely updated down on the usefulness of this given the comments here.