Your link to Import AI 337 currently links to the email, it should be this: https://importai.substack.com/p/import-ai-337-why-i-am-confused-about
I was previously pretty dubious about interpretability results leading to capabilities advances. I've only really seen two papers which did this for LMs and they came from the same lab in the past few months. It seemed to me like most of the advances in modern ML (other than scale) came from people tinkering with architectures and seeing which modifications increased performance.
But in a conversation with Oliver Habryka and others, it was brought up that as AI models are getting larger and more expensive, this tinkering will get more difficult and ... (read more)
They did run the tests for all models, from Table 1:
(the columns are GPT-4, GPT-4 (no vision), GPT-3.5)
So could an AI engineer create an AI blob of compute the same size as the brain, with its same structural parameters, feed it the same training data, and get the same result ("don't steal" rather than "don't get caught")?
There is a disconnect with this question.
I think Scott is asking “Supposing an AI engineer could create something that was effectively a copy of a human brain and the same training data, then could this thing learn the “don’t steal” instinct over the “don’t get caught” instinct?” Eliezer is answering “Is an AI engineer able to create a copy of the human brain, provide it with the same training data a human got, and get the “don’t steal” instinct?”
Are you offering productivity/performance coaching for new alignment researchers, or coaching + research mentorship for alignment researchers?
If you're offering research mentorship, it might be helpful to give some examples of the type of research you do
Yeah, I totally agree. My motivation for writing the first section was that people use the word 'deception' to refer to both things, and then make what seem like incorrect inferences. For example, current ML systems do the 'Goodhart deception' thing, but then I've heard people use this to imply that it might be doing 'consequentialist deception'.
These two things seem close to unrelated, except for the fact that 'Goodhart deception' shows us that AI systems are capable of 'tricking' humans.
This phrase is mainly used and known by the euthanasia advocacy movement. This might also be bad, but not as bad as the association with Jim Jones.
Will this happen? Bet here! https://manifold.markets/PeterBarnett/will-someone-recieve-funding-to-inv
My initial thought is that I don't see why this powerful optimizer would attempt to optimize things in the world, rather than just do some search thing internally.
I agree with your framing of "how did this thing get made, since we're not allowed to just postulate it into existence?". I can imagine a language model which manages to output words which causes strokes in whoever reads its outputs, but I think you'd need a pretty strong case for why this would be made in practice by the training process.
Say you have some powerful optimizer language ... (read more)
This list of email scripts from 80,000 Hours also seems useful here https://80000hours.org/articles/email-scripts/
This is what I send people when they tell me they haven't read Slate Star Codex and don't know where to start.
Here are a bunch of lists of top ssc posts:
These lists are vaguely ranked in the order of how confident I am that they are good
https://www.slatestarcodexabridged.com/ (if interested in psychology almost all the stuff here is good https://www.slatestarcodexabridged.com/Ps... (read more)
Hmm, this might come down to how independent the parameters are. I think in large networks there will generally be enough independence between the parameters for local minima to be rare (although possible).
As a toy example of moving from one algorithm to another, if the network is large enough we can just have the output being a linear combination of the two algorithms and up-regulate one, and down regulate the other:
And a is changed from 1 to 0.
The network needs to be large enough so the ... (read more)
I think there is likely to be a path from a model with shallow circuits to a model with deeper circuits which doesn't need any 'activation energy' (it's not stuck in a local minimum). For a model with many parameters, there are unlikely to be many places where all the deriviatives of the loss wrt all the parameters are zero. There will almost always be at least one direction to move in which decreases the shallow circuit while increasing the general one, and hence doesn't really hurt the loss.
I'm from Dunedin and went to highschool there (in the 2010s), so I guess I can speak to this a bit.
Co-ed schools were generally lower decile (=lower socio-economic backgrounds) than the single sex schools (here is data taken from wikipedia on this). The selection based on 'ease of walking to school' is still a (small) factor, but I expect this would have been a larger factor in the 70s when there was worse public transport. In some parts of NZ school zoning is a huge deal, with people buying houses specifically to get into a good zone (especially in Auckla... (read more)
I think that this is a possible route to take, I don't think we currently have a good enough understanding of how to control\align mesa-optimizers to be able to do this.
I worry a bit that even if we correctly align a mesa-optimizer (make its mesa-objective aligned with the base-objective), its actual optimization process might be faulty/misaligned and so it would mistakenly spawn a misaligned optimizer. I think this faulty optimization process is most likely to happen sometime in the middle of training, where the mesa-optimizer is able to make anothe... (read more)
So do you think that the only way to get to AGI is via a learned optimizer? I think that the definitions of AGI (and probably optimizer) here are maybe a bit fuzzy.
I think it's pretty likely that it is possible to develop AI systems which are more competent than humans in a variety of important domains, which don't perform some kind of optimization process as part of their computation.
Thanks for your reply! I agree that I might be a little overly dismissive of the loss landscape frame. I agree mostly with your point about convergent gradient hackers existing minima of the base-objective, I briefly commented on this (although not in the section on coupling)
Here we can think of the strong coupling regime as being a local minimum in the loss landscape, such that any step to remove the gradient hacker leads locally to worse performance. In the weak coupling regime, the loss landscape will still increase in the directions which directly hurt
There's a drug called Orlistat for treating obesity which works by preventing you from absorbing fats when you eat them. I've heard (somewhat anecdotally) that one of the main effects is forcing you to eat a low fat diet, because otherwise there are quite unpleasant 'gastrointestinal side effects' if you eat a lot of fat.
Oh you're right! Thanks for catching that. I think I was lead astray because I wanted there to be a big payoff for averting the bad event, but I guess the benefit is just not having to pay D.I'll have a look and see how much this changes things
Edit: Fixed it up now, none of the conclusions seem to change (which is good because they seemed like common sense!). Thanks for reading this and pointing that out!
Thanks! Yeah, I definitely think that "it's okay to slack today if I pull up the average later on" is a pretty common way people lose productivity. I think one framing could be that if you do have an off day, that doesn't have to put you off track forever, and you can make up for it in the future.
I make the graphs using the [matplotlib xkcd mode](https://matplotlib.org/stable/api/_as_gen/matplotlib.pyplot.xkcd.html), it's super easy you use, you just put your plotting in a "with plt.xkcd():" block
My read of Russel's position is that if we can successfully make the agent uncertain about its model for human preferences then it will defer to the human when it might do something bad, which hopefully solves (or helps with) making it corrigible.
I do agree that this doesn't seem to help with inner-alignment stuff though, but I'm still trying to wrap my head around this area.