Well, it does say '2016', so that seems... Yeah, that isn't plausible, but the fact that it says 2016 makes it more plausible than it would be otherwise.
After a bit of thought, I believe I've found a basically permanent solution for this.
I use word replacer (not sure how to add links without just posting them, you can google it, it is in the chrome web store) with a bunch of rules to enforce 'they' as default. If you put rules for longer strings at the top they match first ('he is' to 'they are' at the top with 'he' to 'they' lower down, for example)
You will have to put up with some number mismatch unless you want to add a rule for every verb in English ('they puts'), but I feel that that is an acceptabl... (read more)
Whereas, if I am interpreting them correctly, what they are saying is
(1) People say that high IQ is the reason Newton invented calculus.
(2) High processing speed and copious amounts of RAM don't themselves suffice to invent calculus.
(3) Therefore, "High processing speed and copious amounts of RAM" is not a good description of high IQ.
Personally, I'd say that 'high IQ' is probably most useful when just used to refer to whatever it is that enables people to do stuff like invent calculus, and that 'working memory' already suffices for RAM, and that ... (read more)
"[[ My favorite "other" referral was someone who checked the URL on tinychat entirely be coincidence, before it was passworded. ]]"
Yep, that was surprisingly successful. I also had success with that tactic on fimfiction.net, though that produced fewer useful results.
(also, unless there's another 15-year-old, I look to be the youngest.)
The system for generating new fields of research? After all, if it generates other areas that are no longer philosophy reasonably regularly, then that actually creates value.
A way to communicate Exists(N) and not Exists(S) in a way that doesn't depend on the context of the current conversation might be ""Santa" exists but Santa does not." Of course, the existence of "Santa" is granted when "Santa does not exist" is understood by the other person, so this is really just a slightly less ambiguous way of saying "Santa does not exist"
I was thinking of the "feeling bad and reconsider" meaning. That is, you don't want regret to occur, so if you are systematically regretting your actions it might be time to try something new. Now, perhaps you were acting optimally already and when you changed you got even /more/ regret, but in that case you just switch back.
In my opinion, one should always regret choices with bad outcomes and never regret choices with good outcomes. For Lo It Is Written ""If you fail to achieve a correct answer, it is futile to protest that you acted with propriety."" As well It Is Written "If it's stupid but it works, it isn't stupid."
More explicitly, if you don't regret bad outcomes just because you 'did the right thing,' you will never notice a flaw in your conception of 'the right thing.' This results in a lot of unavoidable regret, and so might not be a good algorithm in practice, but at least in principle it seems to be better.
On the contrary, this is what the Litany of Tarski states.
exactly! No knock-on effects. Perhaps you meant to comment on the grandparent(great-grandparent? do I measure from this post or your post?) instead?
In the Least Convenient Possible World of this hypothetical, each and every dust speck causes a small constant amount of harm, with no knock-on effects(no increasing one's appreciation of the moments when one does not have dust in ones eye, no preventing a 'boring painless existence,' nothing of the sort). Now it may be argued whether this would occur with actual dust, but that is not really the question at hand. Dust was just chosen as being a 'seemingly trivial bad thing.' and if you prefer some other trivial bad thing, just replace that in the problem and the question remains the same.
In the Least Convenient Possible World of this hypothetical, every dust speck causes a constant small amount of harm with no knock-on effects(no avoiding buses, no crashing cars...)
"if I can prove that if a version of me with unbounded computational resources is consistent then this is good, do it"
In this formalism we generally assume infinite resources anyway. And even if this is not the case, consistent/inconsistent doesn't depend on resources, only on the axioms and rules for deduction. So this still doesn't let you increase in proof strength, although again it should help avoid losing it.
I don't think he was talking about self-PA, but rather an altered decision criteria, such that rather that "if I can prove this is good, do it" it is "if I can prove that if I am consistent then this is good, do it" which I think doesn't have this particular problem, though it does have others, and it still can't /increase/ in proof strength.
That AI doesn't drop an anvil on its head(I think...), but it also doesn't self-improve.
I think that what Joshua was talking about by 'infinite loop' is 'passing through the same state an infinite number of times.' That is, a /loop/, rather than just a line with no endpoint.
although this would rule out
(some arbitrary-size int type) x = 0;
on a machine with infinite memory, as it would never pass through the same state twice. So maybe I'm still misunderstanding.
Wasn't Löb's theorem ∀ A (Provable(Provable(A) → A) → Provable(A))? So you get Provable(⊥) directly, rather than passing through ⊥ first. This is good, as, of course, ⊥ is always false, even if it is provable.
Darn it, and I counted like five times to make sure there really were 10 visible before I said anything. I didn't realize that the stone the middle-top stone was on top of was one stone, not two.
There might be one more stone not visible?
It should be noted that if measured IQ is fat-tailed, this is because there is something wrong with IQ tests. IQ is defined to be normally distributed with a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of either 15 or 16 depending on which definition you're using. So if measured IQ is fat-tailed, then the tests aren't calibrated properly(of course, if your test goes all the way up to 160, it is almost inevitably miscalibrated, because there just aren't enough people to calibrate it with).
I would disagree with the phrasing you use regarding 'human terminal values.' Now, I don't disagree that evolution optimized humans according to those criteria, but I am not evolution, and evolution's values are not my values. I would expect that only a tiny fraction of humans would say that evolution's values should be our values(I'd like to say 'none,' but radical neo-darwinians might exist). Now, if you were just saying that those are the values of the optimization process that produced humanity, I agree, but that was not what I interpreted you as saying.
I assume you either linked to this in the post, or it has been mentioned in the comments, but I did not catch it in either location if it was present, so I'm linking to it anyway:
contains a not merely computable but tractable algorithm for assigning probabilities to a given set of first-order sentences.
"S proves that A()=1 ⇒ U()=42. But S also proves that A()=1 ⇒ U()=1000000, therefore S proves that A()≠1"
I don't see how this follows. Perhaps it is because, if the system was sound, it would never prove more than one value for U() for a given a, therefore by the principle of explosion it proves A()≠1? But that doesn't seem to actually follow. I'm aware that this is an old post, but on the off chance that anyone ever actually sees this comment, help would be appreciated.
Personally, I fall on the 'all of the above(except idea A)' side of the fence. I primarily use LessWrong for the Main board, as it is an excellent source of well-edited, well-considered articles, containing interesting or useful ideas. I want the remainder of the site to thrive because if there is not a large, active userbase and new users being attracted, then I would expect to see the types of content I want to see become less frequent. All of these ideas seem like good things to do, keeping in mind that if these do not actually support the goal of making good Main articles more frequent, then they are not good things, and it seems possible that some of these could backfire.
Well, this comes up different ways under different interpretations. If there is a chance that I am being simulated, that is this is part of his determining my choice, then I give him $100. If the coin is quantum, that is there will exist other mes getting the money, I give him $100. If there is a chance that I will encounter similar situations again, I give him $100. If I were informed of the deal beforehand, I give him $100. Given that I am not simulated, given that the coin is deterministic, and given that I will never again encounter Omega, I don't thin... (read more)
My resolution to this, without changing my intuitions to pick things that I currently perceive as 'simply wrong', would be that I value certainty. A 9/10 chance of winning x dollars is worth much less to me than a 10/10 chance of winning 9x/10 dollars. However, a 2/10 chance of winning x dollars is worth only barely less than a 4/10 chance of winning x/2 dollars, because as far as I can tell the added utility of the lack of worrying increases massively as the more certain option approaches 100%. Now, this becomes less powerful the closer the odds, are, but... (read more)
This looks to be very related to the idea of "Observe someone's actions. Assume they are trying to accomplish something. Work out what they are trying to accomplish." Which seems to be what you are talking about.
(aware that this is 2 years late, just decided to post)
I find that I work, on average,somewhere between 2-3 times as fast when I am right up next to a deadline,than when I have plenty of time.
Does it count if the state of trying lasted for a long(but now ended) time? because if so, I kept on trying to create a bijection between the reals and the wholes, until I was about 13 and found an actual number that I could actually write down that none of my obvious ideas could reach, and find an equivalent for all the non obvious ones.( 0.21111111..., by the way)