All of Martin Sustrik's Comments + Replies

This is related to an idea I keep stressing here, which is that people rarely have consistent meta-level principles. Instead, they’ll endorse the meta-level principle that supports their object-level beliefs at any given moment. The example I keep giving is how when the federal government was anti-gay, conservatives talked about the pressing need for federal intervention and liberals insisted on states’ rights; when the federal government became pro-gay, liberals talked about the pressing need for federal intervention and conservatives insisted on states’

... (read more)
2Dagon15d
If you reframe this as instrumental vs terminal goals, it's obviously true.  If you don't care about the constitution per se, but only as a means to power and to enabling your policies, and your timeframe is much longer than your opposition, then it's trivially useful to seek power now and use it over the long term. But it's not at all clear that these conditions hold for any humans in the real world.  We don't really have values or goals that are all that well-defined, and we like to think we're more long-term-oriented than our opposition, but we're mostly fooling ourselves.
2abramdemski15d
I don't think this works very well. If you wait until a major party sides with your meta, you could be waiting a long time. (EG, when will 321 voting become a talking point on either side of a presidential election?) And, if you get what you were waiting for, you're definitely not pulling sideways [https://www.overcomingbias.com/p/policy_tugowarhtml]. That is: you'll have a tough battle to fight, because there will be a big opposition.

Hard to say, but one problem I see is that strong regional identity that powers the political processes in federations cannot be created by fiat. If you turn a centralized country to federation by passing such law it would continue to work as a centralized country. Maybe in 100-200 years regional identity, regional elites, specific regional interests would emerge, but it won't be tomorrow. Same, although maybe in a lesser extent, I think, applies to already federated countries and "making them even more federated".

Interesting. I've never heard about that. Any tips about where to read some more about that?

Let's go even further. Assuming the above model, the system can be improved by treating each successful referendum as a system failure. A postmortem should be written a submitted for public discussion:

  • If majority was in favour, why wasn't the law changed before in the first place?
  • Why haven't the counterproposal succeeded?
  • Why haven't the initiants retracted the initiative?
  • What should be done so that a similar failure doesn't happen again?

There's yet one more dynamic: Initiative proposes X. Government is, like, this is just crazy. The initiators: Do change the law to include Y (a watered down version of X) and we'll retract the initiative.

Looking at it from that point of view, the referendum can be thought of not as a way for "the people" to decide, but rather a lever, a credible threat, to change the law without having to go via the standard representative system (joining a party, becoming an MP, etc.)

1Raoul Audouin9mo
The latter “credible threat” seems to work similarly in Denmark, where 30% of the parliament can initiate a referendum. I think this only happened once in 174 years, because the 30% parliament minority uses this institution to force a compromise or even a “deal” (I assume that it’s most of the time a secret deal) with the parties in majority, not for “the people” to decide.
2Martin Sustrik10mo
Let's go even further. Assuming the above model, the system can be improved by treating each successful referendum as a system failure. A postmortem should be written a submitted for public discussion: * If majority was in favour, why wasn't the law changed before in the first place? * Why haven't the counterproposal succeeded? * Why haven't the initiants retracted the initiative? * What should be done so that a similar failure doesn't happen again?

In Switzerland there's a lot of discussion about changing this or that part of the political system, but I've never seen someone advocating for getting rid of referenda. There's something about the concept that people tend to like, irrespective of whether it works well or not.

I still think the “old guard” problem is real, and we’d have to come up with new mechanisms to address it. (Perhaps influential positions would institute a mandatory retirement age of 350.)

I was thinking about this the other day, but from a slightly different perspective. Consider trust in the society. If a country goes through a civil war, or maybe a period of a state collapse, the people are - based on their experience - less trusting of strangers and maybe even willing to take advantage of a defenseless stranger. The prospects for cooperation (and th... (read more)

Picture fixed. Thanks for spotting that.

It would take a large amount of research...

That's the nature of illusion: If you research it there's no illusion. If you just glance at it without much thinking, the illusion is there.

Is this true?

As far as I am aware, yes. At some point it was all about Africa. I recall complaints about that in the media back at the time.

Whether it's a calque or a descriptive expression, I think the main problem is still that it addresses only one term. You encounter a term that has no good translation, invent your own translation, start using it and maybe it'll eventually catch on. But then you have to do the entire dance again for the next term.

What I was thinking of was using the English terms. There are, obviously, problems with the declinations, transliteration to cyrilic or what not, but the main blocker, I think, is that using English terms is seen as ugly, un-literary and generally... (read more)

4Viliam1y
Not sure how transparent is this for native English speakers, but imagine something like this: A: "To avoid dehydration, you should drink a lot of aqua." B: "Just say 'water', moron!" The connotation is that the first speaker is either pretentious, trying to gain some status cheaply by using a Latin word (connotating "I am educated", without actually saying anything impressive), which gets a fair slapdown ("we are just as educated as you")... or maybe actually repeats the teacher's password without fully understanding it, which would be quite shameful in case of an idea this simple. The principle is that the person who fully understands the idea (that you should drink water), and isn't trying to play blatant status moves, would almost certainly have said "water" instead. Which is a good heuristic (communication should be as clear as possible)... that fails if you are using the foreign word because there literally is no good translation (that would convey the intended connotations).
1Alaric1y
Yes, I agree. I think it depends on education in the community. Yes, for example, Leo Tolstoy in "War and peace" wrote even vast fragments in French. But most of his readers knew French well. (Almost exclusively well-educated person had time for fiction reading.) Now despite mandatory learning in school at least one foreign language many Russians know very badly even Latin alphabet (not to mention rules about reading English words). If you are writing/translating something for specialists, you may ignore that. But if you are writing fiction or something for beginners, you need to think about that. And yes, we have problems with declinations. It is hard to read sentences in Russian with words which cannot be declined by language rules. And I often think about the problem: If a reader knows English and sees words, for example, "taboo tradeoff", I think they can understand that "tradeoff" is about changing something to something. And due to that they can understand the whole term easier. If a reader doesn't know English, they see only some strange letter set. I think it may be important in writing text for beginners.

I think you are on the wrong track. Of course, in the end you can find the equivalent term that someone used somewhere.

But look at it from a different perspective.

Take a term that is used and understood in the rationalist community. Say "Moloch".

Now try to write an opinion piece to The Washington Post. If you want to refer to the concept of "Moloch" you can either explain it, wasting your allotted 3000 characters quickly, or just say "Moloch" and hope someone would get it. In the latter case one or two people may get it and the rest would think you are a c... (read more)

2gjm1y
Sorry, I should have made it more explicit that I wasn't making any sort of objection to your general point, just wondering about the specific examples you used. I completely agree that, whether or not there are Slovak terms that are good translations of "economies of scale" and "single point of failure", there are definitely some languages, or dialects, or systems of technical terminology, in which there are some things that can't be said so easily in some others, and that limits on what can easily be talked about are important, and that what communities' ideas end up with a barrier to entry into public discourse will depend on the size of the community and the size and quirks of whatever larger community they're embedded in. I'm not wholly convinced, though, that the size of the larger community is really the point. (To be clear, this is no part of what I was saying before, it's just something I notice while affirming that I agree with all those things I agree with.) If I try to get my head around the mechanisms whereby there aren't (assuming that indeed there aren't) Slovak terms for various standard economics concepts, the size of the Slovak-speaking world seems to enter in only quite indirectly: it's something like "Slovakia isn't a large market, so there aren't a lot of translations of English-language economics texts into Slovak, so the main channel by which those terms would have got into the Slovak language is rather narrow, so those terms haven't had much chance to take hold". All of which might be true, and does have to do with the size of the community -- but (1) only quite indirectly, and (2) it seems like there are other equally plausible mechanisms that have nothing to do with the size of the community. Maybe there are more economists in richer countries, and Slovakia is relatively poor, and so doesn't have a lot of people who have been exposed to technical terms of economics. Maybe it's relevant that Slovakia used to be part of the Soviet bloc wher

"Economies of scale" seems to be "úspory z rozsahu" ("saving from the extent") - but that sounds really weird and I've never heard it being used. My guess is that the economics professors just use the English term.

As for "single point of failure" I am an engineer myself and I've never encountered any Slovak equivalent.

2gjm1y
What about in translations of English texts? (I'm guessing that's pretty common, but have no actual idea.)

I am reading Hirshmann's Exit, Voice and Loyalty right now and it's great. But it's not about governance per se. Which book did you have in mind?

2jmh1y
I agree that Hirshmann is going to lay out any plan towards some ideal government but I do think he gets to some of the problems confronting good governance and so shed light on areas that need consideration. (As and aside I am far from hold the view that "ideal" governance is possible -- it's always going to be contextual in both time and place due to the dynamic nature of social life). If you've not already put his "The Passions and the Interests" you might also find it interesting. In the case of ideal governance it may have some pointers to Constitutional structures that are better at aligning interests (if they can be well enough defined) of the government agents with the societal principles while working to mitigate the passions of the agents. I've not read it but looking at the title "Shifting Involvements: Private Interests and Public Action" may also be relevant to thinking things though.

Some other stuff to look into:

  • Governance of Church. This may not seem like a big deal today, but in early medieval Europe, church probably had more capacity than states, so it mattered a lot. Also, catholic governance structures are quite different from protestant, from the structures in Judaism etc.
  • IETF has a pretty weird governance. The assumption is that anyone can join (or leave) at any moment, so the boundaries of the body politic are quite fuzzy. Thus, no voting, the stress on decision making by consensus, running code etc. Also, limited lifetime
... (read more)
4John Schulman1y
Lee Kuan Yew wrote about how he went looking for a governance system for his party, the PAP (which now rules Singapore) after the party nearly was captured by the communists in the 50s. He looked at the Catholic Church as an inspiring example of a system that had survived for a long time, and he eventually settled on a system based on the Church's system for electing cardinals and the Pope.
3jaspax1y
Fictional example: In The Chosen by Ricardo Pinto, the Emperor is elected by the entire body of nobles descended from a semi-legendary ancestor, but the number of votes is determined by a calculated blood quantum representing the percent of your total ancestry from that person. (In the book, the exceptionally pure-blooded dowager empress casts something like a quarter million votes by herself, but she is nonetheless outvoted by a coalition of most of the rest of the nobles.) One could imagine something similar for the US where voting rights are apportioned according to your ancestry from the Mayflower or the like. Or: all citizens are granted a single vote upon reaching the age of majority, but they are free to permanently sell that vote. Current vote holders are recorded in a public registry. There is a large and thriving vote-trading market. Savvy players will buy up large numbers of votes before an election that they care about, then sell them off before elections of lesser importance.

I've tried to double check. Global production of wheat and exports by Russia and Ukraine, according to FAO:

2019, in 1000 tonnes, amounts to 6.9%, very much the same numbers as you've got.

Where does the 5%/90% statistic come from?

Russian troops refuse to go to Ukraine on grounds they do not have passports, so Russia fires them.

These were riot police. From the interview:

  • What motivates the National Guard for their refusal to participate in the "special operation"?

  • It's very simple. People don't want to kill and get killed. When they got a job, the contract said different things. In addition, OMON has a different mission. They don’t know how to use ground-to-air systems, they don’t drive tanks. How should they fight against a regular army? And with what - with a baton and a sh

... (read more)

As for Galeev's threads: As a person from the former Ostblok, where countries share similar dynamics, there was nothing there that made me call bullshit on the spot. I am not a Russian though so I can't vouch for the particular details.

2Viliam1y
Same here. I am not an expert, but everything I have read so far fits my model of the world.

As a Russian I confirm that everything that Galeev says seems legit. I haven't been following our politics that much, but Gallev's model of Putin's fits my observations.

The only thing that looked a little suspicious to me was the thread on Russian parliamentarism -- there was an opportunity to say something about Navalny's team there (e.g. as a central example of party that can't be registered or something about them organizing protests), and I expected that he would mention it, but he didn't. In fact, I don't think he ever mentioned Navalny in any of his threads. Why?

I am an EU citizen and I've realized that I have little understanding of what EU is, how it works and how it came about. While researching the topic I've stumbled over Jean Monnet.

I guess the general approach is: Look for a surprising development (e.g. Europe suddenly overcoming old enmities) and research it. If change happened, there were people involved. Some of them had more impact, some of them less and some of them have even wrote down their thoughts and experiences.

Here are some interesting people and developments that may or may not prove fruitful t... (read more)

3Ben Pace1y
Thank you very much! This is very helpful to me right now!

Thanks for sharing the story. I've done some research myself and stumbled over the fact that Vavilov's favourite phrase was: "The life is short. One needs to hurry."

It expresses the same sentiment as Nick Bostrom's "Why did we start so late? " but I personally like it much better.

If the above is true, an interesting consequence would be that social progress may slow down as the average length of life increases.

The thing you are missing, I think, is the nature of common knowedge which underpins the society. Thanks to how it works, people can't achieve moral/societal progress individually. If you live in a violent society you can't get less violent by yourself. If you do, you'd get killed. If you live in a corrupt society you can't get less corrupt all by yourself. If you do, you'd be in disadvantage to all the corrupt people. The society can progress only as a whole, thus the limit on the speed of progress is determined by the speed in which the majority is able ... (read more)

3ChristianKl1y
Yes, but you can change systems to make it harder for people to be corrupt. You can fund investigative journalism. You can push for organizations to adopt structures that increase transparency.
5alkexr1y
Yes, I'm aware of all that, and I agree with your premises, but your argument doesn't prove what you think it does. Let's try to reductio it ad absurdum, and turn the same argument against the possibility of fast technological or scientific feedback cycles.  If you live in a technologically backwards society (think bronze age), you can't become more advanced technologically yourself, because you'll starve spending your time trying to do science. The technology of society (including agriculture, communication, tools, etc.) needs to progress as a whole. If you live in a scientifically backwards society, you can't have more accurate beliefs, because you'll be burned at the stake by all the people believing in nonsense. Therefore, science and technology can only progress as fast as the majority can adopt it. And all of the above is true, actually, up to a certain point in history. But once the scientific understanding of society advances to the point where it understands that science is a thing and has a basic understanding of how science works, it can basically create a mesa-feedback-loop. Similarly, once you have technologies like writing and free market capitalism, suddenly it's possible to set up a tech company, sell something worthwhile and in exchange not starve. And that's the frame for my original comment. I didn't mean to imply that a fast moral feedback loop would involve a single person going on some meditation retreat that is somehow a clever feedback loop in disguise and then come back more moral or whatnot. I think it is possible that there is some innovation, moral or social or otherwise (e.g. a common understanding of common knowledge), that would enable the creation of fast moral and social feedback loops. So the question, again: what are the necessary conditions for such a feedback loop? Are they present? What would it look like? How would you recognize it if it was happening right in front of you? (EDIT: spelling)
4Martin Sustrik1y
If the above is true, an interesting consequence would be that social progress may slow down as the average length of life increases.

I would say there were two distinct "progressive" worldwiews in the 19th century. The symbol of the bourgeois progressivism may be Exposition Universelle of 1889, the symbol of the proletarian progressivism the Paris Commune. Two events, same place, 18 years apart. The former with all the wonderful machines etc., the latter with the barricades and soldiers shooting the survivors. The two worldviews, being that distinct and held by different people, it's not clear to me whether the failures of the social progress school led to the souring towards the technical progress.

I haven't seen the latest book, but the older ones I've seen were written in the traditional anthropological way, mostly as collections of anecdata. That's not an objection specifically against Graeber. Anthropology was always done that way. But rigor-wise it doesn't compare to more modern stuff, like, say, Joe Henrich.

1callenK1y
In this one there is plenty of archeological evidence as it is co-authored by D.Wengrow who is a Professor of Comparative Archaeology. I believe Graeber could benefit from a more insistent editor. His writing sometimes seems like ‘stream of consciousness’ and outside of the constraints of academic distinction. On the other hand, his work and ideas circulate well beyond the discipline or anthropology and well beyond academia which allowed him to write in his own way I guess.

IIRC, the study was done on people living in a nearby big city, but originally coming from the respective region.

No idea. I was just speculating.

I don't know, frankly. But what I find fascinating is that one finds the tall poppy syndrome in any society. It almost feels like something inherent to human nature. Does it mean that there's something adaptive about it? And if so, are the societies like Tiv just those that that managed to take the full advantage of that potential?

2Pattern1y
is it an instinct present in 'feral humans'?

A different one. Tiv live in Nigeria, the study was conducted in DRC.

I think that's not the way how people instinctively think. Consider following statement: "Wall Street bankers should be stripped of their wealth/heavily taxed/prosecuted." Ignore whether it would be a good policy or not. Still, it's a human way to think and many do adopt that kind of stance. Now consider the opposite: "Wall Street bankers should be forced to share their methods so that everyone can prosper." That's quite an alien approach and one would be hard pressed to find many people who actually think that.

For the psychology behind it consider this ar... (read more)

I believe the book is rather fresh, haven't read it yet. But reading Graeber was always fun and thought-provoking, I've even exchanged few emails with him back when it was still possible. On the rigor side though I am not that convinced :)

1callenK1y
I highly recommend the dawn of everything as well. It is probably the most recent, up to date book on stateless societies.  Why do you have a problem with 'rigor' side in his books?
5ChristianKl1y
The typo still exists two times.
  1. "Alright, but the Swiss could do that because they didn't need to worry about any outside threat. They didn't have to deal with the same difficulties other countries had to deal with."

That's not historically true. Switzerland, being a country positioned in the middle of big European powers (France, Austria, HRE/Germany, Italy) has gone through all the shit that the rest of Europe did.

That being said, the things often played out differently than elsewhere. It's not clear how much of that is pure luck and how much is attributable to other factors, such as... (read more)

5Yoav Ravid2y
Thanks! These are good answers and some interesting history. That's a really good point I somehow haven't thought on. Some more info from Wikipedia [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Switzerland_during_the_World_Wars#Refugees] (Emphasis mine):

Self-review: Looking at the essay year and a half later I am still reasonably happy about it.

In the meantime I've seen Swiss people recommending it as an introductory text for people asking about Swiss political system, so I am, of course, honored, but it also gives me some confidence in not being totally off.

If I had to write the essay again, I would probably give less prominence to direct democracy and more to the concordance and decentralization, which are less eye-catchy but in a way more interesting/important.

Also, I would probably pay some attention ... (read more)

In red button game the players should be enemies (or at least unaligned) which doesn't play well with the in-community ritual. Adding EA forum this year was, IMO, a step in the right direction. What about getting some further off community involved? Maybe anti-nuclear activists like https://www.icanw.org ? One wouldn't, of course, expect anti-nuclear activists to press the button, but the community may be different enough (UN politics, anyone?) to make it interesting.

With age pyramid shifting is there really a dearth of available experts? If only a fraction of retired experts was involved in apprenticeship programmes, wouldn't that be enough to server the dwindling pool of young apprentices?

Those are some good points. I wonder whether similar happened (or could at all happen) in other nuclear countries, where we don't know about similar incidents - because the system haven't collapsed there, the archives were not made public etc.

Also, it makes actually celebrating Petrov's day as widely as possible important, because then the option for the lowest-ranked person would be: "Get demoted, but also get famous all around the world."

I think it's not just that the old generation has died out. It's also that the conflict theorists shut up for a while after such a bloodshed and gave the people like Hugo Grotius a window of opportunity to create the international law.

Similar thing, by the way, happened in Europe after WWII. I've written about it here. I wonder whether this opening of the window of opportunity after a major catastrophe is a common occurrence. If so, working on possible courses of action in advance, so that they can be quickly applied once a catastrophe is over, may be a usful strategy.

Replace blue and green with protestant and catholic, 95% with 60% and what you get is the Thirty Years' War and the beginning of the modern world order.

9Richard_Kennaway2y
Up to 60% "in some areas of Germany", Wikipedia says. Considering Europe as a whole, it says 8 million out of about 75 million. But yes, the Thirty Years War ended when the parties finally got it through their heads that neither side would ever win. That beginning of the modern world order was the great agreement to disagree that was the Peace of Westphalia, and even that involved conferences at two different places because the parties couldn't bear to all meet each other together. Thirty years. One generation. Maybe no-one ever changed their minds, it's just that the ones who grew up with it and then came into power realised that none of it had ever mattered. Should a country where cryonic preservation is routine try to take over one where it is forbidden?

Here it is (my translation): "You'll get money to distribute at the banks of Loire and three tobacconist shops as well. I even hope to get two postman offices. The finance minister haven't answered yet in this matter, but I'll let you know by telegraph. And moreover, you'll be able to depose almost anyone. You are clever and you will use these rights discreetly." (chapter XLIX)

No, it's just a random thought.

I think the real difference is in the incentives the person faces. If they need to compete for votes or for the favour of their superiors, they are, basically, in political business. The person may be an expert, yes, but the incentives force them to care less about technical superiority of the solution and more about whether it's palatable to the voters/benefactors.

If instead, you are hired to execute tasks that are handed to you by someone else, you can think: "Well, I can try to be cute and try to satisfy my boss' political preferences, at the expense of... (read more)

Looking back at the history of continental Europe, it looks to me we can either have bureaucracy or bureaucracy plus war. Pick one. That being said, it's not so clear to me what went wrong with the EU vaccination strategy. (Admittedly, I haven't been following it closely.) EU did pretty well in its own area, that is coordination. It managed to get the authority to act on behalf of the member states and prevent bidding wars that would otherwise end up with all the vaccines going to Germany and none to Bulgaria. It (as far as I understand) signed cheapskate ... (read more)

4GeneSmith2y
I was mainly referring to the long negotiation-induced delay in the EU's contract with Astra Zeneca. They inked their purchasing agreement a full 3 months after the UK, which is one of the primary reasons they have such a low vaccination rate in comparison. One might say that this simply meant the UK got more vaccines, but that's not true. The long negotiation period actually delayed the beginning of production https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-56286235 [https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-56286235] They've also failed to delay the second dose, which would have allowed more people to get vaccinated, further increasing the death toll. I don't know the degree to which this is simply due to the wrong people being in charge as opposed to poorly designed incentives or the structure of the EU itself. But as a whole, the EU has made many extremely costly mistakes.

Thanks for the feedback!

Unfortunately, the article is mess partly because the events back then were a mess and the entire topic seems to be under-researched. For example, I don't think there's any kind of official narrative for the early history of the EU. Popular understanding, I think, is that WWII was followed by the postwar boom. The entire dark period of 1945-1950 kind of went down the memory hole. (But I'm from the Ostblok, so maybe kids in the West were taught more about it.)

Anyway, I've added couple of links at the end of the article, but again, the events back then were complex and confusing, the resources are in multiple languages etc.

If I knew. Different international organizations exhibit different kind of failures. For example, for UN it may be the failure to agree, but for EU, as the recent vaccination story shows, agreement can be achieved, but execution may lack. The problem is compounded by the fact that institutions evolve in lockstep with the common knowledge (trust in the institutions and such) and thus exactly the same institutional design may produce vastly different results when applied to different countries or organizations. In the end, the only way to approach this, in ... (read more)

Good point about extended names. Yet one more operation that can be done with reputation tokens.

As for the spelling, I've tried to fix what I could. Feel free to point out any remaining typos.

I am not an economist, so it's hard to me to judge the quality of the paper. In fact, I was just trying to show the kind of argument made for bank independence at the time. Feel free to check the paper for yourself: https://debis.deu.edu.tr/userweb//yesim.kustepeli/dosyalar/alesinasummers1993.pdf Section 2. is about measuring the central bank independence.

2ChristianKl2y
It seems to cite among others Bade and Parkin's Central Bank Laws and Monetary Policy from 1982.  When it discusses Italy where shareholders have the right of proposing candidates and the government needs to approve them, it judges the government as having complete control.  In Germany where the Federal government appoints some members and the Bundesrat (body of the state governments) appoint others they judge the system as a self-perpetuating oligarchy. To the extend that they are it's because the job they are doing is valued by the ruling parties in Germany so they listen to their recommendations about who to appoint.

Wouldn't that create the same election-cycle-dependent behaviour seen with politically appointed boards?

1Measure2y
Maybe not all seats are up for (re)election any given year?

The reference comes from Prof. Wolfram Pyta from University of Stuttgart. However, given that Wikipedia disagrees and that the fact doesn't add any added value to the article anyway, I am removing it.

This is something I would like to study one day. There seems to have been a turn in German public attitude at some point. As far as I can say from what I've read, it haven't yet happened in early 50's. Denazification programme and Nurnberg trials were felt to be a farce a it's unclear whether they could have contributed to the change. Some public figures (e.g. Adenauer) may have lead by example, but frankly, I don't know.

If people here, especially Germans, have any insights on the topic, it would be great if they could share.

6ChristianKl2y
I haven't studied this in detail but as a German common knowledge would be that the main change in public attitude came around 1968.   The hippies were influential in challenging the political status quo in many countries and changing the German public attitude towards the Nazis being very bad happened at that time.  There are also lots of different things that happened in the cold war where Germans felt supported by other countries. The military occupation that existed in Germany also allowed the Allies to do various small things to affect German public attitudes.
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