Xi's Options — LessWrong

In the last couple of weeks, domestic coordination on mitigating AI risks has looked more likely. Therefore, I am increasingly concerned about the Chinese government’s (and various Chinese labs’) incentives over the next 6–18 months with respect to international coordination on mitigating potential existential risks from powerful AI. In this sequence, I attempt to model these incentives, and what they mean for Chinese policy.

In Part I, I argue that Chinese AI capabilities will fall increasingly behind the US without major policy shifts.
In Part II, I walk through several domestic policy interventions the CCP may use to improve the situation, and analyze whether these are likely to be sufficient.
In Part III, I discuss foreign policy interventions such as sabotage and weight theft, excluding bilateral treaties or other international coordination.
In Part IV, I describe some considerations on China’s plate walking into hypothetical negotiations for an AI treaty with the United States.