If anyone wants to have a voice chat with me about a topic that I'm interested in (see my recent post/comment history to get a sense), please contact me via PM.
My main "claims to fame":
Given that Vernor Vinge wrote The Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era in 1993, which single-handedly established much of the memeplex, including the still ongoing AI-first vs IA-first debate, another interesting question is why didn't anyone found the AI safety field until around 2000.
For me, I'm not sure when I read this essay, but I did read Vinge's A Fire Upon the Deep in 1994 as a college freshman, which made me worried about a future AI takeover, but (as I wrote previously) I thought there would be plenty of smarter people working in AI safety so I went into applied cryptography instead (as a form of d/acc). Eliezer after reading Vinge (as a teen) didn't immediately heed the implicit or explicit safety warnings and instead wanted to accelerate the arrival of the Singularity as much as possible. It took him until around 2000 to pivot to safety. Nick Bostrom I think was concerned from the beginning or very early, but he was a PhD student when he got interested and I guess it took him a while to work through the academic system until he could found FHI in 2005.
Maybe the real question is why didn't anyone else, i.e., someone with established credentials and social capital, found the field. Why did the task fall to a bunch of kids/students? The fact that nobody did it earlier does seem to suggest that it takes a very rare confluence of factors/circumstances for someone to do it.
(Another tangential puzzle is why Vinge himself didn't get involved, as he was a professor of computer science in addition to science fiction writer. AFAIK he stayed completely off the early mailing lists as well as OB/LW nor had any contacts with anyone in AI safety.)
Let me rephrase. I already believed that there had been a plan originally, like 2004 +/- 3 years, to make sovereign AI. When I was entering the field, I don't recall thinking too hard about "what do you do with it", other than thinking about a Task-ish thing, but with Sovereign AI as a good test case for thought experiments. I don't know when Yudkowsky and others updated (and still don't).
I got a free subscription to Perplexity Pro, and used it to generate a report about this. The result seems pretty good. The short answer to "when Yudkowsky updated (from Sovereign to Task AGI)" is very likely 2014 or 2015 (see second collapsed section below).
Perplexity AI research report on "using this post and comment and linked resources as a starting point, can you build a comprehensive picture of SIAI/MIRI's strategy over time, especially pinpointing the specific dates that its strategy changed/pivoted, backed up by the best available evidence
https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/dGotimttzHAs9rcxH/relitigating-the-race-to-build-friendly-ai"
The Machine Intelligence Research Institute (MIRI), originally the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence (SIAI), has changed strategy multiple times.
Over 25 years, the strategy has moved through roughly these phases:
Below is a more detailed, evidence‑based timeline, with particular attention to when strategy clearly shifted.
Founding mission (July 2000).
The organization is founded on 27 July 2000 as the Singularity Institute for Artificial Intelligence by Eliezer Yudkowsky and Brian & Sabine Atkins. The mission statement on the early IRS forms and timeline is explicit:
“Create a Friendly, self‑improving Artificial Intelligence.”timelines.issarice
Early technical writings like Coding a Transhuman AI and Creating Friendly AI 1.0 (2001) describe specific architectures for a transhuman AI that self‑improves while remaining benevolent. This is not just “study risks”; it is a plan to design the Seed AI.intelligence+1
Early accelerationism.
MIRI’s own 2024 retrospective states that at founding, the goal was:
“to try to accelerate to smarter‑than‑human AI as quickly as possible, on the assumption that greater‑than‑human intelligence entails greater‑than‑human morality.”intelligence
So the earliest SIAI strategy can be summarized as:
Approximate pivot:
By MIRI’s own later account, Eliezer’s “naturalistic awakening” — realizing that superintelligence would not automatically be moral — occurs between 2000–2003, and:
“MIRI shifted its focus to the alignment problem around 2003.”intelligence+1
So around 2003 there is a conceptual pivot from “accelerate AGI, assume it’s benevolent” to “AI alignment is a hard, central problem.”
Mission reformulation (2007 and 2010).
By 2007 the formal mission is updated to:
“developing safe, stable, and self‑modifying Artificial General Intelligence.”timelines.issarice
In 2010 it further becomes:
“To develop the theory and particulars of safe self‑improving Artificial Intelligence… and otherwise improve the probability of humanity surviving future technological advances.”timelines.issarice
This is already less “we will build it” and more “develop theory and improve odds,” but still assumes SIAI as central technical actor.
Strategic plan 2011: three‑pronged strategy.
The 2011 Strategic Plan lays out three “core strategies”:
Near‑term (2011–2012) priorities emphasise:
So in this period, strategy is mixed:
Evidence they still saw themselves as the eventual FAI builders.
Several pieces of evidence support the picture that, in the 2000s and up to at least ~2011, SIAI’s central plan was that it (or a very close “functional equivalent”) would actually build the first Friendly AGI:
In a video first hosted in 2011, Eliezer says:
“As a research fellow of the Singularity Institute, I'm supposed to first figure out how to build a Friendly AI, and then once I've done that go and actually build one…
The Singularity Institute was founded on the theory that in order to get a Friendly artificial intelligence someone's got to build one. So there. We're just going to have an organization whose mission is ‘build a Friendly AI’. That's us. … At the core, the reasoning is: ‘Someone has to do it. “Someone” is us.’”lesswrong
Luke Muehlhauser’s 2013 post Friendly AI Research as Effective Altruism (looking back on the founding) explicitly confirms:
“MIRI was founded in 2000 on the premise that creating Friendly AI is the best way to ensure a positive Singularity…
MIRI co‑founder Eliezer Yudkowsky usually talks about MIRI in particular — or at least, a functional equivalent — creating Friendly AI.”intelligence
Wei Dai’s 2025 LessWrong post also recalls that he was “arguing against SIAI/MIRI’s plan to build FAI” as early as 2004. That is consistent with the explicit “someone is us” framing above.lesswrong+1
So for roughly 2000–2010, the strategic picture is:
Here we see the first clearly documented organizational pivot with a date.
In April 2013, MIRI (new name) publishes MIRI’s Strategy for 2013. Key elements:intelligence
They have:
“once [been] doing three things — research, rationality training, and the Singularity Summit. Now we’re doing one thing: research. Rationality training was spun out to CFAR, and the Summit was acquired by Singularity University.”intelligence
After strategic planning with 20+ advisors in early 2013, they decide to:
“(1) put less effort into public outreach, and
(2) shift our research priorities to Friendly AI math research.”intelligence
They distinguish expository, strategic, and Friendly AI research and explicitly say:
“Strategic research will consume a minority of our research budget in 2013…”intelligence
In other words, as of early 2013:
In the same period, MIRI’s formal mission statement is softened from “create Friendly AI” to a more conditional role. Luke writes in June 2013:
“When updating MIRI’s bylaws in early 2013, Yudkowsky and I came to a compromise on the language of MIRI’s mission statement, which now reads:
‘[MIRI] exists to ensure that the creation of smarter‑than‑human intelligence has a positive impact… Thus, the charitable purpose… is to: (a) perform research… (b) raise awareness… (c) advise… and (d) as necessary, implement a smarter‑than‑human intelligence with humane, stable goals’ (emphasis added).”intelligence
Luke adds:
“My own hope is that it will not be necessary for MIRI (or a functional equivalent) to attempt to build Friendly AI itself. But… I must remain open to the possibility that this will be the wisest course of action as the first creation of AI draws nearer.”intelligence
So early 2013 marks a formal pivot:
Wei Dai’s 2025 LessWrong post, which you linked, is primarily about this era. He characterizes the “circa 2013” strategy as:
“MIRI’s circa 2013 plan, to build a world‑altering Friendly AI, was a good one?”alignmentforum+1
His argument is that this plan was strategically bad even ex ante, because a small team attempting to directly build a Friendly sovereign AI faces “illegible safety problems” — traps they cannot even see.lesswrong
Does the evidence support that this really was the plan?
In the 2013 strategy conversation with Holden Karnofsky and others, Eliezer says:
“Civilization doesn’t seem to be handling AI friendliness on its own … so our mission: just go do it…
I have never held out much hope for approaching a random AGI project 30 years from now… and showing them a bunch of results… So it doesn’t necessarily have to be in MIRI’s basement. It’s going to be some project that shows what I would consider a reasonable level of concern… The present community that we're trying to gather is not so much a community of people who are going to be influential on someone else. It's more like a community of people who do research work.”openphilanthropy
This is consistent with: MIRI expects either itself, or a close “strategically adequate” project built around its ideas and people, to be the group that actually builds the first aligned AGI.
Put together, the best reading is:
This is almost exactly the “race to build Friendly AI” picture the LessWrong post is relitigating, although there is internal disagreement over how much this should be described as “take over the world yourselves” versus “someone legitimate should, and we might be that someone.”lesswrong
Over time, there is a shift in how MIRI talks about what the first aligned system should do.
The LessWrong “pivotal act” and “Task AGI” pages (compiled later, but summarizing this thinking) explicitly give examples of a Task AGI that can:
These are very close to the examples quoted in the comment thread you provided.
When does this show up as strategy?
The clearest institutional articulation is MIRI’s 2017 Fundraiser and Strategy Update (Nov 30, 2017). That document lays out a multi‑step high‑level plan:effectivealtruism
MIRI expects this to require a “risk‑mitigating technology” developed via:
“AGI‑empowered technological development carried out by task‑based AGI systems.”effectivealtruism
That, in turn, requires:
“Construction of minimal aligned AGI… aligned AGI that has the minimal necessary capabilities for ending the acute risk period.”effectivealtruism
This is, in effect, the Task‑AGI / pivotal‑act plan written down in strategic language.
So while Task‑AGI ideas were developing earlier, 2017‑11‑30 is the first strong documented pivot point where MIRI’s official strategic picture becomes:
Eli Tyre’s later comment, which you saw in the LessWrong thread, describes an “intentional switch, around 2016 (though I’m not confident in the date), from aiming to design a Friendly CEV‑optimizing sovereign AI to aiming to design a corrigible minimal Science‑And‑Engineering‑AI to stabilize the world.” That matches what shows up publicly in 2017.lesswrong
In parallel, there was a major research‑tactics pivot.
The 2017 fundraiser already notes that, with new funding and changed views, MIRI is “starting to explore new research directions while also continuing to push on our agent foundations agenda,” and is hiring software engineers to “experiment and explore some ideas in implementation.”effectivealtruism
The 2018 post 2018 Update: Our New Research Directions gives a detailed picture:intelligence
These directions are explicitly engineering‑heavy, Haskell‑centric, and aimed at deconfusion while building real code, not just pen‑and‑paper math.intelligence
The same 2018 post announces a major change in publication policy:
“MIRI recently decided to make most of its research ‘nondisclosed‑by‑default’, by which we mean that going forward, most results discovered within MIRI will remain internal‑only unless there is an explicit decision to release those results…”intelligence
Reasons include:
So 2018‑11‑22 marks a clear tactical pivot:
This is almost certainly the “4–5 years of confidential‑by‑default research” that Habryka references in the comment thread.lesswrong
By late 2020, MIRI states that the 2017–2019 “new directions” have not panned out as hoped.
In 2020 Updates and Strategy (Dec 20, 2020), Nate Soares writes:intelligence
Senior staff have become “more pessimistic about this approach”:
“The non‑public‑facing research I (Nate) was most excited about had a flavor of attempting to develop new pragmatically‑feasible foundations for alignable AI… After pushing more on these lines of research, MIRI senior staff have become more pessimistic about this approach.”intelligence
As a result:
“We are currently in a state of regrouping, weighing our options, and searching for plans that we believe may yet have a shot at working.”intelligence
Some researchers leave; others attempt to “rescue” the 2017‑initiated lines; others pivot to new exploratory projects.intelligence
This is a clear strategic pivot dated 2020‑12‑20:
Eliezer’s widely read 2022 essay AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities further clarifies how MIRI leadership now see the situation.intelligence+1
Key points relevant to strategy:
He argues a pivotal act is still needed:
“We need to align the performance of some large task, a ‘pivotal act’ that prevents other people from building an unaligned AGI that destroys the world.”intelligence
Although AGI Ruin is not itself a strategy document, it marks a public rhetorical pivot:
MIRI’s 2024 Mission and Strategy Update (Jan 3–4, 2024) is the most explicit top‑level strategy document and also provides a retrospective on earlier phases.lesswrong+2
After reviewing its history (founding accelerationism, 2003 alignment shift, 2006–2012 community‑building, 2013 Agent Foundations, 2017 engineering push, 2020 regrouping), it states:
“In 2023, MIRI shifted its strategy to pursue three objectives:
- Policy: Increase the probability that the major governments of the world end up coming to some international agreement to halt progress toward smarter‑than‑human AI, until humanity’s state of knowledge… has drastically changed; and until we are able to secure these systems…
- Communications: Share our models of the situation with a broad audience…
- Research: Continue to invest in a portfolio of research… including technical alignment research (though we’ve become more pessimistic that such work will have time to bear fruit if policy interventions fail to buy the research field more time).”effectivealtruism+2
They add:
“Although we plan to pursue all three of these priorities, it’s likely that policy and communications will be a higher priority for MIRI than research going forward.”lesswrong+1
Thus, in 2023 (per the 2024 retrospective) MIRI’s top‑level strategy pivots to:
This is a very sharp contrast with:
Now, outreach and policy work are explicitly prioritized over new technical work.
Below is a concise list of the clearest, evidence‑backed pivot points.
| Date / period | Pivot | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| 2000‑07‑27 | Founding as SIAI with mission “Create a Friendly, self‑improving AI” and early accelerationist assumption “greater intelligence ⇒ greater morality.” | Founding mission on 2000 Form 990 and timeline; MIRI 2024 retrospective.timelines.issarice+1 |
| ~2003 | Conceptual shift from “accelerate AGI, assume morality” to “alignment is hard and central”; focus moves to the Friendly AI problem and x‑risk. | MIRI 2024 history: “shifted its focus to the alignment problem around 2003.”intelligence+1 |
| 2007–2010 | Mission reworded to “developing safe, stable, and self‑modifying AGI” and then “develop the theory… of safe self‑improving AI,” still with self‑image as eventual FAI builder. | Mission entries on timeline; early FAI texts.timelines.issarice+2 |
| 2011 strategic plan (Aug 2011) | First formal organisational strategy: three pillars (FAI research, outreach/human capital, organisational improvements); heavy emphasis on Summit and rationality outreach. | Strategic Plan, updated Aug 2011.intelligence |
| By ~2011 (video) | Eliezer states explicitly that SI’s mission is “first figure out how to build a Friendly AI, and then… actually build one… ‘Someone has to do it. “Someone” is us’,” confirming the self‑builder strategy. | 2011 video quoted by Eli Tyre.lesswrong |
| Early 2013 | Formal bylaw/mission change: from “build FAI” to “ensure that the creation of smarter‑than‑human intelligence has a positive impact,” with building AGI only “as necessary.” | Luke’s Friendly AI Research as Effective Altruism quoting the new bylaws.intelligence |
| 2013‑04‑12 | MIRI’s Strategy for 2013: pivot from “research + outreach + Summit + rationality” to “one thing: research,” with outreach and expository work sharply deprioritized and FAI math research prioritized. | MIRI’s Strategy for 2013.intelligence |
| Circa 2013 (world‑altering FAI plan) | Operational plan: MIRI or a closely allied small team aims to build a world‑altering Friendly AI (often sovereign / CEV‑like) to secure the future; this is the central “race to build Friendly AI” debated by Wei Dai et al. | Wei Dai’s retrospective; Luke’s confirmation that Eliezer talks of MIRI in particular creating FAI; 2013 strategy conversation stating “mission: just go do it,” possibly not “in MIRI’s basement” but via a tightly concerned project.lesswrong+3 |
| 2017‑11‑30 | 2017 Fundraiser and Strategy Update: explicit strategic model of success via “AGI‑empowered technological development” by task‑based AGI, construction of “minimal aligned AGI”, and need for a strategically adequate project; this is the Task‑AGI / pivotal‑act plan in official form. | 2017 strategy/fundraiser post.effectivealtruism |
| 2017–2018 | Launch of “new research directions” — engineering‑heavy, software‑based deconfusion work — alongside Agent Foundations, enabled by new funding. | 2017 fundraiser and 2018 update.effectivealtruism+1 |
| 2018‑11‑22 | Adoption of “nondisclosed‑by‑default” policy: most new technical results kept internal unless clear safety upside in release; MIRI explicitly positions itself as doing non‑outreach, straight‑shot alignment research. | 2018 Update: Our New Research Directions.intelligence |
| 2020‑12‑20 | 2020 Updates and Strategy: senior staff judge that the 2017–2019 non‑public‑facing research “has, at this point, largely failed”; MIRI enters a state of regrouping and strategy search. | 2020 Updates and Strategy.intelligence |
| 2022‑06‑10 | AGI Ruin: A List of Lethalities: public articulation that alignment is extremely difficult and likely to fail; still endorses need for a “pivotal act” but with very little hope of achieving it under current dynamics. | AGI Ruin.intelligence+1 |
| 2023 (described 2024‑01‑03) | Major strategy shift to policy and communications as higher priority than research: goal is to increase odds of an international agreement to halt progress toward smarter‑than‑human AI, while still doing some technical and supporting research. | MIRI 2024 Mission and Strategy Update.intelligence+2 |
Starting from the post and comments you linked:
The main point of disagreement in the LessWrong discussion is about phrasing like “MIRI’s plan, to build a Friendly AI to take over the world,” which some participants (e.g. Habryka) see as overstating how explicitly “take over the world ourselves” was ever adopted as official organizational strategy, versus “someone should do something world‑altering, and maybe that someone is us or a very similar team.”lesswrong
On the factual side, however, the evidence is fairly clear that:
That is the best evidence‑backed reconstruction of SIAI/MIRI’s strategic trajectory given the post, its links, and MIRI’s own later retrospectives.
Follow-up answer to "Can you dig deeper, for example into LessWrong posts/comments, to find out when Eliezer or MIRI first started thinking or talking about task AGI?"
Based on a deeper analysis of LessWrong posts, Arbital edit histories, and MIRI archives, the concept of Task AGI (and the associated shift to "pivotal acts" rather than immediate "Sovereign/CEV") emerged earlier than the 2017 strategy update.
The specific "origin date" for the term and formalized concept is June 9, 2015.
The timeline of MIRI's internal pivot to "Task AGI" can be reconstructed as:
In short: While the public saw the pivot in 2017, the intellectual shift happened in mid-2015, likely triggered by the digestion of Bostrom’s 2014 book and the need for a more pragmatic "minimum viable" target than full CEV.
Hmm, did you also read my immediate reply to him, where I made the point "if you’re the only philosopher in the team, how will others catch your mistakes?" How to understand his (then) plan except that he would have been willing to push the "launch" button even if there were zero other similarly capable philosophers available to scrutinize his philosophical ideas?
Definitely read the second link if you haven't already (it's very short and salient), but otherwise, sure.
But what I most want to read from you right now is an in-depth account of which the things in the world have gone or are going most right, and the ways in which you think metaphilosophical competence or consequentialist reasoning contributed to them.
(First a terminological note: I wouldn't use the phrase "metaphilosophical competence", and instead tend to talk about either "metaphilosophy", meaning studying the nature of philosophy and philosophical reasoning, how should philosophical problems be solved, etc., or "philosophical competence", meaning how good someone is at solving philosophical problems or doing philosophical reasoning. And sometimes I talk about them together, like in "metaphilosophy / AI philosophical competence" because I think solving metaphilosophy is the best way to improve AI philosophical competence. Here I'll interpret you to just mean "philosophical competence".)
To answer your question, it's pretty hard to think of really good examples, I think because humans are very bad at both philosophical competence and consequentialist reasoning, but here are some:
I guess this isn't an "in-depth account" but I'm also not sure why you're asking for "in-depth", i.e., why doesn't a list like this suffice?
I should also try to write up the same thing, but about how virtues contributed to good things.
I think non-consequentialist reasoning or ethics probably worked better in the past, when the world changed more slowly and we had more chances to learn from our mistakes (and refine our virtues/deontology over time), so I wouldn't necessarily find this kind of writing very persuasive, unless it somehow addressed my central concern that virtues do not seem to be a kind of thing that is capable of doing enough "compute/reasoning" to find consistently good strategies in a fast changing environment on the first try.
I just came across @lukeprog's (Executive Director of MIRI at the time) Intelligence Amplification and Friendly AI (while looking for something else), which seems to be a reply to Justin Shovelain's doc and my post.
I think no one should build AGI. If someone is going to build AGI anyway, then it might be correct to make AGI yourself first, if you have a way to make actually aligned (hopefully task-ish or something).
If Eliezer or MIRI as a whole had said something like this, especially the first part "I think no one should build AGI." while pursuing their plans, I would be more tempted to give them a pass. But I don't recall them saying this, and a couple of AIs I asked couldn't find any such statements (until after their latest pivot).
Also I wouldn't actually endorse this statement, because because it doesn't take into account human tendency/bias to think of oneself as good/careful and others as evil/reckless.
I'm still not sure where you're getting this?
Eliezer claiming to have solved metaethics. Saying that he wouldn't "flinch from" trying to solve all philosophical problems related to FAI by himself. (man, it took me 30-60 minutes to find this link) Being overconfident on other philosophical positions like altruism and identity.
If there was (by great surprise) some amazing pile of insights that made a safe Task-AGI seem feasible, and that stood up to comprehensive scrutiny (somehow), then it would plausibly be a good plan to actually do.
I would be more ok with this (but still worried about unknown unknowns) if "comprehensive scrutiny" meant scrutiny by thousands of world-class researchers over years/decades with appropriate institutional design to help mitigate human biases (e.g., something like academic cryptography research + NIST's open/public standardization process for crypto algorithms). But nothing like this was part of MIRI's plans, and couldn't be because of the need for speed and secrecy.
I expect that this kind of reasoning itself steers people away from making important scientific contributions, which are often driven by open-ended curiosity and a drive to uncover deep truths.
I agree with this statement denotatively, and my own interests/work have generally been "driven by open-ended curiosity and a drive to uncover deep truths", but isn't this kind of motivation also what got humanity into its current mess? In other words, wasn't the main driver of AI progress this kind of curiosity (until perhaps the recent few years when it has been driven more by commercial/monetary/power incentives)?
I would hesitate to encourage more people to follow their own curiosity, for this reason, even people who are already in AI safety research, due to the consideration of illegible safety problems, which can turn their efforts net-negative if they're being insufficiently strategic (which seems hard to do while also being driven mainly by curiosity).
I think I've personally been lucky, or skilled in some way that I don't understand, in that my own curiosity has perhaps been more aligned with what's good than most people's, but even some of my interests, e.g. in early cryptocurrency, might have been net-negative.
I guess this is related to our earlier discussion about how important being virtuous is to good strategy/prioritization, and my general sense is that consistently good strategy requires a high amount of consequentialist reasoning, because the world is too complicated and changes too much and too frequently to rely on pre-computed shortcuts. It's hard for me to understand how largely intuitive/nonverbal virtues/curiosity could be doing enough "compute" or "reasoning" to consistently output good strategy.
A lot of what I have in mind is that Deng allowed more freedom than can readily explained by his self-interest, and Xi seems more Maoist than Deng.
I think this can mostly be explained by different incentives faced by Deng and Xi. Here's a longer AI-generated explanation on Deng allowing more freedom, which generally matches my own understanding:
Gemini 3.0 Pro's response to "is it fair to say Deng Xiaoping allowed more freedom than can readily explained by his self-interest"
It is generally not fair—or at least, historically inaccurate—to say that Deng Xiaoping allowed more freedom than can be explained by his self-interest.
To understand why, one must define what Deng’s "self-interest" was. If self-interest is defined narrowly as "accumulating personal wealth" or "exercising sadism," then he was certainly more benevolent than that.
However, if self-interest is defined as the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the preservation of his own legacy as the savior of China, then almost every freedom he granted can be explained as a calculated move to serve those ends.
Here is an analysis of why Deng’s granting of freedoms aligns closely with political necessity rather than altruistic liberalism.
When Deng rose to paramount power in the late 1970s, the CCP was facing a crisis of legitimacy. The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution had left the country in poverty and social chaos. Belief in Marxist ideology was shattered.
Deng realized that for the Party (and himself) to survive, they could no longer rely on ideological fervor; they needed results.
In the late 1970s, Deng was locked in a power struggle with Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, and the "Whateverist" faction (hardline Maoists).
Deng introduced term limits, collective leadership, and mandatory retirement ages. One could argue this limited his own power, and thus went against his self-interest.
The ultimate test of whether Deng prioritized freedom over self-interest occurred in 1989. Protesters demanded political transparency, an end to corruption, and greater press freedom.
There is one area where Deng went further than a purely cynical dictator might have: The Southern Tour (1992).
After Tiananmen, conservatives in the party wanted to roll back economic reforms. An elderly Deng, holding no official top titles, toured southern China to rally support for continued economic liberalization.
Deng Xiaoping was a pragmatist, not a liberal. His famous maxim, "It doesn't matter if a cat is black or white, so long as it catches mice," sums up his approach to freedom.
He viewed freedom not as a human right, but as a utility. He dispensed exactly as much economic and personal freedom as was necessary to unleash China’s productivity and restore the Party’s strength, but he ruthlessly withheld any political freedom that threatened the Party’s dominance. Therefore, his actions are readily explained by a sophisticated, long-term understanding of self-interest.
The ideologies are partly a tool for that, but they have more effects on the wielder than a mere tool does. My biggest piece of evidence for that is the mostly peaceful collapse of the Soviet Union. I was quite surprised that the leaders didn't use more force to suppress dissent.
This seems fair, but I note that other Communist countries did suppress dissent more forcefully. One explanation is that it's a tool wielded by a fairly dumb and constrained agent, namely one's subconscious, and sometimes the situation gets away from it before it has a chance to respond. In my "master-slave" post linked earlier, I wrote:
Plus, the slave is in charge day-to-day and could potentially overthrow the master. For example, the slave could program an altruistic AI and hit the run button, before the master has a chance to delete the altruism value from the slave.
After reading this article by a human historian (Bill Black), I think there's a number of inaccuracies in Claude's account above, but the key point I wanted to verify is that Truman's reaction happened after just that one sentence by Oppenheimer (which in my mind seems like an appropriate expression of reflection/remorse, not being a drama queen, if he didn't do or say anything else "dramatic"), and that does seem to be true.
The author's conclusions, which seems right to me: