I think if you disagree with what someone thinks, or plans to do, the rational response is an argument to persuade them that they are wrong. (This is true irrespectively of whether they were, themselves, arguing, and it goes for the fruit-seller, the wrestler, etc. too.)
Of course if what you want is to acquire fruit from someone or defeat them in wrestling--as opposed to showing them that they are wrong--then you should not use argument, but money/force.
This has led me to ponder the following question:
What is the difference between trying to persuade someone that something is the right or best thing for them to do, and trying to incentivize them to do that thing (by payment, or threats, etc.)?
I do believe there is a difference, but I do not have an adequate account of what the difference is.
Thanks for bringing this problem to my attention.
Also, if you want to read the NYT oped (sorry abt paywall), I've put the text here:
https://twitter.com/AgnesCallard/status/1277304501133873152?s=20
Hi, thanks for writing this, someone linked me to it on twitter and I wrote a reply there: https://twitter.com/AgnesCallard/status/1277274771735089152?s=20
Yes, good point, thanks for the request for clarification.
I think there is a third kind of rationality, called "communicative rationality"
See this tweet: https://twitter.com/AgnesCallard/status/1276531044024451073?s=20
(and also my replies to questions therein)
I think there is such a thing as "communicating well" where "well" picks out internal norms of communication (not, e.g. in such a way as to conduce instrumentally to my interests or to my having truer beliefs--bc it could happen that lying to you serves either of those ends) and that is what I mean by "communicating rationally"
The goals of such communication are what I called (in the tweet thread) "bidirectional likemindedness"--that we think the same thing, but not bc it's determined in advance that you will think what I (independently) thought or that I will think what you (independently) thought.