And very scary as well.
Given the current status quo, it is impossible. However, I can imagine the political world developing into an atmosphere where Esperanto might be made the lingua franca. Imagine that American and British power continues to decline, and Russia and China and German, and maybe India, become more influential, leading to a new status quo, a stalemate. Given sufficiently long stalemate, like decades, Esperanto might once again become a politically viable situation.
Are people here is interested in having a universal language, and have strong opinions on esperanto?
I just thought of this 'cute' question and not sure how to answer it.
The sample space of an empirical statement is True or False. Then, given an empirical statement, one would then assign a certain prior probability 0<p<1 to TRUE and one minus that to FALSE. One would not assign a p=1 or p=0 because it wouldn't allow believe updating.
For example: Santa Claus is real.
I suppose most people in LW will assign a very small p to that statement, but not zero. Now my question is, what is the prior probability value for the following statement:
Prior probability cannot be set to 1.
Thank you. This reply actually answer the first part of my question.
The 'working' presuppositions include:
I will quote most important part from Fundamental Doubts
So, in the end, I think we must allow the use of brains to think about thinking; and the use of evolved brains to think about evolution; and the use of inductive brains to think about induction; and the use of brains with an Occam prior to think about whether the universe appears to be simple; for these things we really cannot unwind entirely, even when we have reason to distrust them. Strange loops through the meta level, I think, are not the same as circular logic.
And this have a lot of similarities with my previous conclusion (with significant differences about circular logic and meta loops)
a non-contradicting collection of self-referential statement that covers the epistemology and axiology
I will have to copy paste my answer to your other comment:
Yes I could. I chose not to. It is a balance between suspension of disbelieve and narrative simplicity. Moreover, I am not sure how much credence should I put on recent cosmological theories that they will not be updated the future, making my narrative set up obsolete. I also do not want to burden my reader with familiarity of cosmological theories.
Am I not allowed to use such narrative technique to simplify my story and deliver my point? Yes I know it is out of touch with the human condition but I was hoping it would not strain my audiences' suspension of disbelieve.
genuine marital relationship
"If Adam is guilty, then the relationship was not genuine." Am I on the right track? or did I misunderstood your question?
Why are you a theist?
This is very poorly formulated. But there are 2 foundations in my logic. First is, that I am leaning towards presuppositionalism (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Presuppositional_apologetics). The only way to build a 'map', first of all, is to take a list of presuppositions for granted. I am also interested in that (see my post on http://lesswrong.com/lw/nsm/open_thread_jul_25_jul_31_2016/). The idea is that a school could have a non-contradicting collection of self-referential statement that covers the epistemology and axiology and another school have another distinct collection. And due to the expensiveness of computation and lack of information, both maps are equally good and predicting what should and should not happen ("and also what is actually... (read more)
We needn't presume that we are not in a simulation, we can evaluate the evidence for it.
How do we not fall into the rabbit hole of finding evidence that we are not in a simulation?
Second language might still be necessary for the cognitive development effect.