The Instrumental Value of Good and Evil

The naturalist, realist project of morality is one that aims to define what is right and wrong by appealing to a set of objective moral truths, whether that be through the maximization of pleasure or through the categorical imperative. However, this essay will argue these theories fall short insofar as they fail to establish the existence of objective mind-independent moral properties. Nevertheless, completely embracing an error theory of morality likely leads to complete moral abolitionism which, for the pragmatist, is not an appealing reality. Therefore, this essay explores alternatives, such as Smith’s constitutivism and Joyce’s fictionalism, to fill the nihilistic void left by the anti-realist. While it is better to dispense of the metaphysically objective good and evil, the counterfactual must be one that embraces a fictional view of morality.

Issues Pertaining to Moral Realism

Moral realism faces insurmountable challenges in establishing objective moral facts independent of human attitudes and institutions. J.L. Mackie's "argument from queerness" identifies the core problem. Moral properties would be metaphysically peculiar entities unlike anything else in our ontology. They would need inherent motivational force, somehow bridging Hume's is-ought gap.

Consider utilitarian attempts to ground morality in pleasure maximization. Hedonistic states are real psychological phenomena, but the claim that we ought to maximize them requires an unjustified normative leap. Utilitarians must posit that pleasure possesses intrinsic "to-be-pursuedness" independent of our attitudes. Yet such properties appear nowhere else in scientific understanding. Neurochemical processes underlying pleasure represent evolved behavioral reinforcement mechanisms, not objective moral significance.

Kantian deontology attempts to derive moral obligations from rational agency itself. The categorical imperative generates universal moral laws through pure practical reason, independent of contingent desires. However, this faces the normative authority problem. Even granting logical inconsistencies in universalized maxims, why should consistency constitute moral obligation rather than mere instrumental rationality? Kantians claim rational agents are necessarily committed to consistency, but this fails to explain why logical commitment carries moral rathe...

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