I don't think it's *contradicting* it but I vaguely thought maybe it's in tension with:
"Big changes within
companiesGovernment AI x-risk policy are typically bottlenecked much more by coalitional politics than knowledge of technical details.
Because lack of knowledge of technical details by A ends up getting B to reject and oppose A.
Mostly I wasn't trying to push against you though, and more trying to download part of your model on how important you think this is, out of curiosity, given your experience at OA.
Do you not think it's a problem that big-picture decisions can be blocked by a kind of overly-strong demand for rigor from people who are used to mostly think about technical details?
I sometimes notice something roughly like the following dynamic:
1. Person A is trying to make a big-picture claim (e.g. that ASI could lead to extinction) that cannot be argued for purely in terms of robust technical details (since we don't have ASI yet to run experiments, and don't have a theory yet),
2. Person B is more used to think about technical details that allow you to make robust but way more limited conclusions.
3. B finds some detail in A's argument that is unjustified or isn't exactly right, or even just might be wrong.
4. A thinks the detail really won't change the conclusion, and thinks this just misses the point, but doesn't want to spend time, because getting all the details exactly right would take maybe a decade.
5. B concludes A doesn't know what they're talking about and continues ignoring the big picture question completely and keeps focusing on more limited questions.
6. The issue ends up ignored.
It seems to me that this dynamic is part of the coalitional politics and how the high-level arguments are received?
Interesting, I wonder what you think of this:
My sense is that there is a underlying psychological dynamic going on that people tend to judge their current state relative to some "absolute victory" state:
* Two countries who are in total war with each other are both in a precarious state. Each of them judges the current state relative to "I have completely won and subjugated the opponent". Relative to this total victory state they feel very precarious.
* Islam is doing quite well globally. Islam "has" 1/4th the global population, it is increasing in members the fastest out of the major religions. Yet I suspect the reason for at least some Muslims that this feels very dis-satisfactory is because according to them Islam "should" have ~100% followers worldwide. (of course there are many other factors going on here). Relative to this total victory state, the current situation of merely 1/4th of the global population seems extremely weak.
* People in the AI x-risk community want ~everyone or ~every-serious-person to take AI x-risk seriously, rather than mock or ignore it. People who think it's all a big dangerous distraction want ~no-one to take it seriously and it to never get any serious news coverage. Relative to these diametrically opposed total victory conditions, both sides feel the other side has "too much" influence, and their own side seems too weak.
What do you think of this idea, that the sense of being an underdog is (often) downstream of a prior feeling of your side being weak/threatened relative to a total-victory condition? And that this causes a distorted picture in which your side is actually objectively weak relative to the other side.
Just a quick comment after skimming: This seems broadly similar to what Eric Drexler called "Security Services" in his "Comprehensive AI Services" technical report he wrote at FHI.
So I think all of this sounds mostly reasonable (and probably based on a bunch of implicit world-model about the brain I don't have), especially the longest paragraph makes me update.
I think whether I agree with this view really depends heavily on quantitatively how well these brain-in-a-dish systems perform which I don't know so I'll look into it more first.
Oh, I didn't expect you to deny the evidence, interesting. Before I look into it more to try to verify/falsify (which I may or may not do), suppose that it turns out this general method does in fact, i.e. it learns to play pong, or at least in some other experiment it learns using this exact mechanism, would that be a crux? I.e. would that make you significantly update towards active inference being a useful and correct theory of the (neo-)cortex?
EDIT: the paper in your last link seems to be a purely semantic criticism of the paper's usage of words like "sentience" and "intelligence". They do not provide any analysis at all of the actual experiment performed.
Im curious what @Steven Byrnes has to say about the Kagan et al, Oct 2022 paper that @Roman Leventov mentioned.
My summary (I'm uncertain as its a bit unclearly written I find) is that they
And this caused the cells to learn to play pong correctly, i.e. not miss the ball.
Isn't this concrete evidence in favor of active inference? This seems like evidence that the cortex is doing active inference at a very micro level? Because the neural circuit in the petridish is not merely making predictions about what sensory observations it will see, but actually taking actions to minimize prediction error later. We could try to look at the implementation details of how this happens and then it might turn out to work by a feedback control system, but I don't know the implementation details. My best guess for how to model this behaviour would be essentially that the whole neural net is optimizing itself so as to minimize its average prediction error over time, and where prediction error is actually a hardcoded variable in the neural net (I don't know what, maybe some number of proteins of a certain type inside the soma, or perhaps just the firing rate, I don't know enough about neuroscience).
I'm not sure about any of this. But it really does seem like the neural network ends up taking actions to minimize its later prediction error, without any kind of RL. It basically seems like the outputs of the neurons are all jointly optimized to minimze average prediction error over time within the Pong environment. And that is exactly what active inference claims, as far as I understand (but I haven't studied it much). And to be clear, afaict it is completely possible that (in the brain, not in this petridish) on top of this active inference system there is RL happening, so this doesn't mean predictive processing + active inference (+ free energy principle maybe idk) is a unified theory of the brain, but maybe it still is a correct theory of the (neo-)cortex?
(Of course that doesn't mean that the free energy principle is the right tool, but it might be the right tool for an active inference system even though it's overkill for a thermostat. This is not my main question though).
I'm worried that "This is not a metaphor" will not be taken correctly. Most people do not communicate in this sort of explicit literal way I think. I expect them to basically interpret it as a metaphor if that is their first instinct, and then just be confused or not even pay attention to "this is not a metaphor"
Just a general concern regarding some of these proposals:
* It should be really very clear that this is a book
* Some of the proposals give me a vibe that might be interpreted as "this is a creative ad for a found-footage movie/game pretending to be serious"
* People's priors with these kinds of posters are very strongly that it is entertainment. This needs to be actively prevented.
* Even if it rationally cannot be entertainment if you analyze the written words, it is I think much better if it actually feels at a gut level (before you read the text) closer to an infomercial than to the marketing poster of a movie. Like I'm worried about the big red letters with black background for example...
But the problem is that we likely don't have time to flesh out all the details or do all the relevant experiments before it might be too late, and governments need to understand that based on arguments that therefore cannot possibly rely on everything being fleshed out.
Of course I want people to gather as much important empirical evidence and concrete detailed theory as possible asap.
Also, the pre-everything-worked-out-in-detail arguments also need to inform which experiments are done, and so that is why people who have actually listened to those pre-detailed arguments end up on average doing much more relevant empirical work IMO.