I'm only just past half that age, and the changes I've seen are ridiculous.  My star-trek pocket computer (phone) is many thousands of times more powerful than my first computer, and I was unusual as a kid to even have access to that.  There were 5 channels of TV available when I was a young kid, and videotapes went from very rare to common as I grew up.  I was cutting-edge with my 300 bps modem in junior high.  I was a young adult, out of college, when UUCP/Usenet gave way to universal tcp/ip and internet e-mail.  I was part of http and html adoption, replacing gopher and ftp and the like.  All these moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.  wait, what was I saying?

The last 100 years is the first part in history with recorded media available.  It's only been a few hundred that printing was cheap enough that there's a lot of novels and written detail about historical state of the world.  There are records and sparse documents going back a few thousand years.  It gets even less documented (though there are artifacts and other evidence) for the 30K or so years before that, not much for the 300K or so that probably-conscious beings have been on earth.  

It's so easy to forget just how recently everything we take for granted has happened.  

Do you have a cost metric for these?  Sure, the variance is high, but they're all positive.  

What would a more conservative/successful strategy look like?  Do you think more effort on the top-vote-getter would have gotten more incremental upvotes than the median (42)?

Note that this is a graph metric, not a single attribute.  Attractiveness varies WIDELY across person-person edges.  It would be interesting to try to measure the variance across incoming attractiveness for specific women.  Much more interesting than ignoring that variance and pretending attractiveness is a single value comparable in useful ways.

Also, "egalitarian" is not well defined here.  To the extent it's a relative measure (man X or even median man "would prefer" woman Y over woman Z), it cannot be egalitarian unless there's an extremely large number of "no preference".  Which I don't think is your claim.  If you collapse it to "would bang, on a desert island", that may be equal, but that's because it's a binary dimension which CANNOT vary by much.

I don't care enough about basketball to follow that object-level analysis.   I do appreciate that the thought experiment of doing so seems to indicate that you believe there IS some objective thing (the inputs or the weighting) that you or they are incorrect about.   

I think that is what I was pointing at, and in my mind dissolves our disagreement.  I was probably over-weighting your line

But despite that being my guess, I still wouldn't say that I agree with Taylor. There's this voice inside me that wants to utter "I think you're wrong, Ben".

I took this to mean that you cognitively preferred your model, even though it differed from theirs.  After our discussion, you may have only meant that your instincts are probably wrong, and they're likely more correct than your feelings.

edit: which I guess means I should ask more directly - if you believe there is a more correct answer than yours, why don't you want to hone your instincts and change your feelings?

Hmm.  I'm not sure how to resolve our disagreement on this.  When you say "roughly", you're acknowledging the lack of precision in your criteria, which is exactly the place I think your and Ben's criteria differ.

Does it feel like if you built the calculator / trained the ranking model such that all the weights were visible, and all the inputs about Draymond Green's (and all other players') performances were agreed, and if your counterparts did the same, you'd be able to actually WANT to change your mind to be more correct, or at least identify the places where you disagree on definition/methodology?

Have you addressed the identity problem?  What is the unit of personhood that a court would likely consider?  Current LLMs and near-term projections of capabilities don't have the continuity of a unitary behavior that other persons-under-the-law exhibit.

For a collection of software and data that is easily copied, forked, and split into sub-entities, with external storage of context and memories, what is it that these tests would be applied to?

It’s even worse with real workloads, where I/O, shared data contention, cache variance, and simple differences in unit of work size all make it impossible to predict the optimal parallel vs queue vs reject decision.

This seems more like an underspecified question than a prediction difference.  You and Ben (and Omega) have different criteria for your rankings.  Or, I guess different factual data about what happened - maybe you misread a stat or something.

The reason you feel a dissonance is that you’re not noticing the difference between “rank of peak using my subjective and unspecified weighting”, which is not objectively testable against any future experience, vs “my prediction of what someone else would say to a different question using the same words”, which is resolvable.

Does one of your posts summarize your proposal/prediction of how digital minds will be treated by US courts?  Understanding whether you're implying that they're a natural person who might have some duties and rights of an embodied resident of a jurisdiction, or whether they're a specific existing (or a new category, which I'd be interested in how this gets defined and agreed) kind of fictional person, would go a long way to helping me frame these interesting, but not-necessarily-relevant details.

This fits with part of a larger thing I have where I think that utility doesn't need to be "noticed" to be real 

This is one of the reasons I object to utilitarianism.  There's no actual measure of utility.  This isn't just that it's inconsistent in whether I notice it, or even that it's inconsistent in which things I prefer at a given moment (though both are true).  It's that it's so inconsistent across time and across individuals that it's very hard to believe that it's actually quantifiable at all.

Utility as an instantaneous ordinal preference, revealed by choice, is extremely well-supported.  Utility as a quantity is far more useful for calculations, but far less justifiable by observation.  Heck, most utilitarians can't even tell me whether it's a stock or a flow - do you save/spend utility, or just maximize each second's utility value?