Nope, I just misread. Over on ACX I saw that Scott had left a comment

Our scenario's changes are partly due to change in intelligence, but also partly to change in agency/time horizon/planning, and partly serial speed. Data efficiency comes later, downstream of the intelligence explosion.

I hadn't remembered reading that in the post Still "things get crazy before models get data-efficient" does sound like the sort of thing which could plausibly fit with the world model in the post (but would be understated if so). Then I re-skimmed the post, and in the October 2027 section I saw

The gap between human and AI learning efficiency is rapidly decreasing.

Agent-3, having excellent knowledge of both the human brain and modern AI algorithms, as well as many thousands of copies doing research, ends up making substantial algorithmic strides, narrowing the gap to an agent that’s only around 4,000x less compute-efficient than the human brain

and when I read that my brain silently did a s/compute-efficient/data-efficient.

Though now I am curious about the authors' views on how data efficiency will advance over the next 5 years, because that seems very world-model-relevant.

Agent-3, having excellent knowledge of both the human brain and modern AI algorithms, as well as many thousands of copies doing research, ends up making substantial algorithmic strides, narrowing the gap to an agent that’s only around 4,000x less compute-efficient than the human brain

I recognize that this is not the main point of this document, but am I interpreting correctly that you anticipate that rapid recursive improvement in AI research / AI capabilities is cracked before sample efficiency is cracked (e.g. via active learning)?

If so, that does seem like a continuation of current trends, but the implications seem pretty wild. e.g.

• Most meme-worthy: We'll get the discount sci-fi future where humanoid robots become commonplace, not because the human form is optimal, but because it lets AI systems piggyback off human imitation for physical tasks even when that form is wildly suboptimal for the job
• Human labor will likely become more valuable relative to raw materials, not less (as long as most humans are more sample efficient than the best AI). In a world where all repetitive, structured tasks can be automated, humans will be prized specifically for handling novel one-off tasks that remain abundant in the physical world
• Repair technicians and debuggers of physical and software systems become worth their weight in gold. The ability to say "This situation reminds me of something I encountered two years ago in Minneapolis" becomes humanity's core value proposition
• Large portions of the built environment begin resembling Amazon warehouses - robot restricted areas and corridors specifically designed to minimize surprising scenarios, with humans stationed around the perimeter for exception handling
• We accelerate toward living in a panopticon, not primarily for surveillance, but because ubiquitous observation provides the massive datasets needed for AI training pipelines

Still, I feel like I have to be misinterpreting what you mean by "4,000x less sample efficient" here, because passages like the following don't make sense under that interpretation

> The best human AI researchers are still adding value. They don’t code any more. But some of their research taste and planning ability has been hard for the models to replicate. Still, many of their ideas are useless because they lack the depth of knowledge of the AIs. For many of their research ideas, the AIs immediately respond with a report explaining that their idea was tested in-depth 3 weeks ago and found unpromising.

As a newly-minted +1 strong upvote, I disagree, though I feel that this change reflects the level of care and attention to detail that I expect out of EA.

I am not one of them - I was wondering the same thing, and was hoping you had a good answer.

If I was trying to answer this question, I would probably try to figure out what fraction of all economically-valuable labor each year was cognitive, the breakdown of which tasks comprise that labor, and the year-on-year productivity increases on those task, then use that to compute the percentage of economically-valuable labor that is being automated that year.

Concretely, to get a number for the US in 1900 I might use a weighted average of productivity increases across cognitive tasks in 1900, in an approach similar to how CPI is computed

• Look at the occupations listed in the 1900 census records
• Figure out which ones are common, and then sample some common ones and make wild guesses about what those jobs looked like in 1900
• Classify those tasks as cognitive or non-cognitive
• Come to estimate that record-keeping tasks are around a quarter to a half of all cognitive labor
• Notice that typewriters were starting to become more popular - about 100,000 typewriters sold per year
• Note that those 100k typewriters were going to the people who would save the most time by using them
• As such, estimate 1-2% productivity growth in record-keeping tasks in 1900
• Multiply the productivity growth for record-keeping tasks by the fraction of time (technically actually 1-1/productivity increase but when productivity increase is small it's not a major factor)
• Estimate that 0.5% of cognitive labor was automated by specifically typewriters in 1900
• Figure that's about half of all cognitive labor automation in 1900

and thus I would estimate ~1% of all cognitive labor was automated in 1900. By the same methodology I would probably estimate closer to 5% for 2024.

Again, though, I am not associated with Open Phil and am not sure if they think about cognitive task automation in the same way.

What fraction of economically-valuable cognitive labor is already being automated today?

Did e.g. a telephone operator in 1910 perform cognitive labor, by the definition we want to use here?

Oh, indeed I was getting confused between those. So as a concrete example of your proof we could consider the following degenerate example case

def f(N: int) -> int:
    if N == 0x855bdad365f9331421ab4b13737917cf97b5e8d26246a14c9af1adb060f9724a:
        return 1
    else:
        return 0

def check(x: int, y: float) -> bool:
    return f(x) >= y

def argsat(y: float, max_search: int = 2**64) -> int or None:
    # We postulate that we have this function because P=NP
    if y > 1:
        return None
    elif y <= 0:
        return 0
    else:
        return 0x855bdad365f9331421ab4b13737917cf97b5e8d26246a14c9af1adb060f9724a

but we could also replace our degenerate f with e.g. sha256.

Is that the gist of your proof sketch?

Finding the input x such that f(x) == argmax(f(x)) is left as an exercise for the reader though.

Is Amodei forecasting that, in 3 to 6 months, AI will produce 90% of the value derived from written code, or just that AI will produce 90% of code, by volume? It would not surprise me if 90% of new "art" (defined as non-photographic, non-graph images) by volume is currently AI-generated, and I would not be surprised to see the same thing happen with code.

And in the same way that "AI produces 90% of art-like images" is not the same thing as "AI has solved art", I expect "AI produces 90% of new lines of code" is not the same thing as "AI has solved software".

I'm skeptical.

Did the Sakana team publish the code that their scientist agent used to write the compositional regularization paper? The post says

For our choice of workshop, we believe the ICBINB workshop is a highly relevant choice for the purpose of our experiment. As we wrote in the main text, we selected this workshop because of its broader scope, challenging researchers (and our AI Scientist) to tackle diverse research topics that address practical limitations of deep learning, unlike most workshops with a narrow focus on one topic.

This workshop focuses particularly on understanding limitations of deep learning methods applied to real world problems, and encourages participants to study negative experimental outcomes. Some may criticize our choice of a workshop that encourages discussion of “negative results” (implying that papers discussing negative results are failed scientific discoveries), but we disagree, and we believe this is an important topic.

and while it is true that "negative results" are important to report, "we report a negative result because our AI agent put forward a reasonable and interesting hypothesis, competently tested the hypothesis, and found that the hypothesis was false" looks a lot like "our AI agent put forward a reasonable and interesting hypothesis, flailed around trying to implement it, had major implementation problems, and wrote a plausible-sounding paper describing its failure as a fact about the world rather than a fact about its skill level".

The paper has a few places with giant red flags where it seems that the reviewer assumes that there were solid results that the author of the paper was simply not reporting skillfully, for example in section B2

 , 

I favor an alternative hypothesis: the Sakana agent determines where a graph belongs, what would be on the X and Y axis of that graph, what it expects that the graph would look like, and how to generate that graph. It then generates the graph and inserts the caption the graph would show if its hypothesis was correct. The agent has no particular ability to notice that its description doesn't work with the graph.

 

Plausibly going off into the woods decreases the median output while increasing the variance.