I feel like this has come up before, but I'm not finding the post. You don't need the stick-on mirrors to eliminate the blind spot. I don't know why pointing side mirrors straight back is still so popular, but that's not the only way it's taught. I have since learned to set mine much wider.
This article explains the technique. (See the video.)
In a nutshell, while in the diver's seat, tilt your head to the left until it's almost touching your window, then from that perspective point it straight back so you can just see the side of your car. (You might need a similar adjustment for the passenger's side, but those are often already wide-angle.) Now from normal position, you can see your former "blind spot". When you need to see straight back in your side mirror (like when backing out), just tilt your head again. Remember that you also have a center mirror. You should be able to see passing cars in your center mirror, and then in your side mirror, then in your peripheral vision without ever turning your head or completely losing sight of them.
1- It's not enough for a hypothesis to be consistent with the evidence; to count in favor, it must be more consistent with the hypothesis than its converse. How much more is how strong. (Likelihood ratios.)
- Knowledge is probabilistic/uncertain (priors) and is updated based on the strength of the evidence. A lot of weak evidence can add up (or multiply, actually, unless you're using logarithms).
- Your level of knowledge is usually not literally zero, even when uncertainty is very high, and you can start from there. (Upper/Lower bounds, Fermi estimates.) Don't say, "I don't know." You know a little.
- A hypothesis can be made more ad-hoc to fit the evidence better, but this must lower its prior. (Occam's razor.)
- The reverse of this also holds. Cutting out burdensome details makes the prior higher. Disjunctive claims get a higher prior, conjunctive claims lower.
- Solomonoff's Lightsaber is the right way to think about this.
- More direct evidence can "screen off" indirect evidence. If it's along the same causal chain, you're not allowed to count it twice.
- Many so-called "logical fallacies" are correct Bayesian inferences.
French, but because my teacher tried to teach all of the days of the week at the same time, they still give me trouble.
They're named as the planets: Sun-day, Moon-day, Mars-day, Mercury-day, Jupiter-day, Venus-day, and Saturn-day.
It's easy to remember when you realize that the English names are just the equivalent Norse gods: Saturday, Sunday and Monday are obvious. Tyr's-day (god of combat, like Mars), Odin's-day (eloquent traveler god, like Mercury), Thor's-day (god of thunder and lightning, like Jupiter), and Freyja's-day (goddess of love, like Venus) are how we get the names Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday.
Why is Google the biggest search engine even though it wasn't the first? It's because Google has a better signal-to-noise ratio than most search engines. PageRank cut through all the affiliate cruft when other search engines couldn't, and they've only continued to refine their algorithms.
But still, haven't you noticed that when Wikipedia comes up in a Google search, you click that first? Even when it's not the top result? I do. Sometimes it's not even the article I'm after, but its external links. And then I think to myself, "Why didn't I just search Wikipedia in the first place?". Why do we do that? Because we expect to find what we're looking for there. We've learned from experience that Wikipedia has a better signal-to-noise ratio than a Google search.
If LessWrong and Wikipedia came up in the first page of a Google search, I'd click LessWrong first. Wouldn't you? Not from any sense of community obligation (I'm a lurker), but because I expect a higher probability of good information here. LessWrong has a better signal-to-noise ratio than Wikipedia.
LessWrong doesn't specialize in recipes or maps. Likewise, there's a lot you can find through Google that's not on Wikipedia (and good luck finding it if Google can't!), but we still choose Wikipedia over Google's top hit when available. What is on LessWrong is insightful, especially in normally noisy areas of inquiry.
Seems like a signal-to-noise problem. Some amount seems like a useful signal, but too much is too hard to digest. Privileges based on karma make some sense but restricting it based on time (1/day/user or something) seems pretty crude, so I don't like that idea.
Not sure if this is a good idea either, but the number of reacts allowed per post could be based on the amount of karma that user generated on comments on that post. That way, a user who's doing too many reacts would be encouraged to just write a comment instead. That still doesn't seem like exactly the right incentive, but I'm also not sure how I want it to work.
Maybe the ability to filter out reacts from a particular (prolific) user would suffice?
The real problem of humanity is the following: we have paleolithic emotions; medieval institutions; and god-like technology.
---E. O. Wilson
"Medieval institutions" seem like they have a lot of room for improvement. Can we build high integrity/epistemics institutions at all? Or are we still lacking some key social tech we've yet to find or develop? (Do we e.g. need Rationalist alternatives to "mutual reputation alliances"?) There seem to have been several attempts by the Rationalists, with mixed results. LessWrong itself being one.
Can anyone suggest some of which have been the most successful and why? Which have failed spectacularly and why? Which are failing more subtly? (Or if this has been answered or partially answered already, can you link?)
Do we have a catalog of social tech that might help with institution building? E.g., I heard about prediction markets and dominant assurance contracts first on LW, etc. Seems like a lot of game theory is applicable.
When I first heard the recipe suggested by Yudkowsky, I thought, "That sounds not bad, actually." Seems my prediction was correct. Although, he might have said "rock salt", rather than flakes, which might be too much salt at once. The aliens should know better though.
See the paper I linked in my other comment.
Eight years later, but we're finally approaching the technical capability to perform my proposed experiment to elicit tetrachromacy in a human trichromat through eye tracking and targeting a subset of retinal cells: https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/sciadv.adu1052#sec-3
See the DISCUSSION section proposing further experiments.