O body swayed to music, O brightening glance,

How can we know the dancer from the dance?

—William Butler Yeats, "Among School Children"

In his 2009 book The Second-Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability, Stephen Darwall redefines moral obligation as inherently relational and interactive, rooted deeply in mutual accountability and respect among free and rational agents. Central to Darwall’s argument is the concept that morality is not simply a personal or detached observation of right and wrong; rather, it emerges distinctly from second-person interactions: the communicative space where individuals address, demand, and recognize obligations toward each other. Moral obligations are thus not just norms but demands we legitimately place upon one another, supported by what Darwall identifies as "second-personal reasons."

These second-personal reasons derive their authority not from their practical outcomes but from the mutual acknowledgment of each participant’s standing within the moral community. Darwall emphasizes the critical role of "reactive attitudes" such as resentment, gratitude, and indignation, which presuppose that others have the competence and authority to understand and respond to moral demands. The validity of these demands depends inherently on this mutual recognition of agency and authority. Moral accountability, in Darwall’s framework, necessarily involves addressing others (or oneself) with a presumption of shared moral competence.

Although Darwall could not have imagined applying his ideas to artificial intelligence fifteen years ago, I bet he would agree with me that it would be worth doing so now. Much like the reactive attitudes central to Darwall’s theory, interactions with AI raise profound questions about accountability, moral recognition, and mutual respect. Contemporary discourse, including Amanda Askell’s critique of AI bias, touches on the practical and epistemic locality challenges of aligning AI systems with ethical norms. Askell's framework underscores that AI systems inherit ethical limitations from the very human narratives and social structures that train them. But perhaps even more foundational than Askell's concern is Darwall’s core insight: Morality demands genuine second-personal engagement, which is precisely the kind of reciprocal recognition that current AI fundamentally lacks....

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