I realised that the level of suffering and the fidelity of the simulation don't need to be correlated, but I didn't make an explicit distinction.
Most think that you need dedicated cognitive structures to generate a subjective I, if that's so, then there's no room for conscious simulacra that feel things that the simulator doesn't.
I intellectually understand that (libertarian) free will is an illusion that emerges from the subjective experience of thinking about counterfactually having done something else at a specific moment, but I still often catch myself feeling bad about past mistakes, imagining how I could have done something else as if it had been an actual literal possibility at that time.
I'm sure it's not uncommon at all, but I feel like it's not the best way of framing those memories from the point of view of improving oneself.
It seems that imagining oneself as succeeding is often used as a 'substitute' for actually succeeding (even if it doesn't feel nearly as good), which might not help to motivate oneself.
I think this is sound. I thought you were making stronger claims about cognitive processes that might be embodied.
Do you know any interesting literature on the topic?
It's still typically acknowledged that the evolution of intelligence from more primitive apes to humans was mostly an increase of computational power (proportionally bigger brains) with little innovation on structures. So, there seems to be merit to the idea.
Larger animals, all things being equal, need more neurons to perform the same basic functions than we do because of their larger bodies.
I still don't get why from your perspective: "It seems weird to me that you ask this."
It is true that at that time I'd lost some of the content, but I know that, I even mentioned situs inversus as an example.
But I still would need an actual example of what kind of computations you think would need to be performed in this weirdly-placed organs that are not possible based on the common idea that the brain maps the positions of the organs.
Yeah but you didn't tell me how different the way those organs are wired is compare to the typical way. Even if the relative position is different, I would need specific examples to understand why the mapping of the brain of those organs wouldn't work here.
Mmm, maybe(?, do you have an actual example of this phenomenon or something? It seems weird to me that you ask this. How would this work?
Even if they are wired differently, cognition might still be solely in the brain and the way the brain models the body will still be based on the way those nerves connect to the brain.
There's not much point on having mentioned it really, but I meant in the case that somehow the relative position of the organs could affect the way they are wired, yeah, probably not conceivable in real life.
Something like situs inversus.
There's not much context to this claim made by Yoshua Bengio, but while searching in Google News I found a Spanish online newspaper that has an article* in which he claims that:
*https://www.larazon.es/sociedad/20221121/5jbb65kocvgkto5hssftdqe7uy.html