I will also reply to the edit here.

would you say that "we have qualia" is just a strong intuition imbued in us by the mathematical process of evolution, and your "realist" position is that you choose to accept {referring to it as if it is real} as a good way of communicating about that imbued intuition/process?

I wouldn't say that about qualia and I wouldn't say that about free will. What you described sounds like being only a nominal realist. 

This is going into details, but I think there is a difference between semantic realism and nominal realism. Semantic realist would say that based on a reasonable definition of a term, the term is real. Most if not all realists are semantic realists. Almost nobody would an apple realist if the reasonable definition of apple would be something like "fruit that turns you into the unicorn".

Whereas nominal realist is someone who would say that based on a reasonable definition of a term, the term probably isn't real, but it's a useful communication tool, so they are going to keep using it.

Using an analogy (specifically for free will), I would say that free will is as real as consent, whereas I would imagine that a nominal realist would say that free will is as real as karma.

By the way, I will quickly reply to your edit in this comment. Determinism certainly seems compatible with qualia being fundamental.

"Hard Determinism" is just a shorthand for a position (in a free will debate) that accepts the following claims:

• Determinism is true.
• Determinism is incompatible with free will

I am pretty sure that the term has no use outside of discussions about free will.

I will try reply to your edit:

Also, another thing I'm interested in is how someone could have helped past you (and camp #1 people generally) understand what camp #2 even means. There may be a formal-alignment failure mode not noticeable to people in camp #1 where a purely mathematical (it may help to read that as '3rd-person')

I don't remember the exact specifics, but I came across Mary's Room thought experience (perhaps through this video). When presented in that way and when directly asked "does she learn anything new?" my surprising (to myself at the time) answer was an emphatic "yes".

what is qualia, in your ontology

It the direct phenomenal experience of stuff like pain, pleasure, colors, etc.

what does it mean for something to be irreducible or metaphysically fundamental

Something is irreducible in a sense that it can't be reduced to interactions between atoms. It can't also be completely completely described from a 3rd person perspective (the perspective from which science usually operates).

I understand the 'compatibilist' view on free will to be something like this: determinism is true, but we still run some algorithm which deterministically picks between options, so the algorithm that we are is still 'making a choice', which I choose to conceptualize as "free will and determinism are compatible"

I would rather conceptualize it as acting according to my value system without excessive external coercion. But I would also say that I agree with all four claims that you made there, namely:

• Determinism is true
• We run some algorithm which deterministically picks between options
• We are making a choice
• Free will and determinism are compatible

Anti-realists about free will" and I have no actual disagreement about the underlying reality of determinism being true and us being predictable.

Yeah, I would agree that we are predictable in principle.

If so, is your view on qualia similar, in that you've mostly re-conceptualized it instead of having "noticed a metaphysically fundamental thing"?

I used to think that qualia was a reducible and non-fundamental phenomenon, whereas now I think it is an irreducible and fundamental phenomenon. So I did "notice a metaphysically fundamental thing".

one who believes that those in camp #2 merely have a strong intuition that they have <mysterious-word>

Under this definition I think I would still qualify as a former illusionist about qualia.

Ah, I see. I usually think of illusionism as a position where one thinks that a certain phenomenon isn't real but only appears real.

Under the terminology of your most recent comment, I would be a determinist and a realist about free will.

I used to be a hard determinist (I think that's what people usually mean by "illusionism"), but currently I am a compatibilist.

So yeah, right now I am not an illusionist about free will either.

Has there ever been a case of someone being in camp #1, but eventually realizing, according to their self-report, "I actually do have qualia; it was right in front of me this whole time, but I've only now noticed it as a separate thing needing explanation, even though in retrospect it seems obvious to me"?

This is almost exactly my story. I used to think that qualia was just another example of anti-physicalist magical thinking.

Currently, I am actually pretty firmly in Camp #2

illusionists actually do not experience qualia

As someone who used to be (but no longer is) an illusionist about both free will and qualia, I can assure you that this was not the case (at least with me). Nothing really changed, besides me getting a deeper understanding of the position of the other camp.

It was pointed out, e.g. [here](https://web.archive.org/web/20170918044233/http://files.openphilanthropy.org/files/Grants/MIRI/consolidated_public_reviews.pdf) but unfortunately the mindset is self-reinforcing so there wasn't much to be done.

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