1. Introductory Remarks

The phenomenon commonly referred to as consciousness has been interpreted through numerous theoretical frameworks, including global workspace architectures, high-dimensional causal structures, hierarchical generative models, and narrative or representational accounts of the self. Each framework emphasizes distinct functional properties of cognitive systems, yet none individually captures the full range of mechanisms contributing to conscious experience. A more comprehensive account can be generated by integrating principles from predictive processing, global broadcasting, and structural integration.

The position developed here presents consciousness as emerging when a hierarchical predictive system generates temporally deep expectations concerning its own state trajectories and when these predictions are integrated and broadcast across the system in a manner that stabilizes a functional representation of a self. This “self” is not treated as a discrete entity or metaphysical subject but as a set of the system’s most temporally stable and globally influential high-level priors. These priors act as organizational anchors within the generative model, guiding inference and action across multiple timescales.

2. Predictive Processing as the Base Mechanism

At the lowest theoretical level, the brain can be modeled as a hierarchical generative system that seeks to minimize variational free energy. Each layer of the hierarchy generates predictions concerning expected sensory or internal states and updates these predictions based on incoming prediction-error signals. This principle applies across several modalities:

Exteroception: predictions about external sensory inputs and environmental causes.
Proprioception: predictions concerning bodily position and motor configuration.
Interoception: predictions regarding internal physiological states.
Cognitive and attentional dynamics: predictions about future representational, attentional, motivational, or decision-related states.

Crucially, these predictions do not represent objects, features, or qualia directly. Rather, they encode conditional probability distributions over the system’s own future sensory and internal states, constrained by environmental regularities and the organism’s embodied structure. This framing treats the organism as continuously predicting its evolving state under the assumption of on...

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