We must also consider the possibility that cellular-level information may not be sufficient to capture a person's psychological structure. We might need molecular-level data. Even if information about the synaptic structure of the connectome is sufficient, molecular data could aid in the deduction, reconstruction, and inference of memories by providing greater precision about brain structures. A destructive molecular scan would offer a thousand times more accuracy than a simple microscopic analysis, according to Freitas’s estimates in Cryostasis Revival. Moreover, aldehyde cross-links would need to be corrected, this is essentially a computational task requiring brute-force cryptographic algorithms, as explained by cryonicist Ralph C. Merkle.
A destructive molecular scan of the brain would involve gradually disassembling it, atom by atom, recording the type and position of each atom in external backup software. This could be achieved using positional mechanosynthesis tools, a molecular nanotechnology based on diamondoid materials.
Imagine a giant surgical device mounted on a cart, far larger than a brain. Robotic arms would extend from this device and branch into billions of tiny mechanosynthetic manipulators, molecular fingers, that could manipulate atoms individually.
This method appears safer and more conservative than simply mapping a person's connectome with fluorescent tracers.
I am revisiting what I wrote earlier. In fact, I am now in favor of chemopreservation. It so happens that some time ago I was concerned about the "paradox of duplicates":
https://www.benbest.com/philo/doubles.html
"I would be happy to know Your Lordship's opinion, namely, whether, when my brain has lost its original structure, and when, a few hundred years later, the same materials are recreated in such a curious way that they become an intelligent being, I should say that this being will be me; or whether two or three of these beings would be formed from my brain; whether they will all be me, and therefore a single identical intelligent being."
— Letter from Thomas Reid to Lord Kames, 1775
Since then, I have revised my position to consider the copy paradox as unjustified. Initially, I was worried about this issue because once a patient is fixed, the proteins can no longer return to their original states, and the brain is biologically dead. A chemically fixed brain cannot simply be repaired with medical nanorobots and reheated; it must be scanned and emulated in the form of a whole brain emulation or reconstructed. In short, revival after fixation normally relies solely on the information while discarding the matter, which was problematic for me.
Then I read Michael A. Cerullo's theory of branched psychological identity. According to him, consciousness will continue to exist as long as there is continuity in a person’s psychological structure, memories, personality, dreams, and the causal relationships between different pieces of information. In short, if at least fifty percent of this structure can be reinstated, then identity has survived and consciousness continues. The theory asserts that if two copies are made, you will continue to exist independently in both; if three, four, or even a hundred copies are made, it is the same. Your consciousness is restarted at the point where it left off.
This is scientifically coherent if we consider that the human mind is defined by its substrate, the brain. The brain is a physical object governed by the laws of physics and composed of a finite physical quantity. It can therefore be described with information, such as bits. If you can recover a version sufficiently close to this model and reinstate it, you recover a person’s mind, and the problem of copying in the context of cryonics or duplication becomes completely unjustified.
Here is a link to Cerullo’s theory:
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11023-014-9352-8
Now that I am a brancher, I logically have no objections to chemical fixation, and it is a form of preservation that interests me as much as cryonics.
Syd Lonreiro
The enthusiasm for aldehyde-based chemical fixation preservation seems extremely misplaced to me. Biological viability is lost, and the original proteins can no longer return to a normal state. Traditional cryopreservation is much safer if you're looking for real prospects of revival—at least, that's how I see it.
I see absolutely no point in requesting whole-head preservation when preserving only the brain (which is essentially the same thing) costs significantly less than having your entire head preserved at Oregon Brain Preservation.
The only argument I’ve found in favor of whole-head preservation is that handling a slippery and fragile structure like the brain might cause problems—meaning it could be damaged in the process.
My article focuses on a stable scenario for Alcor without an economic crisis. I believe Alcor could just as well survive 4% inflation, as they are very wealthy. Historically, it’s clear that Alcor has weathered the subprime crisis and other economic downturns, as well as a number of lawsuits from people who didn’t understand biostasis, lawsuits that unfortunately cost them a lot of money. We have no way of knowing for sure whether this trend will continue, but economically speaking, Alcor seems to have fairly good chances of surviving long enough for its cryopatients to be revived.