Here's an edited version of a puzzle from the book "Chuck Klosterman four" by Chuck Klosterman.
It is 1933. Somehow you find yourself in a position where you can effortlessly steal Adolf Hitler's wallet. The theft will not effect his rise to power, the nature of WW2, or the Holocaust. There is no important identification in the wallet, but the act will cost Hitler forty dollars and completely ruin his evening. You don't need the money. The odds that you will be caught committing the crime are negligible. Do you do it?
When should you punish someone for a crime they will commit in the future? Discuss.
Can you explain and/or link this analysis of transparent Newcomb? It looks very wrong to me.
It's only wrong if you are the kind of person who doesn't like getting $1,000,000.
If only all our knowledge of our trading partners and environment was as reliable as 'fundamentally included in the very nature of the problem specification'. You have to think a lot harder when you are only kind of confident and know the limits of your own mind reading capabilities.
Depends on what about it seems wrong. Do you disagree that you should one-box if you see that box B is empty? It's unintuitive, but it's the strategy that UDT stratightforwardly yields and that you would want to precommit to. Here's one bit of intuition: by being the kind of person that one-boxes even with an empty box, you force Omega to never give you an empty box, on pain of being wrong. Maybe these are relevant too.
Here's an edited version of a puzzle from the book "Chuck Klosterman four" by Chuck Klosterman.
When should you punish someone for a crime they will commit in the future? Discuss.