The impression that I got is that he had a pretty short time scale in mind (i.e. to the point that he was working with labor unions in the present day). One could argue that he believed that AI would develop faster than it has, or that he thought that networking with labor unions in the present would be useful for preventing problems 50+ years down the road.
AFAIT, all he did was write a few letters to two or three union officials, alerting them to this issue. I don't think that really counts as "networking". I also wasn't able to find any place where Wiener gave a specific time scale, but if he did expect a short time scale, I think his error was definitely in expecting that AI would develop faster than it has, rather in economic theory. If we assume the existence of AIs that are as capable as any human of average intelligence, and can be operated at a cost less than a human's minimum wage (or subsistence wage in the absence of minimum wage laws), then clearly there would be a great deal of unemployment, and "equilibrating influences" isn't going to help. I think the following quotes show that this is what Wiener had in mind:
It has long been clear to me that the modern ultra-rapid computing machine was in principle an ideal central nervous system to an apparatus for automatic control; and that its input and output need not be in the form of numbers or diagrams but might very well be, respectively, the readings of artificial sense organs, such as photoelectric cells or thermometers, and the performance of motors or solenoids. With the aid of strain gauges or similar agencies to read the performance of these motor organs and to report, to "feed back," to the central control system as an artificial kinesthetic sense, we are already in a position to construct artificial machines of almost any degree of elaborateness of performance.
[...}
The modern industrial revolution is similarly bound to devalue the human brain, at least in its simpler and more routine decisions. Of course, just as the skilled carpenter, the skilled mechanic, the skilled dressmaker have in some degree survived the first industrial revolution, so the skilled scientist and the skilled administrator may survive the second. However, taking the second revolution as accomplished, the average human being of mediocre attainments or less has nothing to sell that it is worth anyone’s money to buy.
My impressions are largely primarily from Some Notes on Wiener’s Concerns about the Social Impact of Cybernetics, the Effects of Automation on Labor, and “the Human Use of Human Beings” (though I did spend some time looking at other sources). Do you think that other sources give a different impression?
AFAIT, all he did was write a few letters to two or three union officials, alerting them to this issue. I don't think that really counts as "networking". I also wasn't able to find any place where Wiener gave a specific time scale,
This is part...
As a part of my work on the "Can we know what to do about AI?" project for MIRI, I looked at mathematician Norbert Wiener's predictions about the impact of automation on society, and how he acted based on these predictions.
I already wrote about Wiener's "Sorcerer's Apprentice" type concerns about the dangers of automation, which parallel MIRI's concerns and Eliezer's concerns about AI risk. But Wiener was also concerned that automation would cause unemployment.
Coincidentally, immediately after I investigated this, Eliezer wrote The Robots, AI, and Unemployment Anti-FAQ, which argues against the position that Wiener held.
I found a recent paper titled Some Notes on Wiener’s Concerns about the Social Impact of Cybernetics, the Effects of Automation on Labor, and “the Human Use of Human Beings” which summarizes Wiener's views on automation and unemployment and how he acted based on them.
Wiener's prediction
Wiener believed that unless countermeasures were taken, automation would render low-skilled workers unemployable, precipitating an economic depression of far greater magnitude than the Great Depression of the 1930s:
What Wiener did based on his prediction
Wiener believed that the problem that he foresaw was so great that he considered giving top priority to mitigating it:
He attempted to network with labor unions so as to mitigate the problem:
Assessing Wiener's prediction
Wiener was correct that automation would put some workers out of work in the near term:
However, at a macro-level, and over large time scales, automation doesn't seem to have increased unemployment nearly as much as Wiener seems to have believed. The graph of unemployment from 1950 until present gives the impression that at the time when Wiener expressed his concerns, unemployment hovered around 6%, whereas in later decades it's hovered around 7%. It's interesting that there appears to have been a slight increase, but this could be attributable to outsourcing to foreign countries rather than to automation, and the absolute unemployment rate is very low compared with the 20% unemployment rate from the Great Depression.
As Eliezer said in his recent post
Wiener seems not to have assimilated conventional economic theory. Specifically, he seems to have been unattuned to the existence of equilibrating influences. As Robin Hanson wrote in his post on Eventual Futures:
At least with the benefit of hindsight, Wiener's predictions appear naive.
Where did Wiener go wrong?
Wiener seems to have gone wrong in relying on one relatively strong argument as opposed to many weak arguments. The argument "if machines start doing the labor that low skilled workers are qualified to do, then their employers will fire them, and they won't have jobs" may have seemed strong from the inside. But arguments that feel strong from the inside are often wrong.
Wiener could have done better by giving more weight to conventional wisdom, by trying harder to understand why others didn't share his concerns (which might have resulted in more exposure to conventional economic theory), and by doing a more detailed study of the historical impact of technological innovations on employment.
In Chapter 2 of Nate Silver's book "The Signal and the Noise", Silver describes Philip Tetlock's study of expert political judgment, and Tetlock's findings about characteristics of relatively successful political expert predictors. Two characteristics that he highlights as helpful are
If Wiener had approached the question of whether automation will lead to large scale unemployment in a more multidisciplinary and empirical way, he might have made a better prediction.