Interesting. I mostly agree with the gist.
The following are a few thoughts that occur to me. Presented as potentially useful pointers, rather than well-thought-through arguments/conclusions.
It would be best if we could simply not follow the compulsion, and stay as much as possible at the level of data patterns and phenomenological compressions, at least until we have a good handle there.
Personally, when I try to predict the behaviour of people, I start with their past actions. As in, I look at what they have done in the past, and assume they’ll do more of that.
Similarly here, I think it's asking for trouble to imagine that [Gabe's characterization and extrapolation of [that]] doesn't already rely on a bunch of intent-based expectations and assumptions. (these will usually be more reliable than guesses we'd tend to label "psycho-analysis" - but they're present and important)
For this reason, [be aware of the degree to which you're x-ing, and the implications] seems safer advice than [avoid x-ing], for many x.
Lately I’ve been reading more intellectual histories. For those unaware of the genre, it’s a type of (usually scholarly) book that hunts down the origin of the concept we use, and how they were thought about and framed across time.
Reading a few of these, a curious pattern emerged: there is usually a succession of explanation or metaphors for the concepts, not so much tied to the concept itself, but more to the prevalent and salient memes in the air at the time.
For example, Georges Vigarello identifies four successive Western explanations of tiredness (“fatigue” in the original French):
(Georges Vigarello, Histoire de la fatigue, 2020, p.11-12 , translated by me)
And in his intellectual history of how we think about the brain, Matthew Cobb reveals the following stages in the conceptualization of the brain as a machine:
(Matthew Cobb, The Idea of The Brain, 2020, p.3-4)
What surprised me was the seeming arbitrariness of which metaphor was used to explain the phenomenon. It felt as if they got plucked from the idea current at the time, without thought for adequacy and fitness.
My first instinct was to search for the value of these weird pseudo-mechanisms. Maybe there was something deeper there, some hidden methodological virtue?
But after some time, I came to the conclusion that the explanation was much simpler: there is a deep-rooted human compulsion for explanation, even when the explanations are ungrounded, useless, and weak.
We Need Explanations
Once you look for it, you see this tendency everywhere. Pseudo-mechanisms were postulated in cooking, medicine, astronomy. From old anthropological gods to vapors, humors, forces and energies, I’ve yet to find many examples where people didn’t jump to a pseudo-mechanism, however impotent it was at handling the phenomena.[1]
I’m guilty of this myself. So when articulating issues of emotional management for example, I grasped at the available mechanism of potential energy (which I was studying) to frame it.
Even aside from the lackluster explanation power of most of these pseudo-mechanisms (a topic I will explore below), this aching need for an explanation is curious, because it goes against a key methodological tenet I have underscored many times: you want first to find stable phenomenological compressions (patterns in the data) before jumping to mechanistic models, otherwise you have no ways to ground the latter.
Without crisps and manageable handles on the system under study, the quest for a useful and grounded mechanism is quixotic, unmoored to any stable foundation in the data.
Indeed, if we look at some of the most impressive cases of scientific progress throughout history, they usually involve people actively avoiding mechanistic models for a time, or at least cleanly separating them from the phenomenological compressions under study.
For example, Darwin used the black-boxing technique mentioned in a previous post to sidestep the mechanism for inheritance and variability, which was beyond the power level of the science of his day.
(Marco J. Nathan, Black Boxes, 2021, p.55)
Similarly, Mendel captured the most fundamental properties of inheritance without any recourse to mechanisms or explanations, focusing exclusively on phenomenological compressions.
(Marco J. Nathan, Black Boxes, 2021, p.56)
Other examples come to mind, like the revolutionary work of Milman Parry (covered in a previous post). Through sheer autistic textual analysis of Homeric epics, Parry revealed an intensely formulaic and procedural style, which eventually led him and his student Albert Lord to an exquisitely complex model of oral composition for this and many other poetic traditions.
Similarly, the establishment of Phenomenological Thermodynamics (what we usually called Thermodynamics), one of the most wide-ranging and stable theory in physics, required the efforts of Clausius to remove the weird pseudo-mechanisms (notably the calorific fluid) from Carnot’s insane insights.[2]
(Rudolf Clausius, The Mechanical Theory of Heat, 1867, p.267-269)
And yet, we keep searching and giving explanations, whatever our lack of grounds. If I had to venture an explanation (the compulsion strikes again!), I would say that we just struggle to keep track of and manipulate patterns of data without an underlying story. So we end up making one up, pulling it out of our memetic climate.
Note that this claim also make sense of the recurrent overcompensation in various fields, where some practitioners become allergic to any kind of model or explanation. I expect this is a reaction to both this deep-seated compulsion, and a recent history of of repeated failures of these arbitrary explanations.[3]
Progress Despite (And Thanks To) This Compulsion
Now, the methodological weaknesses of this compulsion to explain don’t condemn us to never make any progress in modeling and problem solving.
First, these pseudo-mechanism have one clear benefit: they focus our attention, delineating specific enough questions for us to actually investigate without feeling overwhelmed. This investigation, when done well, then yields new phenomenological compressions, which provide the soil for the growth of future, more grounded explanations.
In that way, pseudo-mechanisms act as randomizers and symmetry-breakers, where the arbitrary actually jumps us out of the paralysis analysis that a completely open field might cause.
Next, the historical record shows an improvement in the quality of explanations through time, of their “mechanisticness” or “gears-levelness”. As more and more phenomenological regularities accumulate, the first actually mechanistic and powerful explanations emerge, coming notably from the most grounded and regular fields (physics, then chemistry). This creates an improved taste for what a good mechanism looks like, leading to better models all around.
This obviously also brings issues. For example, you can see the developments of fads about what a “real” model looks like. Most fields of science have their youth period where they desperately looked for models like the ones from the physicists, irrespective of whether or not these were adapted. Even in physics, especially early on, some shapes of models ended up sacrosaints for a time.
(Friedrich Steinle, Exploratory Experiments, 2016, p.25-26,30)
And this also breeds an adversarial tendency to present whatever you have in the trappings of accepted models, so they pass people’s filters. That’s why so many conspiracy theories and pseudo-sciences adopt pseudo-mechanisms that feel scientific, without actually bringing on the right properties for a mechanism.
Last but not least, in exceptional cases, the very compulsion to look for mechanisms can be fruitfully exploited. I know of one particularly salient example: Maxwell’s work on Electromagnetism. While he accepted the core phenomenological compression of lines of forces from Faraday, Maxwell experimented wildly with different methods and explanations, until homing in on what is still one of the most impressive theories in all of human history.[4]
(Giora Hon and Bernard R. Goldstein, Reflections on the Practice of Physics, 2021, p.209)
Mitigating The Costs Of Pseudo-Mechanisms
Still, realizing that this compulsion exists in each and everyone of us creates new requirements for a good epistemic hygiene.
It would be best if we could simply not follow the compulsion, and stay as much as possible at the level of data patterns and phenomenological compressions, at least until we have a good handle there.
This is one way to interpret my friend Gabe’s point about predicting and interpreting people based on their behavior, not the intents we ascribe to them.[5]
(Gabe, Intention-based reasoning, 2025)
Yet this is clearly not sufficient. We can’t just will this fundamental compulsion away — want it or not, we will find ourselves regularly coming up with explanations, with or without grounding. And at some point, this is necessary: never looking for explanation is cowardice, not wisdom.
I see two clear ways of improving our natural explanation-making tendencies:
Finally Clarifying Phlogiston
On a personal note, understanding this compulsion and how it fits in the messy picture of “technical progress” also clarified a long-standing confusion I had.
Since I first read Hasok Chang’s Is Water H2O?, I’ve been convinced by his argument that there was something to the old chemical concept of phlogiston, which was completely replaced and eradicated by the more compositional chemistry of Lavoisier (in what we now call The Chemical Revolution).
I even wrote a blogpost years ago trying to defend it, since both in scientific circles and rationalist ones, phlogiston is the poster child of a fake explanation.
But it never felt exactly right. Phlogiston obviously smells fake, a curiosity-stopper that just ascribe some behaviours of chemical matter to a substance that is taken out and put back through various processes, notably combustion. It’s quite obvious that the precise weighting and combination of elements advocated by Lavoisier is a better mechanism, and it is indeed the basis of an incredibly successful modern chemistry.
And yet Chang’s point still stand: by completely killing anything related to phlogiston, the Lavoisierians also threw away some of the core questions and observations that the study of phlogiston had revealed, which were not well explained by the new mechanisms.
(William Odling, The Revived Theory of Phlogiston, 1876)
(Gilbert Lewis, The Anatomy of Science, 1926, p.167-168)
My mistake was to try to resolve this tension between fake mechanism and real loss fully on one side, mostly by pushing a Whiggish history that phlogiston was a good mechanism from the beginning.
But now the correct approach jumps at me: the problem with the treatment of phlogiston by the Lavoisierian was not their replacement of a bad mechanism, but their throwing away of the phenomenological compressions revealed by phlogiston: things we now model as potential chemical energy, electron flow, free electrons in metals…
Where I think the Lavoisierian failed was in their totalizing desires, usually rare in the history of chemistry, that made them try to delete every mention of phlogiston from the history books like a modern damnatio memoriae.
In doing so, they fucked up one of the main source of progress, namely the accumulation of phenomenological compressions.
There is a pattern that I can’t clearly see yet, where the attachment to the explanations was inversely proportional to the economic benefits and pragmatism of the field. One gets the impression that chemists working on dyes and blacksmiths forging weapons didn’t care that much about the accuracy of their mechanisms, whereas physicist and fundamental scientists and thinkers of all sorts got obsessed with their specific explanation.
Another amazing example in physics is the invention of the potential. I know of only one great source, in French, but it convincingly argues that the potential was nothing more than a mathematical compression for the manipulation of inverse-square law forces — it’s the incredibly wide applicability and power of the trick that eventual suggested its reification as potential energy, and Lagrangian.
Of the top of my head, I’m thinking of the self-coherence checks of temperature scale by Victor Regnault described in Chang’s Inventing Temperature, the refusal of internal state in Behaviorism, and the fear of ascribing causation anywhere in many modern statistical analyses.
This is a topic I’ve been wanting to write a blogpost about for years. For the curious, I truly recommend the book from which I’m drawing, Reflections on the Practice Of Physics.
Note that the main point of this post is more a decision theoretic one: relying on intents first leads to worse predictions, susceptibility to self and external deception, and generally bad equilibrium of responsibility across society.
Cosmopolitanism in general helps here, because reading and interacting with other cultures reveals your own hidden assumptions.