More freedom does not necessarily mean less modeling burden (and certainly not less burden of choice). Making 300 decisions in sequence is a greater burden than making the first 10 and having the others automatically handled by context. Low-level programming languages are burdensome despite (or perhaps because of) the freedom that they expose to the modeler. And universal constructions are appealing in part because they allow you to specify important information arguably without making any (unjustified) choices at all (i.e., very little modeling burden)! As davidad points out, this burden is a matter of syntax, i.e., the interface for constructing valid objects. Do the constraints of that interface provide helpful, simplifying guidance? Or does working within the constraints impose (computational) difficulties on the modeler? My experience is that the structure of PDGs does both: it makes specifying "natural" beliefs easier and "unnatural" ones more difficult.
My understanding is that @davidad wants to sidestep syntax and focus on delivering an IR (intermediate representation) for beliefs: a simple common compilation target that retains some useful structure (in this case, additive combination). This effectively deflects my point about the modeler's burden, since his aim is instead to reduce the burden of a compiler that targets the IR. This allows him to endorse PDGs as one particular (nice) language for articulating inconsistency functionals, casting PDG semantics as the way to compile them. This makes a lot of sense to me, and the mathematical simplicity is definitely an appealing advantage over PDGs for this purpose.
However, I'm not 100% convinced that this is a good idea. The class of PDGs is itself already a useful IR, since it unifies so much, and it intentionally occupies a different point in the design space. The structure can indeed create some burden for certain modelers (e.g., for one who wants to arrive at a certain preconceived belief functional, but now, annoyingly, has to figure out how to write it down in terms of local conditional probabilities and confidences), but this exercise also has nice side-effects (e.g., gives you justification for your loss function), often yielding significant interpretability benefits. As you point out, the map from PDGs to belief functionals is non-injective; in my view, that is because the mapping loses something that is worth tracking in a belief state. There's technically a difference between specifying P(X) and P(Y|X) vs P(Y) and P(X|Y) (all with the same confidence), even though we all agree they are semantically equivalent. Making this distinction (and others in the same class) can be relevant for revising your beliefs (e.g., if you determine that your mechanism for forming conditional beliefs had a flaw). My concern is that direct specification of an inconsistency functional could short-circuit the modeling process that PDGs are designed to elicit.
Richard Ngo challenged me to set a time box and write down as many of the most important features of my formal epistemology as I can in one sitting. Here goes.
Motivation: Where probability distributions fail...
...to express beliefs
...to make safety tradeoffs
Beliefs, according to davidad
Definition 1. Given a state space , we define probability space as the space of all conceivable probability distributions on .
Definition 2. A belief about ( ) is a functional
which is lower semicontinuous (meaning that ).
Following Richardson, we interpret as the level of inconsistency between the conceivable probability distribution and one's belief .
Slogan: When one has multiple beliefs at the same time, one's overall belief is simply the sum of its parts.
All other known notions of belief are full subcategories
Bayesian beliefs
Definition 3. If one has a prior (big if), then one's prior belief is
Bayesian updating
Definition 4. If one has a belief over a hypothesis space, and the total state space of the situation is the product of hypothesis space and data space , then one's prior belief about is the inverse-image functor
Definition 5. An observation is a closed subset .
Example 6. If one observes that , this is the subset .
Definition 7. The belief that corresponds to an observation is
Definition 8. If one has a conditional distribution , then one's conditional belief is
Example 9. If one has a likelihood function , then the previous definition applies with and :
Definition 10. A Bayesian reasoner with prior and likelihood function has belief state
Theorem 11. The two components of a Bayesian reasoner's initial belief state, only one of which is a probability distribution, simply sum when lifted into the belief space, forming the joint belief:
However, this would be meaningless unless we could recover the Bayesian update by also summing the observations in the belief space.
Theorem 12. Whenever the Bayesian posterior is well-defined, then
with a constant denoting the level of incompatibility of the observation with the Bayesian reasoner's initial belief state, namely the prior predictive surprisal, .
Notice that the orthodox Bayesian update's “normalization” to a full-mass posterior distribution silently subtracts away the constant — the amount of incompatibility between the observed data and the statistical model as a whole — which is Deborah Mayo's criticism of Bayesian epistemology in a nutshell.
Bayesian beliefs have fully trivial categorical structure (no Bayesian belief implies any other Bayesian belief except itself), so Bayesian beliefs about are a full subcategory of , but the content of this is just that is injective (its post-inverse is ).
Infra-Bayesian beliefs (Kosoy and Appel)
Definition 13 (Kosoy and Appel). A homogenous ultracontribution is a nonempty topologically-closed convex down-closed subset of subprobability space, .
Theorem 14. Homogenous ultracontributions (ordered by ) form a full subcategory of . Specifically, given , the corresponding belief is
and given a belief , the corresponding subset of subprobability space is
and . Furthermore, is a member of iff is convex in probability space, which every satisfies.
Definition 15 (Kosoy and Appel). A homogenous ultradistribution is a homogenous ultracontribution whose intersection with the full-mass face is nonempty ( ).
Of course, is also a full subcategory of , since is a full subcategory of .
MWER (Halpern and Leung)
Theorem 16. Homogenous ultradistributions are exactly isomorphic to the belief states of Halpern and Leung's MWER framework (Minimax Weighted Expected Regret), via
Theorem 17. The updating process of simply adding , which is equivalent to that of Theorem 12, is also equivalent to Halpern and Leung's prescribed belief-updating procedure on the domain of their belief states.
Note: via the transform, this updating process is also consonant with the famous Multiplicative Weight Update family of algorithms (although I am not yet confident about whether e.g. AdaBoost is literally a special case of it).
Probabilistic dependency graphs (Richardson and Halpern)
Richardson and Halpern's PDGs, a common generalization of Bayes nets and factor graphs, take their semantics in functionals , and these functionals are always lower semicontinuous (though Richardson does not explicitly prove this), so therefore every PDG denotes a belief in my sense. Furthermore, the combination of PDGs with overlapping variables denotes exactly the sum of their beliefs, so the semantics of PDGs is a monoidal functor from PDGs into beliefs.
For a wide parameter regime of PDGs ( on every edge, or equivalently ) — assumed by some but not all PDG theorems [correction due to Richardson himself in the comments] — the beliefs they denote are convex, and thus immediately satisfy the exp-convexity criterion to be transformed into homogenous ultracontributions. However, even these PDGs do not typically denote homogenous ultradistributions, unless their semantics are “normalized” (by subtracting ).
PDGs can also express independence beliefs, which are non-convex while remaining lower semicontinuous.
Credal sets (Cozman)
Definition 18 (Cozman). A credal set is a nonempty closed convex set of probability distributions, .
Theorem 19. Credal sets about (ordered by ) form a full subcategory of . Specifically, given , the corresponding belief is
and given a belief , the corresponding credal set is
which is topologically closed by lower semicontinuity of .
Previsions (Goubault-Larrecq)
Definition 20 (Goubault-Larrecq). A gamble about is a Borel function . A prevision about is a functional such that and . An upper prevision is a prevision which is sub-additive: . A continuous upper prevision is an upper prevision which is Scott-continuous (for every directed family with least upper bound , ).
Definition 21. A coherent continuous upper prevision is a continuous upper prevision satisfying .
Theorem 22. Coherent continuous upper previsions about form a full subcategory of . Specifically, given the coherent continuous upper prevision , the corresponding belief is
and given a belief , the corresponding upper prevision is
The monad (Mio, Sarkis, and Vignudelli)
Definition 23 (Mio, Sarkis, and Vignudelli). The monad is defined on sets as the set of non-empty finitely-generated down-closed convex sets of subprobability distributions .
Mio, Sarkis, and Vignudelli prove that this monad is presented by the equational theory of semilattices equipped with finite probabilistic choice and , making in a strong sense the smallest semantic universe that can simultaneously interpret finite nondeterminism, finite probability, and partiality (and partiality is, in turn, needed to interpret either inconsistent beliefs or nonterminating probabilistic programs).
Theorem 24. ordered by inclusion is a full subcategory of , assuming is a Polish space. Specifically, this condition implies that finitely-generated convex sets are topologically closed, which makes a full subcategory of .