This post slightly improves on the impossibility results in my last post and A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values. This is very similar to those arguments but with minor technical differences. I may refer people here if we're discussing details of the argument against unbounded utilities, but for more interesting discussion you should check out those other writeups.
Summarizing the key differences from my last post:
I replace the dominance principle ∀i:Ai>Bi⇒∑piAi>∑piBi with ∀i:Ai≥Bi⇒∑piAi≥∑piBi.
Assuming unbounded positive and negative utilities, I remove the assumption of Intermediate Mixtures.
Weakening dominance
We'll represent preferences by a relation ≤ over probability distributions over some implicit space of outcomes Ω (and we'll identify outcomes with the constant probability distribution). Define A<B to mean (A≤B and not B≤A).
We'll show that it's impossible for ≤ to satisfy four properties: unbounded utilities, intermediate mixtures, very weak dominance, and transitivity.
The properties
Unbounded utilities: there is an infinite sequence of outcomes X1,X2,X4,X8,… each "more than twice as good"[1] as the last. More formally, there exists an outcome X0 such that:
X0<X1
X2k<12X2k+1+12X0 for every k
That is: X1 is not as good as a 12 chance of X2, which is not as good as a 14 chance of X4, which is not as good as a 18 chance of X8...
Intermediate mixtures: If A<B and 0<p<1,[2] then A<pA+(1−p)B<B.
That is: a chance of a good outcome is strictly worse than a sure thing.[3]
Weak lottery-lottery dominance: Let A0,A1,A2,…, and B0,B1,B2,… be sequences of lotteries, and p0,p1,p2,… be a sequence of probabilities summing to 1. If Ai≥Bi for all i, then ∑piAi≥∑piBi.
Consider the lottery X∞:=13X0+29X1+427X2+881X4+…, where each outcome X2k is 23 as likely as the one before. Intuitively this sum is "more infinite" than the usual St Petersburg lottery and this will be important for our proof.
By weak dominance we can replace X1 by X0 without making the lottery any better. Thus:
We can apply bounded utilities to each parenthesized expression. Combining with weak dominance, we obtain:
X∞≥19X0+827X1+1681X2+32243X4+…
Write X2∞ for the right hand side of this inequality.
X2∞:=19X0+827X1+1681X2+32243X4+…
Now note that X∞=14X0+34X2∞, despite the fact that X∞≥X2∞. If we knew X2∞>X0, then intermediate mixtures would imply that X2∞>X∞, contradicting X∞≥X2∞.
So all that remains is to show that X2∞>X0. This will involve a bit of annoying arithmetic but it should feel pretty obvious given that all the outcomes in X2∞ seems much better than X0.
Combining 12X0+12X2≥X1 with weak dominance and X1>X0 we get:
X2∞≥1327X0+127X1+781X2+32243X4+64729X8+…
Then we write the right hand side as a mixture and apply unbounded utilities and weak dominance:
To rule out unbounded utilities, we've made two substantive consistency assumptions: intermediate mixtures and weak lottery-lottery dominance. The assumption of intermediate mixtures is necessary: we could satisfy the other properties by simply being indifferent between all lotteries with infinite expectations.
But if we can have unboundedly good or unboundedly bad outcomes, then we can obtain a contradiction even without infinite mixtures. That is, we will show that there is no relation ≤ satisfying transitivity, symmetric unbounded utilities, and weak outcome-lottery dominance.
I think that almost anyone who accepts unbounded utilities (in the informal sense) should accept symmetric unbounded utilities, so I think they probably need to reject weak outcome-lottery dominance (or stop defining preferences over arbitrary probability distributions). I find this pretty damning, but maybe others are more comfortable with it.
The properties
Transitivity. If A≤B and B≤C, then A≤C.
Symmetric unbounded utilities: There is a pair of outcomes X0<X1 (i.e. it's not the case that all pairs of outcomes are either incomparable or equal). Moreover:
For any[5] pair of outcomes X+>X, there is outcome X− such that 23X++13X−≤X.
For any pair of outcomes X−<X there is an outcome X+ such that 23X−+13X+≥X.
In words: no matter how much better X+ is than X, there's always an X− that's 2x "further away" from X on the other side. By that we mean that a 13 risk of moving from X to X− can offset a 23 chance of moving from X to X+. And no matter how bad an outcome X− is, there's always an X+ that's 2x "further away" from X on the other side.
Weak outcome-lottery dominance: Let X be an outcome, let A0,A1,A2,… be a sequence of lotteries, and let p0,p1,p2,… be a sequence of probabilities summing to 1. If Ai≥X for all i, then ∑piAi≥X. Similarly, if Ai≤X for all i, then ∑piAi≤X.
Inconsistency proof
Define a sequence of outcomes X0,X1,X−2,X7,X−14,X31… as follows:
Pick X0<X1 arbitrarily.
Take X−2 to be the "reflection" of X1 across X0 as defined in symmetric unbounded utilities.
Take X7 to be the reflection of X−2 across X1.
Take X−14 to be the reflection of X7 across X0.
Take X31 to be the reflection of X−14 across X1.
And so on.
Now define the lottery X±∞=12X1+14X−2+18X7+116X−14+132X31+…
Note that we only actually need to apply this principle for p=34 and p=89 so a reader squeamish about very small probabilities need not be concerned. By making the argument with different numbers we could probably just fix p=12.
Despite appearing innocuous, this might be more "controversial" than very weak dominance. Many theories say that if B is infinitely good, then it doesn't matter whether I achieve B with 100% probability or 50% probability (or 1% probability or 0.000001% probability...) I find this sufficiently unappealing to reject such theories out of hand, but each reader must pick their own poison.
I'm pretty sure this isn't necessary for the proof, since we only use it as a convenience for short manipulations rather than to establish very long chains. That said, it makes the proof easier and it's a pretty mild assumption.
We don't really need this universal quantifier---it would be enough to define a single chain of escalating and alternative outcomes. But the quantitative properties we need out of the chain are somewhat arbitrary, so it seemed clearer to state an axiom capturing why unbounded utilities allow us to construct a particular kind of chain, rather than to directly posit a chain. That said, it results in a stronger assumption---for example it may be that there is an outcome X∞ which can offset any negative outcome, while still having a chain of increasingly large finite outcomes.
Here's a more intuitive way to view the first proof (under very slightly different assumptions).
Suppose that Omega offers two lotteries: a St. Petersburg lottery X∞ and a "half chance of a St. Petersburg lottery" 12X0+12X∞. Suppose I draw an outcome from X∞, I see what it is, and then I'm given the option to switch to the other (currently uncertain) lottery.
No matter what finite value I see, it's very easy to argue that I'm going to want to switch (and I'd want to switch even if I truncated the second St. Petersburg lottery after some finite number of steps). But then by a reasonable dominance or "sure thing" principle I might as well just switch before I even look at the outcome.
But that implies 12X0+12X∞≥X∞, i.e. I'm just as happy with a half chance of a St. Petersburg lottery as a sure thing of a St. Petersburg lottery. And similarly I'm just as happy with an ε chance for any ε>0. That violates Intermediate Mixtures (and is generally just a kind of bizarre preference to have).
Oh, nice! It seems more irrational to me to violate this "sure thing" principle than the axioms in your post, or at least, this comment makes it clear that you can get Dutch booked and money pumped if you do so. You have a Dutch book, since the strategy forces you to commit to switching to a lottery that's stochastically dominated by a lottery available at the start that you previously held (assuming X0 has identically 0 payoff). There's also a money pump here, since Omega can offer you a new St. Petersburg lottery after you see the outcome of yo... (read more)
If you truncate the second lottery so that the outcome that you got from the first one doesn't appear then you would not want to switch.
I am a little confused as I read this setup multiple times as "We draw a an outcome 'jackpot' from St. Petersburg. Then you get to choose between 'jackpot' and 'heads goat, tails jackpot'". If goat were just an arbitrary condolence price then it might happen that jackpot<goat and it might happen that jackpot>goat. But goat is not an unconnected outcome but the shittiest thing that St Petersburg can spit out. So jackpot>=goat and I am fine staying with jackpot. And I think the setup intends that the lotteries are drawn "separately", that you can get a diffrent thing out. But in that case it escapes me how rolling one die would make me update in any direction about disconnected dice even if they have the same makeup. That somebody wins the lottery doesn't make me update the value of lottery tickets upwards.
To my mind "half St. Petersburg" has a transfinite expectation value which is smaller than St. Petersburg. The main gist how the argument goes forward is imply that transfinite values breaking things sufficiently mean they need to have equal value. If you can't say > and can't say < one option is that the things are equal but another option is that they are incoparable or can't be compared by those methods one wishes to use.
This post slightly improves on the impossibility results in my last post and A paradox for tiny probabilities and enormous values. This is very similar to those arguments but with minor technical differences. I may refer people here if we're discussing details of the argument against unbounded utilities, but for more interesting discussion you should check out those other writeups.
Summarizing the key differences from my last post:
Weakening dominance
We'll represent preferences by a relation ≤ over probability distributions over some implicit space of outcomes Ω (and we'll identify outcomes with the constant probability distribution). Define A<B to mean (A≤B and not B≤A).
We'll show that it's impossible for ≤ to satisfy four properties: unbounded utilities, intermediate mixtures, very weak dominance, and transitivity.
The properties
Unbounded utilities: there is an infinite sequence of outcomes X1,X2,X4,X8,… each "more than twice as good"[1] as the last. More formally, there exists an outcome X0 such that:
That is: X1 is not as good as a 12 chance of X2, which is not as good as a 14 chance of X4, which is not as good as a 18 chance of X8...
Intermediate mixtures: If A<B and 0<p<1,[2] then A<pA+(1−p)B<B.
That is: a chance of a good outcome is strictly worse than a sure thing.[3]
Weak lottery-lottery dominance: Let A0,A1,A2,…, and B0,B1,B2,… be sequences of lotteries, and p0,p1,p2,… be a sequence of probabilities summing to 1. If Ai≥Bi for all i, then ∑piAi≥∑piBi.
Transitivity: if A≥B and B≥C, then A≥C.[4]
Inconsistency proof
Consider the lottery X∞:=13X0+29X1+427X2+881X4+…, where each outcome X2k is 23 as likely as the one before. Intuitively this sum is "more infinite" than the usual St Petersburg lottery and this will be important for our proof.
By weak dominance we can replace X1 by X0 without making the lottery any better. Thus:
We can rewrite this new lottery as a mixture:
We can apply bounded utilities to each parenthesized expression. Combining with weak dominance, we obtain:
Write X2∞ for the right hand side of this inequality.
Now note that X∞=14X0+34X2∞, despite the fact that X∞≥X2∞. If we knew X2∞>X0, then intermediate mixtures would imply that X2∞>X∞, contradicting X∞≥X2∞.
So all that remains is to show that X2∞>X0. This will involve a bit of annoying arithmetic but it should feel pretty obvious given that all the outcomes in X2∞ seems much better than X0.
Combining 12X0+12X2≥X1 with weak dominance and X1>X0 we get:
Then we write the right hand side as a mixture and apply unbounded utilities and weak dominance:
Leveraging negative utilities
To rule out unbounded utilities, we've made two substantive consistency assumptions: intermediate mixtures and weak lottery-lottery dominance. The assumption of intermediate mixtures is necessary: we could satisfy the other properties by simply being indifferent between all lotteries with infinite expectations.
But if we can have unboundedly good or unboundedly bad outcomes, then we can obtain a contradiction even without infinite mixtures. That is, we will show that there is no relation ≤ satisfying transitivity, symmetric unbounded utilities, and weak outcome-lottery dominance.
I think that almost anyone who accepts unbounded utilities (in the informal sense) should accept symmetric unbounded utilities, so I think they probably need to reject weak outcome-lottery dominance (or stop defining preferences over arbitrary probability distributions). I find this pretty damning, but maybe others are more comfortable with it.
The properties
Transitivity. If A≤B and B≤C, then A≤C.
Symmetric unbounded utilities: There is a pair of outcomes X0<X1 (i.e. it's not the case that all pairs of outcomes are either incomparable or equal). Moreover:
In words: no matter how much better X+ is than X, there's always an X− that's 2x "further away" from X on the other side. By that we mean that a 13 risk of moving from X to X− can offset a 23 chance of moving from X to X+. And no matter how bad an outcome X− is, there's always an X+ that's 2x "further away" from X on the other side.
Weak outcome-lottery dominance: Let X be an outcome, let A0,A1,A2,… be a sequence of lotteries, and let p0,p1,p2,… be a sequence of probabilities summing to 1. If Ai≥X for all i, then ∑piAi≥X. Similarly, if Ai≤X for all i, then ∑piAi≤X.
Inconsistency proof
Define a sequence of outcomes X0,X1,X−2,X7,X−14,X31… as follows:
Now define the lottery X±∞=12X1+14X−2+18X7+116X−14+132X31+…
We can write X±∞ as the mixture:
By Unbounded Utilities each of these terms is ≤X0. So by weak dominance, X±∞≤X0.
But we can also write X±∞ as the mixture:
By Unbounded Utilities each of these terms is ≥X1. So by weak dominance, X±∞≥X1.
Now we have X0≥X±∞≥X1. By transitivity, X0≥X1, contradicting X1>X0.
Of course the same argument would work if we replaced "good" with "bad."
Note that we only actually need to apply this principle for p=34 and p=89 so a reader squeamish about very small probabilities need not be concerned. By making the argument with different numbers we could probably just fix p=12.
Despite appearing innocuous, this might be more "controversial" than very weak dominance. Many theories say that if B is infinitely good, then it doesn't matter whether I achieve B with 100% probability or 50% probability (or 1% probability or 0.000001% probability...) I find this sufficiently unappealing to reject such theories out of hand, but each reader must pick their own poison.
I'm pretty sure this isn't necessary for the proof, since we only use it as a convenience for short manipulations rather than to establish very long chains. That said, it makes the proof easier and it's a pretty mild assumption.
We don't really need this universal quantifier---it would be enough to define a single chain of escalating and alternative outcomes. But the quantitative properties we need out of the chain are somewhat arbitrary, so it seemed clearer to state an axiom capturing why unbounded utilities allow us to construct a particular kind of chain, rather than to directly posit a chain. That said, it results in a stronger assumption---for example it may be that there is an outcome X∞ which can offset any negative outcome, while still having a chain of increasingly large finite outcomes.