Aumann's Agreement Theorem says that SREoEs who start with the same beliefs and see the same evidence cannot disagree without doing something wrong.

Perhaps, then, I don't fully agree with Aumann's Agreement Theorem. I'll leave it to you to decide whether that means I'm not a "genuine" Bayesian. I wouldn't have a problem with being unable to fully adopt a single method of thinking about the universe.

In practice, I'm not sure any adult human hasn't been exposed to E1 already, and I'm doubtful that most children are SREoEs

Is it fair to say that most current SREoEs became that way during a sort of rationalist awakening? (I know it's not as simple as being a SREoE or not, and so this process actually takes years. but let's pretend for a moment.) Imagine a child who grows up being fed very high priors about G1. This child (not a SREoE) is exposed to E1 and has a high confidence in G1. When he (/she) grows up and eventually becomes a SREoE, he first of all consciously throws out all his priors (rebellion against parents), then re-evaluates E1 (re-exposure?) and decides that in fact it entails ~G1.

Whether or not this describes you, does it make sense?

I'm saying that people who assign high probability to G1 after exposure to E1 either (a) had very different priors about G1 than I before exposure to E1, or (b) are not SREoEs. Alternatively, I either (a) am not an SREoE, or (b) have not been exposed to the evidence we have referred to as E1.

How about this: since both of you have been exposed to the same evidence and don't agree, then either (a) you had very different priors (which is likely), or (b) you evaluate evidence differently. I'm going to avoid saying either of you is "better" or "more rational" at evaluating evidence.