I have some sympathy with the Nate side. It feels a bit like the Scott position is doing separation of concerns wrong. If your beliefs and your actions disagree, I think it better to revise one or the other, rather than coming up with principles about how it's fine to say one thing and do another.
What do you mean by "better" here?
For humans (or any other kinds of agents) that live in the physical world as opposed to idealized mathematical universes, the process of explicitly revising beliefs (or the equivalent action-generators in the latter case) imposes costs in terms of the time and energy necessary to make the corrections. Since we are limited beings that often go awry because of biases, misconceptions etc, we would need to revise everything constantly and consequently spend a ton of time just ensuring that our (conscious, S2-endorsed beliefs) match our actions.
But if you try to function on the basis of these meta-principles that say "in one case, think about it this way; in another case, think about it this other way (which is actually deeply incompatible with the first one) etc," you only need to pay the cost once: at the moment you find and commit to the meta-principles. Afterwards, you no longer need to worry about ensuring that everything is coherent and that the different mindsets you use are in alignment with one another; you just plop whatever situation you find yourself confronted with into the meta-principle machine and it spits out which mindset you should select.
So I can agree that revising one of your beliefs and actions to ensure that they agree generates an important benefit, but the more important question is whether that benefit overcomes the associated cost I just mentioned, given the fundamental and structural imperfections of the human mind. I suspect Scott thinks it does not: he would probably say it would be axiologically good if you could do so (the world-state in which you make your beliefs and actions coherent is "better" than the one in which you don't, all else equal), but because all else is not equal in the reality we live our lives in, it would not be the best option to choose for virtually all humans.
(Upon reflection, it could be that what I am saying here is totally beside the point of your initial dialogue with Anthony, and I apologize if that's the case)
I've been reading the hardcover SSC collection in the mornings, as a way of avoiding getting caught up in internet distractions first thing when I get up. I'd read many of Scott Alexander's posts before, but nowhere near everything posted; and I hadn't before made any attempt to dive the archives to "catch up" to the seeming majority of rationalists who have read everything Scott Alexander has ever written.
(The hardcover SSC collection is nowhere near everything on SSC, not to mention Scott's earlier squid314 blog on livejournal. I'm curious how much shelf space a more complete anthology would occupy.)
Anyway, this has gotten me thinking about the character of Scott Alexander's writing. I once remarked (at a LessWrong meetup) that Scott Alexander "could never be a cult leader". I intended this as a sort of criticism. Scott Alexander doesn't write with conviction in the same way some other prominent rationalist authors do. He usually has the attitude of a bemused bystander who is merely curious about a bunch of things. Some others in the group agreed with me, but took it as praise: compared to some other rationalist authors, Scott Alexander isn't an ideologue.
(now I fear 90% of the comments are going to be some variation of "cults are bad")
What I didn't realize (at the time) was how obsessed Scott Alexander himself is with this distinction. Many of his posts grapple with variations on question of just how seriously we can take our ideas without going insane, contrasting the holy madman in the desert (who takes ideas 100% seriously) with the detached academic (who takes an intellectual interest in philosophy without applying it to life).
But related ideas are in many other posts. It's a thread which runs throughout Scott's writing. (IMHO.)
This conflict is central to the human condition, or at least the WASP/WEIRD condition. I imagine most of Scott's readers felt similar conflicts around applying their philosophies in practice.
But this is really weird from a decision-theoretic perspective. An agent should be unsure of principles, not sure of principles but unsure about applying them. (Related.)
It's almost like Scott implicitly believes maximizing his own values would be bad somehow.
Some of this makes sense from a Goodhart perspective. Any values you explicitly articulate are probably not your values. But I don't get the sense that this is what's going on in Scott's writing. For example, when he describes altruists selling all their worldly possessions, it doesn't sound like he intends it as an example of Goodhart; it sounds like he intends it as a legit example of altruists maximizing altruist values.
In contrast, blogs like Minding our way to the heavens give me more of a sense of pushing the envelope on everything; I associate it with ideas like:
In more SSC-like terms, it's like, if you're not a holy madman, you're not trying.
I'm not really pushing a particular side, here, I just think the dichotomy is interesting.