The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:
Consequentialists can account for phenomena that are usually thought of in nonconsequentialist terms, such as rights, duties, and virtues, whereas the opposite is false of nonconsequentialist theories. Rights, duty or virtue-based theories cannot account for the fundamental moral importance of consequences. Because of this asymmetry, it seems it would be preferable to become a consequentialist – indeed, it would be virtually impossible not to be a consequentialist.
You can represent any form of agency with utility function that is 0 for doing what agency does not want to do, and 1 for doing what agency want to do. This looks like a special case of such triviality, as true as it is irrelevant. Generally one of the problems with insufficient training in math is the lack of training for not reading extra purpose into mathematical definitions.
This was demonstrated, in a certain limited way, in Peterson (2009). See also Lowry & Peterson (2011).
The Peterson result provides an "asymmetry argument" in favor of consequentialism:
Another argument in favor of consequentialism has to do with the causes of different types of moral judgments: see Are Deontological Moral Judgments Rationalizations?
Update: see Carl's criticism.