This isn't a dichotomy. We can farm animals while making their lives reasonably comfortable. Their moments of pain would be few up to and until they reach the age for slaughter, which itself can be made stress-free and painless.
Here in Brazil, for example, we have huge ranches where cattle move around freely. Cramping them all in a tiny area to maximize productivity at the cost of making their lives extremely uncomfortable, as in the US factory farm system, may happen here, but I'm not personally aware of it so unusual that is. The US could do it the same way, as it isn't like the country lacks territory where cattle could roam freely, but since this isn't required by law, and factory farming is more profitable, this is rare, with the end result of free-roaming meat being sold at a much higher premium than it should.
Brazilian chickens, on the other hand, are typically cramped together the same as in the US, unless one opts to buy eggs from small family-owned farms, who mostly let them roam freely.
A few remarks that don't add up to either agreement or disagreement with any point here:
Considering rivers conscious hasn't been a difficulty for humans, as animism is a baseline impulse that develops even in absence of theism, and it takes effort, at either the individual or cultural levels, for people to learn not to anthropomorphize the world. As such, I'd suggest a thought experiment that allows for the possibility of a conscious river, even if composed of atomic moments of consciousness arising from strange flows through an extremely complex network of pipes, taps back, into that underlying animistic impulse, and so will only seem weird to those who've previously managed to supress it either via effort or nurture.
Conversely, as one can learn to suppress their animistic impulse towards the world, one can also suppress their animistic impulse towards themselves. Buddhism is the paradigmatic example of that effort. Most Buddhist schools of thought deny the reality of any kind of permanent self, asserting the perception of an "I" emerges from atomistic moments as an effect of those interactions, not as their cause or as a parallel process to them. From this perspective we may have a "non-conscious in itself" river whose pipe flows, interrupted or otherwise, cause the emergence of consciousness, exactly the same and in no way differently from what human minds do.
But even those Buddhist schools that do admit of a "something extra" at the root of the experience of consciousness, consider it as a form of matter that binds to ordinary matter to, operating as a single organic mixture, give rise to those moments of consciousness. This might correspond, or be an analogous on some level, to Searle's symbols, at least going from the summarized view presented in this post. Now, irrespective of such symbols being or not reducible to ordinary matter, if they can "attach" to human brain's matter to form, er, "carbon-based neuro-symbolic aggregates", nothing in principle (that I can imagine, at least) prevents them from attaching to any other substrate, such a water pipes, at which point we'd have "water-based pipe-symbolic" ones. Such an aggregate might develop a mind of its own, and even a human-like mind, complete with a self-delusion that similarly believes that emergent self as essential.
As such, it'd seem to me that, without a fully developed "physics of symbols", such speculations may go either way and don't really help solve the issue. A full treatment of the topic would need to expand on all such possibilities, and then analyse them from perspectives such as the ones above, before properly contrasting them.
1Where is all the furry AI porn you'd expect to be generated with PonyDiffusion, anyway?
From my experience, it's on Telegram groups (maybe Discord ones too, but I don't use it myself). There are furries who love to generate hundreds of images around a certain theme, typically on their own desktop computers where they have full control and can tweak parameters until they get what they wanted exactly right. They share the best ones, sometimes with the recipes. People comment, and quickly move on.
At the same time, when someone gets something with meaning attached, such as a drawing they commissioned from an artist they like, or that someone gifted them, it has more weight both for themselves, as well as friends who share on their emotional attachment to it.
I guess the difference is similar to that many (a few? most?) notice between a handcrafted vs an industrialized good: even if the industrialized one is better by objetive parameters, the handcrafted one is perceived as qualitatively distinct. So I can imagine a scenario in which there are automated, generative websites for quick consumption -- especially video, as you mentioned -- and Etsy-like made-by-a-real-person premium ones, with most of the associated social status geared towards the later.
A smart group of furry advertisers would look at this situation and see a commoditize-your-complement play: if you can break the censorship and everyone switches to the preferred equilibrium of AI art, that frees up a ton of money.
I don't know about sexual toys specifically, but something like that has been attempted with fursuits. There are cheap, knockoff Chinese fursuit sellers on sites such as Alibaba, and there's a market for those somewhere otherwise those wouldn't be advertised, but I've never seen someone wearing one of those on either big cons or small local meetups I attended, nor have I heard of someone who does. As with handcrafted art, it seems furries prefer handcrafted fursuits made either by the user themselves, or by artisan fursuit makers.
I suppose that might all change if the fandom grows to the point of becoming fully mainstream. If at some point there are tens to hundreds of millions of furries, most of whom carrying furry-related fetishes (sexual or otherwise), real industries might form around us to the point of breaking through the traditional handcraft focus. But I confess I have difficulty even visualizing such a scenario.
Hmm... maybe a good source for potential analogies would be Renaissance Fairs scene. I don't know much about them, but they're (as far as I can gather) more mainstream than the Furry Fandom. Do you know if such commoditization happens there? That might be a good model for what's likely to happen with the Furry Fandom as it further mainstreams.
This probably doesn't generalize beyond very niche subcultures, but in the one I'm a member of, the Furry Fandom, art drawn by real artists is such a core aspect that, even though furries use generative AI for fun, we don't value it. One reason behind this is that, different from more typical fandoms, in which members are fans of something specific made by a 3rd party, in the Furry Fandom members are fans of each other.
Give that, and assuming the Furry Fandom continues existing in the future, I expect members will continue commissioning art from each other or, at the very least, will continue wanting to be able to commission art from each other, and will use AI-generated art as a temporary stand in while they save to commission real pieces from the actual artists they admire.
I'd like to provide a qualitative counterpoint.
Aren't these arguments valid for almost all welfare programs provided by a first-world country to anyone but the base of the social pyramid? For one example, let's take retirement. All the tax money that goes into paying retirees to do nothing would be much better spent by helping victims of malaria etc. in 3rd world countries. If they weren't responsible enough to save during their working years to be able to live without working for the last 10 to 30 years of their lives, especially those from the lower middle class and above, or to have had 10 kids who would sustain them in their late years, each with 10% of their income, that increases the burden on society etc. And thus similarly for other programs targeting the middle class. So why not redirect most or even all of this to those more in need?
A possible answer, covering the specific case you brought as well as the generalized version above, counterintuitive as it may be, is that the original intent of welfare seems to have been forgotten nowadays, which makes it worth bringing it back.
Welfare wasn't originally implemented due to charitable impulses of those in power. Rather, it was first implemented to increase worker productivity, as in the programs pioneered by Bismarck in the 19th century. After that, it went on being implemented to reduce the working class's drive to become revolutionaries, as Marx noticed would happen in his Critique of the Gotha Program, which is why he opposed such programs. And in fact, wherever extensive welfare programs were instituted early empirical observations showed they did in fact reduce the revolutionary impulse.
Add to that the well observed fact mass revolutions over the last century and half, both left- and right-wing alike, have been strongly driven by dispossessed but well-educated, and thus entitled, young adults whose social and economic status were below their perceived self-worth, and we have the recipe for why providing welfare directed at those who traditionally form a revolutionary vanguard so they don't become a vanguard may be a reasonable long-term strategy, supposing we consider such movements, and what they result in, a net negative.
Hence the baseline question, as I see it, isn't as much in regard to the raw economics of the issue, but on how likely a revolution in the US due to the worsening economic conditions of its young middle class versus the changing shape of the US age pyramid is, and, based on a cost-benefit analysis, how much a revolution not happening in the US over the next generation or two is worth in monetary terms. Is a US revolution strictly impossible? If it's possible, is its likelihood high enough that reducing that likelihood is worth $1 trillion?
The same goes for all welfare aimed at this socio-economic/age-bracket group.
EDIT: Typo and punctuation corrections, and minor clarifications.
When this person goes to post the answer to the alignment problem to LessWrong, they will have low enough accumulated karma that the post will be poorly received.
I don't think this is accurate, it depends more on how it's presented.
In my experience, if someone posts something that's controversial to the general LW consensus, but argues carefully and in details, addressing the likely conflicts and recognizing where their position differs from the consensus, how, why, etc., in short, if they do the hard work of properly presenting it, it's well received. It may earn an agreement downvote, which is natural and expected, but it also earns a karma upvote for the effort put into exposing the point, plus those who disagreed engaging with the person explaining their points of disagreement.
Your point would be valid on most online forums, as people who aren't as careful about arguments as LWers tend to conflate disliking with disagreeing, which results in a downvote is a downvote is a downvote. Most LWers, in contrast, tend to be well skilled at treating the two axes as orthogonal, and it shows.
The answer is threefold.
a) First, religious and spiritual perspectives are a primarily a perceptual experience, not a set of beliefs. For those who have this perception, the object of which is technically named "the numinous", it is self-evident. The numinous stuff clearly "is there", for anyone to see/feel/notice/perceive/experience/etc., and they cannot quite grasp the concept of someone saying they notice nothing.
Here are two analogies of how this works.
For people with numinal perception, hearing "it's pretty, but that's all" is somewhat similar to someone with perfect vision hearing from a born blind person they don't see anything. The person with vision can only imagine "not seeing" as "seeing a black background", similar to what they perceive when they close their eyes or are in a perfectly dark room. Not seeing isn't seeing black, it's not seeing.
Consider, for another analogy, that a dove with normally functioning magnetic field sensing were able to talk, and it asked you: "So, if you don't feel North, which direction do you feel?" You'd reply "none", and the dove would at most be able to imagine you feel something like up or down, because they cannot grasp what it is like not to physically feel cardinal directions.
The opposite also applies. People with no numinous perception at all are baffled by those with it describing they perceive something that quite evidently isn't there. Their immediate take is that the person is self-deluded, or maybe suffering from some perceptual issue, maybe even schizophrenic, if not outright lying. At their most charitable, they'll attribute this perceptual error to a form of synesthesia.
Unsurprisingly, it's much more likely to be a Theist or similar if one has numinous perception, and much easier to be an Atheist if one doesn't have it, though there are exceptions. I don't remember if it was Carl Sagan or Isaac Asimov, but I recall one of them explaining in an interview they did have this perception of a "something" there (I don't think they referred to it by its name), and were thus constantly tempted towards becoming religious, but kept fighting against that impulse due to knowing it as a mental trick.
b) Thus, if we establish numinal perception is a thing, it becomes easy to understand what religions and spiritual beliefs are. Supernatural belief system are attempts, some tentative and in broad strokes, others quite systematic, to account for these perceptions, starting from the premise they're perceptions of objective phenomena, not of merely subjective, mental constructs.
Interestingly, in my experience talking with people with this perception, what's perceived as numinal varies from one to the other, which likely account for religious preferences when one has a choice.
For example, for some the navy of a Catholic cathedral is shock full of the numinal, while a crystal clear waterfall in a forest is just pretty but not numinal at all. Those with this kind of numinal perception are more likely to be Christian.
For others, it's the reverse. Those are more likely to go for some religion more focused on nature things, some form of native religiosity, unstructured spirituality, animism or the like.
For others yet, they feel the numinal in both contexts. These will be all in with syncretisms, complex ontological takes, and the like.
c) Finally, on whether perceived numinous thingies are objectively real or not depends on one's philosophical assumptions.
If one's on the side of reductionism, then they're clearly some kind of mental epiphenomena either advantageous or at least not-disadvantegeous for survival, so it keeps being expressed.
If one's an antireductionist, they can say numinous thingies are quite real, but made of pure qualia, without any measurable counterpart to make it numerically apprehensible, so either one has the sensory apparatus to perceive them, or they don't, external devices won't help.
And the main issue here is the choice for either reductionism or antireductionism is axiomatic. One either prefers one, and goes with it, or prefers the other, and goes with it. There's no extrinsic way to decide, only opposite arguments that tend to cancel out.
In conclusion:
To more directly answer the question then, when someone says they believe in God, what they mean is they perceive a certain numinal thing-y, and that the most accurate way to describe that numinal thing-y is with the word "God", plus the entire set of concepts that come with it in the belief system they're attuned with.
If they abandoned this specific explanatory system, that wouldn't affect their numinal perception qua perception, so they'd likely either go with another explanation they felt covered their perception even better, or more rarely actively force themselves to resist accepting the reality of that perception. The perception itself would remain there, calling for their attention.
I mean sure if you take self-reports as the absolute truth (...)
Absolute truth doesn't exist, the range is always ]0;1[. 0 and 1 require infinitely strong evidence. What imprecisions in self-reporting do generate is higher variance, skewing, bias etc., and these can be solved by better causal hypotheses. However, those causal hypotheses must be predictive and falsifiable.
why go with the convoluted point about aro-ace trans women (...)
Because that's central to the falsifiability requirement. Consider: if transgender individuals explicitly telling researchers they never experienced autogynephilic impulses, nor any sexual impulse or attraction at all, is dismissed by the autogynephilic hypothesis proponents and considered invalid, with proponents suggesting they actually did experience it but {ad hoc rationalization follows}, then what is the autogynephilic hypothesis' falsifiability criteria? Is there any?
More studies != better integration of the information from those studies into a coherent explanation.
There are several moments in research.
The initial hypothesis is simple: there are identifiable physiological differences between human male and female brains, and transgender individuals' brains show distinctive traits typical of the brains of the other sex, while cisgender individuals don't.
This is testable, with clear falsifiability criteria, and provides a pathway for the development of a taxonomy of such differences, including typical values, typical variances, normal distributions for each sex, a full binomial distribution to cover both sexes, and the ability to position an individual's brain somewhere along that binomial distribution.
Following that taxonomic mapping, if it pans out, there come questions of causality, such as what causes some individual brains to fall so distantly from the average for their birth sex. But that's a further development way down the line. Right now what matters is the first stage is falsifiable and has been experiencing constant corroboration, not constant falsification.
So now it's a matter of contrasting this theory's falsifiability track record with the autogynephilic hypothesis's falsifiability track record -- supposing there's one.
Feels like an example of bad discourse that you dismiss it on the basis of ace trans women without responding to what Blanchardians have to say about ace trans women.
Thanks for the link, but I'd say the text actually confirms my point rather than contradicting it. The numbers referred to:
"In this study, Blanchard (...) found that 75% of his asexual group answered yes. Similarly, Nuttbrock found that 67% of his asexual group had experienced transvestic arousal at some point in their lives. (...) 45.2% of the asexuals feel that it applies at least a little bit to them (...)"
Can all be reversed to show that, respectively, 25% / 33% / 54.8% of aro-ace trans individuals answer in the negative, and the rebuttal of the universality of the hypothesis needs only these numbers to be non-zero. That they're this high comes as an added bonus, so to speak.
I would enjoy if someone could lay it out in a more comprehensible manner.
This is being constantly done. Over the last 20+ years, as neuroimaging and autopsy techniques advance, and new studies are done using those more advanced techniques, we mostly get corroborations with more precision, not falsifications. There are occasional null results, so that isn't strictly always the case, but those come as outliers, not forming a new, contrary body of evidence, and not significantly affecting the trend identified as meta-analyses keep being done.
I'm not aware of someone having done a formal Bayesian calculation on this, but my impression is it'd show the scale constantly sliding toward the physiological hypothesis, and away from the autogynephilic one, as time advances, with only small backslides along the way.
This paper is far from a complete answer, but it may help: