Whether or not momentary death is necessary for multiverse immortality depends on what view of personal identity is correct. According to empty individualism, it should not matter that you know you will die, you will still "survive" while not remember having died as if that memory was erased.

Do you mean Monday or Tuesday? :)

Kotrfa never turned up but another LWer did and we had a nice discussion! When is next meeting? :)

Count me in! I'm 20, also skinny and curly haired :)

You write that the orthogonality thesis "...states that beliefs and values are independent of each other", whereas Bostrom writes that it states that almost any level of intelligence is compatible with almost any values, isn't that a deviation? Could you motivate the choice of words here, thanks.

From The Superintelligent Will: "...the orthogonality thesis, holds (with some caveats) that intelligence and final goals (purposes) are orthogonal axes along which possible artificial intellects can freely vary—more or less any level of intelligence could be combined with more or less any final goal."

Should we value outside entities as much as we do ourselves? Why?

Nate Soares recently wrote about problems with using the word "should" that I think are relevant here, if we assume meta-ethical relativism (if there are no objective moral shoulds). I think his post "Caring about something larger than yourself" could be valuable in providing a personal answer to the question, if you accept meta-ethical relativism.

The very notion of something being "out there" independent of us is itself a mental model we use to explain our perceptions.

Yes, I think that's right, the conviction that something exists in the world is also a (unconscious) judgement made by the mind that could be mistaken. However, when we what to explain why we have the perceptual data, and it's regularities, it makes sense to attribute it to external causes, but this conviction could perhaps too be mistaken. The underpinnings of rational reasoning seems to bottom out to in unconsciously formed convictions as well, basic arithmetic is obviously true but can I trust these convictions? Justifying logic with logic is indeed circular. At some point we just have to accept them in order to function in the world. The signs that these convictions are ofter useful suggest to me that we have some access to objective reality. But for everything I know, we could be Boltzmann brains floating around in high entropy with false convictions. Despite this, I think the assessment that objective reality exists and that our access and knowledge of it is limited but expandable is a sensible working hypothesis.

The same animation studio also made this fairly accurate and entertaining introduction to (parts of) Bostrom's argument. Although I don't know what to think of their (subjective) probability for possible outcomes.