We will then prove in a later post that conditions 2.5 or 2.6 will lead to a larger set of computable functions than a UTM can compute, and thus the Church-Turing Thesis is false, in that it's not universally valid, that is it doesn't hold in every model. It is satisfiable, however, in that there exists a model where it's correct.
I think you are overclaiming here. I'm not a philosopher of computation, but it seems fair to say that the Church-Turing thesis refers to the specific model gestured at by the simplified model of reality where you allow unbounded space and time usage, and no edge cases of physics or quantum phenomena etc. Similarly, the natural numbers as such don't depend on any mathematical model, but they are what you get if you "just keep counting".
It is unclear to me on whether having your name publicly associated with them is good or bad. (compared to advising without it being publicly announced)
On one hand it boosts awareness of the CAIS and gives you the opportunity to cause them some amount of negative publicity if you at some point distance yourself. On the other it does grant them some license to brush off safety worries by gesturing at your involvement.
I think excitement can be valuable after you used the fear-based motivation to try and figure out what the problem is and acknowledge it without trying to take direct action. Excitement without a solid foundation of caution is what is causing the current AI race.
Are wildly different claims. The point is that it's always easy to do 1. in retrospect and this has no bearing whatsoever on 2.
I think we would agree that (Log-) Flops or parameters or some mild combination of those would count as a reasonable metric?
I'm not a statistician, but from what I know it should be extremely hard to predict S-curves before their inflection point, in particular if there's no guarantee that what you're predicting is literally a logistic function.
That being said, trying to create benchmarks for all kinds of tasks seems like a reasonable thing to do in an case.
Putting the question of assisted suicide aside, I agree with what seems to be the core of this answer: The "value calculus" often used by utilitarians is a nice mathematical framework, but ultimately not a real thing (not saying that suffering isn't a real thing or that one can't gain useful knowledge from such calculations).
E.g. I would always trade an infinite amount of suffering for +epsilon control of the future and my current and future values don't necessarily align. I don't see how a strong form of utilitarianism can contend with such things.
I think asking for non-smoothness to call something an emergent property is unreasonable. If a performance graph is precisely an S-curve along a reasonable metric, it is reasonable to call that emergent, although it is perfectly smooth you can reparametrize to make it seem linear etc.
I haven't looked at the paper to see what it's substance is, but from the description alone it could be a mathematical sleight of hand.
I agree that it seems like a pretty low value addition to the discourse and neither provides any additional insight, not do their categories structure the problem in a particularly helpful way. That may be exaggerated, but it feels like a plug to insert yourself into a conversation where you have nothing to contribute otherwise.
So it would be: Claim: A nuclear bomb could set the atmosphere on fire and destroy everything on earth Argument: Someone did a calculation. Counterargument: Clearly, that's absurd. Good Counterargument: Someone else did another calculation.
And I guess the analogy to AI applies foom/room a the bottom, where one can actually do calculations to at least in principle estimate some OOMs.
I'm curious how this fits into the context. Regardless of whether or not one believes it's true, doesn't it seem reasonable and intuitively right - so the opposite of what is asked for?
Even more infuriating, it appears that the picture shows a variety of porcelain crabs, and not in fact different species.