This piece was written by Aidan Mackenzie and originally posted on QRI's website.
Aidan is a recent graduate of Cornell University with a BA in philosophy and is a visiting research fellow at QRI. His current interests focus on global priorities research as well as the intersections between meta-ethics and philosophy of mind.
TLDR
This post discusses and explores the philosophy of well-being, a subtopic in moral philosophy. I focus on outlining what I call “experientialist” views — the class of views which argue that experience is necessary for well-being. I aim to illustrate why these views, and the discussion around them, can more thoroughly frame hedonism and other theories which attempt to explain value... (read 3238 more words →)
I think many of the different takes you listed with "consciousness as... X" can actually be held together and are not mutuall exclusive :)
Also, you may enjoy seeing David Chalmer's paper on The Meta-Problem of Consciousness... "the problem of explaining why we think consciousness is hard to explain" in the first place. https://philarchive.org/archive/CHATMO-32