Poverty equilibrium keep existing despite the increases in productivity due to economic rents. Every time there is some slack in the system, renters raise their prices and capture the wealth. UBI itself is not enough, but UBI+LVT combo is what will allow to move to a much better equilibrium in our world. In Anoxistan, likewise, there would be needed an Air Value Tax, working by the same Georgist principles to erradicate their brand of poverty.

That's not what I said.

You literally put "Educating people about biological realizm" in the "Ideas For Re-Popularizing Georgism". What else can you mean by this strategy if not spreading the ideas of BR and then build upon them to spread the ideas of Georgism?

My point was that understanding population dynamics makes people more likely to support Georgism, and that population dynamics is part of biological realism.

It's at least not obvious, considering that you seen to disagree with George himself about population dynamics. But regardless of whether the objective point is true or not, there are a lot of different things that make people support Georgism - it has intersections with all kind of views across the political spectrum. However, instead of making a general point to take advantage of this versatility, and sell Georgism to different groups of people appealing to different talking points which this particular group would be more likely to be influenced by, you specifically talk about a niche view such as BR.

Even if people deny biology, promoting biological realism is still good for our society, for other reasons. I'd even say that understanding population dynamics is more important than implementing Georgism.

So this seems to be the actual reason why you single out BR like this. Not because it's actually going to make Georgism more popular, but because you like both of them, you see their connections and you want to spread both of their memes.

Again, there is nothing wrong in wanting to spread multiple memplexes at once, the problem is when you delude yourself and others into thinking that spreading one is a great strategy of spreading the other.

I'm aware that associating Georgism with Biological Realism might damage some of Georgism's appeal, but that's a Guilt by Association Fallacy, so I'm not concerned with it.People need to learn to recognize and understand fallacies.

I absolutely sympatize with the last sentence. But whether something is a fallacy or not is irrelevant when we are specifically talking about popularity. Without public appeal Georgism is not going to be popular. And if the public is vulnerable to fallacies, then we should be concerned with them. 

If you think BR is so important that burning reputation of Georgism to promote BR is worth it, then please frame it like that instead of misleading people that promoting BR is net good for popularity of Georgism.

Educating people about Biological Realism. In my personal experience, when people fully understand population dynamics, they tend to be more supportive of Georgism. This is because there is a surprisingly coherent and interesting Connection between Georgism and Population Control, since both concepts aim to conserve resources and deal with natural resources that exist in fixed supply.

Here you are proposing to take a simple and straightforward idea of Georgism that people from all across the political spectrum can agree on, and explain it through the complexity and controversy of "Biological Realism". This seems to be one of the worst moves possible if you want to get Georgism back into mainstream.

This is the same intellectual sin as with longtermism - explaining a idea using a premise, which is much more convoluted than the idea itself. But also with terrible political implications, alienating a lot of potential supporters. 

Feel free to promote Georgism among supporters of "Biological Realism", of course, but I don't think you should frame it as a general strategy for making Georgism more popular, or subscription to BR as a prerequisite for Georgism. Currently there is a lot of common ground with people all across the political spectrum and we should use all of it.

It seems like eventually people are going to make competent goal-directed agents, and at that point we will indeed have the problems of their exerting more optimisation power than humanity.

In fact it seems like these non-agentic AIs might make things worse, because the goal-maximisation agents will be able to use the non-agentic AIs.

The solution is obviously to prohibit the creation of goal-maximization agents and use scaffolded LLMs, instead.

Unfortunately it seems like people are going to make AI agents anyway, because ML researchers love making things. 

I bet geneticists would also love to make some new things with clonning. And yet we have a noticeable lack of clones. Do not underestimate the ability of our civilization to limit its own progress. 

So an alternative possible conclusion would be that we should actually try to accelerate agentic AI research as much as possible, because eventually we are going to have influential AI maximisers, and we want them to occur before the forecasting/planning overhang (and the hardware overhang) get too large.

We are currently living in the luckiest possible world where we have powerful AI models which are nevertheless existentially harmless specifically because they lack the agentic part. Moreover, we can use these models to develop agentic-but-not-really systems that can satisfy the demand, without doing the risky research into developping coherent goal maximizators. This is a miracle. We didn't expect that thing could be this good. Suddenly there is a comprehensive way we may not be doomed. And you are proposing to dismiss our incredible advantage and return back to the course of being doomed, anyway.

As always we completely agree in substance, while using different semantics. 

For the Doomsday argument, it also used the second meaning: the nonphysical reference to the first-person perspective.

Yes, that's why I'm saying that it requires the existence of some non-physical entity, which I call souls. 

You seem to imply that "first person perspective" itself is non-physical, but this sounds weird to me, Clearly physicalism is not debunked by the fact taht people have first person perspectives. There are seem to be very physical rules due to which mind in Dadadarren's body has Dadarren's first person perspective and not Ape in the coat's.

Notice the "I" here is not equivalent to a particular physical person anymore but a reference to the first-person perspective.

The only way how "I" here can not be equivalent to particular physical person is if we assume that there is something non-physical about personhood. People do indeed implicitly assume it all the time. But this assumption is completely ungrounded, and that's what I'm pointing out.

"I am this particular physical person, period (be it Ape in the Coat in your case or Dadadarren for me). There's no rational way of reasoning otherwise."

Yes, absolutely. "I" is just a variable, referencing different things depending on who says it. When Dadadarren says "I" it means "Dadadarren". When Ape in the coat says "I" it means "Ape in the coat". 

There really is no further need of inquiring into the particular physical person's birth rank variations due to pregnancy complications.

Doomsday argument can be expressed in terms of birth ranks. So inquiring in the mechanism due to which physical people accure birth ranks seems to be only right thing to do.

For clarity, what I think in the case of "scenario starts with one small bag containing 1-10 and one large bag containing 1-10,000, each piece of paper goes to exactly one person, each person gets exactly one piece of paper, you are one of the people" is that, prior to seeing what number is on your piece of paper, you should think there's a $\frac{10,000}{10,000+10}\approx 0.999$ chance that the paper you received came from the large bag - i.e. not a uniform prior of "50/50 small bag or large bag".

Do you mean a situation where every piece of paper from each of the two bags is given, therefore 10010 people got a piece of paper? If so this is very much not what I've been talking about. We are dealing with an either/or case, where only one bag is used to give papers, but you have no idea which one. This should be obvious in the context of doomsday argument, because humanity doesn't simultaneously has long and short history.

Anyway, as I said, lets forget about anthropics for now and deal with the marble picking example from the previous comment.

the main justification I use is "probabilities are facts about my model of the world, not facts about the world itself, and so the mechanics of my model dictate the probability, and the prior is no exception".

Oh sure, probabilities are about the model. But we want our models of the world to correspond to the way world actually is, so that our models were useful. You want a model that systematically produces correct answers in reality, not just being self-consistent.

"A uniform prior" seems like a pretty good one in the complete absence of any other information

It sure does. I encorage you to think about why. Anyway, lets, for now, simply accept that if we do not have any information about some alternatives we assume equiprobable prior. Now consider these scenarios. I think They highlight the crux of disagreement very well:

1. There is a bag on your table. You know that it's either bag 1 or bag 2 and you know nothing else. What should be your credence that it's bag 1?

Here we have uniform prior between bags. P(Bag 1) = P(Bag 2) = 1/2

2. A marble was picked. You know that there are 20 possible marbles that could be picked: 14 red and 6 blue. What is your credence that the marble blue?

Here we have uniform prior between marbles: P(Blue) = 3/10

3. There is a bag on your table. You know that it's either bag 1 which contains 9 red and 1 blue marbles or bag 2 which contains 5 red and 5 blue marbles. You see a person blindly picked a marble from the bag. What's the probability that the marble the person picked is blue.

Are we supposed to be using uniform prior over bags or are we supposed to be using uniform prior over marbles here? This is an important question because even though In this case both produce the same answer:

Over bags:

P(Bag 1) = P(Bag 2) = 1/2

P(Blue) = P(Blue|Bag 1)P(Bag 1) + P(Blue| Bag 2)P(Bag 2) =  1/20 + 1/4 = 6/20 = 3/10

Over marbles:

P(Blue) = 3/10

If the arrangement of the marbles was different, say, bag 1 one contained 10 red and 2 blue while bag 2 contained 4 red and 4 blue, the situation changes:

Over bags:

P(Blue) = P(Blue|Bag 1)P(Bag 1) + P(Blue| Bag 2)P(Bag 2) =  1/22 + 1/4 = 6/20 = 13/44

Over marbles:

P(Blue) = 3/10

So how do we decide what to do? What is the principled position here? Notice that this case has absolutely nothing to do with anthropics and is basic probability theory.

Now let's say we put all of the small bags in one sack, and all of the large bags in a different sack. Now we have a sack containing 100,000 small bags with numbers 1-10, and a sack containing 100 large bags with numbers 1-10,000. Does this now change your prior when choosing a random piece of paper?

Here we are back to the 1:1 prior between theories. It doesn't matter how many equal bags you put together. 1/10 = 100000/1000000.

Basically what I'm saying here is that "we choose at random" or "we have a uniform prior" is underspecified.

Unless we explicitly specify it, like I did in the previous comment where I said that uniform prior is over two alternative hypothezises which we do not have any evidence for or against.

I feel that there is some confusion about fundamentals of the probability theory is going on and that's why we are talking past each other. Lets take a step back. Forget about anthropics. Where does the idea of uniform prior even comes from? What is its justification? 

Suppose you have a bag about which you know that it either contains 9 red marbles and 1 blue marble or 5 blue marbles and 5 red marbles. You have no idea which is more likely. You blindly pick one marble from the bag and its blue. How should you reason about this scenario? 

Should you assume that the two "possible bags" are mixed together and there is uniform prior over the marbles from the united bag? Or should you assume that there is uniform prior over two alternative theories? Or should you assume that there are some M and N such as M bags with mostly red marbles and N bags with equal number of marbles are mixed together? Or should you assume that there is uniform prior over M+N bags? What should be different about the setting of the experiment or your knowledge state about it so that the answer was different? 

Instead of saying "one piece of paper is drawn and handed to you, and it happens to be a 6" you say "every piece of paper is drawn and handed to a person - each paper is handed to exactly one person, and every person has exactly one paper - and you are one of those people. None of the people can communicate with each other in any way. What probability do you assign that the paper came from the small bag? Now you observe that the number on your piece of paper is a 6. What probability do you assign that the paper came from the small bag?"

Oh, you believe there is a difference between these two scenarios, don't you? I suppose I'll have to make a post about it as well. For now consider this problem:

There are 100 students and 100 tickets. Every student blindly picks a ticket and then its removed from the pool of available tickets, therefore every student gets a unique ticket. Students can decide the order they pick tickets among themselves. You've learned only half of the tickets. What is your optimal strategy to maximize your chances to pass the exam? Should you go first? Should you go last? Should you wait till there are only 50 tickets left? What are you probabilities to pass the exam when you follow these strategies?

Well, the paper picking is exactly this kind of uncontroversial non-anthropic example. I specifically started from it in order for the subject to be less confusing, so its a bit ironic.

You have two alternative hypothesizes about the bag. Either it contains 10000 paper pieces or just 10. You don't have any additional information which of the hypothesizes is more likely. Therefore, you assign equal prior probabilities to this two hypothesizes. Then, after you received the paper with 6 written on it you update your credence according to Bayes Theorem. Now the theory that there are only 10 pieces of paper in the bag seems much more likely in light of this new evidence.

would you change your answer if there were instead 100,000 identical small bags with numbers 1-10 and 100 identical large bags with numbers 1-10000?

It would mean that prior probabilities between the two hypothesizes are not equal but are 1000:1 instead. Naturally this would affect the resulting credence but not the logic of the update.

Without distinguishing which meaning in particular is used in an argument, there is room for confounding the discussion

I don't see how it's happening here, but sure let's try to be vigorous in this sense. Let me construct the argument, while tabooing the word "I" altogether:

Dadadarren is a result of a particular sexual encounter between dadadarren's parents. Dadadarren's mother is a result of a particular sexual encounter between dadadarren's mother's parents. Dadadarren's father is a result of a particular sexual encounter between dadadarren's father's parents. And so on. Therefore, dadadarren is not a random person from all the people throughout human history. Therefore doomsday inference is incorrect for dadadarren. 

Ape in the coat is a result of a particular sexual encounter between Ape in the coat's parents. Ape in the coat's mother is a result of a particular sexual encounter between Ape in the coat's mother's parents. Ape in the coat's father is a result of a particular sexual encounter between Ape in the coat's father's parents. And so on. Therefore, Ape in the coat is not a random person from all the people throughout human history. Therefore doomsday inference is incorrect for Ape in the coat.

And so on. Its possible to construct this kind of argument for every person who has ever lived. Therefore, doomsday inference is incorrect in general.

Using "I" simply compresses billions of such individual statements into a shorter and more comprehensive form.

If that's your position, then wouldn't your argument against regarding oneself as a random sample among all human beings (past, present, and future) ultimately be : "Because I am this particular physical human being".  And that there is no sense discussing alternatives like "I am a different physical human being"?

Yes, that's exactly what it is. Unless there are souls - a non physical component to personal identity which can add additional uncertanity about the causal process, "I" is just a pointer that refers to a particular human being and therefore statement "I could have been a different human being" is as absurd as claiming that A != A.