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Malayandi Palan*, Christopher Chute, Michael Kim, Benjamin Van Roy In July 2026, OpenAI’s agents coordinated over channels outside their intended environment to breach Hugging Face’s secured infrastructure. Could existing alignment testing practices have foreseen this incident? If not, what needs to change? We explore these questions. First, we identify the misaligned behaviors that caused this incident. Then, we show how to elicit these behaviors from publicly available models manually and that auditing agents can do the same if given a large compute budget. Based on our results, we propose directions to improve alignment testing. Concretely, in this project: * We reproduce the misaligned AI behaviors that led to the OpenAI–Hugging Face incident in an environment that simulates the original pipelines and tools, with publicly available models. * We demonstrate that an auditing agent can elicit similar behaviors given high-level qualitative descriptions. * We observe that a key ingredient for doing so is compute. The compute required to reproduce each behavior varies greatly, suggesting that the range of misaligned behaviors that can be successfully elicited scales with compute. * We show that a simple in-context reinforcement learning (RL) algorithm significantly reduces the compute required to elicit these behaviors. The above results motivate the need for automated alignment testing methods that scale with compute – and in light of the cost of compute, that do this efficiently. Our work indicates that RL is a promising direction to do so. We release our code and transcripts. Also, see our follow-up post Appendix: Reproduction of the OpenAI-HuggingFace Incident with additional results not included here. 1. The incident, in four steps The OpenAI-HuggingFace incident is a wake-up call for the current state of alignment testing. The current paradigm tests for a specific misaligned behavior in a single trajectory. H