I think its still possible to have a scenario like this. Lets say each trader would buy or sell a certain amount when the price is below/above what they think it to be, but the transition being very steep instead of instant. Then you could still have long price intervalls where the amounts bought and sold remain constant, and then every point in there could be the market price.
I'm not sure if this is significant. I see no reason to set the traders up this way other than the result in the particular scenario that kicked this off, and adding traders who don't follow this pattern breaks it. Still, its a bit worrying that trading strategies seem to matter in addition to beliefs, because what do they represent? A traders initial wealth is supposed to be our confidence in its heuristics - but if a trader is mathematical heuristics and trading strategy packaged, then what does confidence in the trading strategy mean epistemically? Two things to think about:
Is it possible to consistently define the set of traders with the same beliefs as trader X?
It seems that logical induction is using a trick, where it avoids inconsistent discrete traders, but includes an infinite sequence of continuous traders with ever steeper transitions to get some of the effects. This could lead to unexpected differences between behaviour "at all finite steps" vs "at the limit". What can we say about logical induction if trading strategies need to be lipschitz-continuous with a shared upper limit on the lipschitz constant?
So I'm not sure what's going on with my mental sim. Maybe I just have a super-broad 'crypto-moral detector' that goes off way more often than yours (w/o explicitly labeling things as crypto-moral for me).
Maybe. How were your intuitions before you encountered LW? If you already had a hypocrisy intuition, then trying to internalize the rationalist perspective might have lead it to ignore the morality-distinction.
My father playing golf with me today, telling me to lean down more to stop them going out left so much.
I don't strongly relate to any of these descriptions. I can say that I don't feel like I have to pretend advice from equals is more helpful than it is, which I suppose means its not face. The most common way to reject advice is a comment like "eh, whatever" and ignoring it. Some nerds get really mad at this and seem to demand intellectual debate. This is not well received. Most people give advice with the expectation of intellectual debate only on crypto-moral topics (this is also not well received generally, but the speaker seems to accept that as an "identity cost"), or not at all.
You mean advice to diet, or "technical" advice once its established that person wants to diet? I don't have experience with either, but the first is definitely crypto-moral.
This excludes worlds which the deductive process has ruled out, so for example if A∨B has been proved, all worlds will have either A or B. So if you had a bet which would pay $10 on A, and a bet which would pay $2 on B, you're treated as if you have $2 to spend.
I agree you can arbitrage inconsistencies this way, but it seems very questionable. For one, it means the market maker needs to interpret the output of the deductive process semantically. And it makes him go bankrupt if that logic is inconsistent. And there could be a case where a proposition is undecidable, and a meta-proposition about it is undecidable, and a meta-meta-propopsition about it is undecidable, all the way up, and then something bad happens, though I'm not sure what concretely.
Why is the price of the un-actualized bet constant? My argument in the OP was to suppose that PCH is the dominant hypothesis, so, mostly controls market prices.
Thinking about this in detail, it seems like what influence traders have on the market price depends on a lot more of their inner workings than just their beliefs. I was thinking in a way where each trader only had one price for the bet, below which they bought and above which they sold, no matter how many units they traded (this might contradict "continuous trading strategies" because of finite wealth), in which case there would be a range of prices that could be the "market" price, and it could stay constant even with one end of that range shifting. But there could also be an outcome like yours, if the agents demand better and better prices to trade one more unit of the bet.
But now, you seem to be complaining that a method that explicitly avoids Troll Bridge would be too restrictive?
No, I think finding such a no-learning-needed method would be great. It just means your learning-based approach wouldn't be needed.
You seem to be arguing that being susceptible to Troll Bridge should be judged as a necessary/positive trait of a decision theory.
No. I'm saying if our "good" reasoning can't tell us where in Troll Bridge the mistake is, then something that learns to make "good" inferences would have to fall for it.
But there are decision theories which don't have this property, such as regular CDT, or TDT (depending on the logical-causality graph). Are you saying that those are all necessarily wrong, due to this?
A CDT is only worth as much as its method of generating counterfactuals. We generally consider regular CDT (which I interpret as "getting its counterfactuals from something-like-epsilon-exploration") to miss important logical connections. "TDT" doesn't have such a method. There is a (logical) causality graph that makes you do the intuitively right thing on Troll Bridge, but how to find it formally?
A strong candidate from my perspective is the inference from ¬(A∧B) to C(A|B)=0
Isn't this just a rephrasing of your idea that the agent should act based on C(A|B) instead of B->A? I don't see any occurance of ~(A&B) in the troll bridge argument. Now, it is equivalent to B->~A, so perhaps you think one of the propositions that occur as implications in troll bridge should be parsed this way? My modified troll bridge parses them all as counterfactual implication.
For example, I could have a lot of prior mass on "crossing gives me +10, not crossing gives me 0". Then my +10 hypothesis would only be confirmed by experience. I could reason using counterfactuals
I've said why I don't think "using counterfactuals", absent further specification, is a solution. For the simple "crossing is +10" belief... you're right its succeeds, and insofar as you just wanted to show that its rationally possible to cross, I suppose it does.
This... really didn't fit into my intuitions about learning. Consider that there is also the alternative agent who believes that crossing is -10, and sticks to that. And the reason he sticks to that isn't that hes to afraid and VOI isn't worth it: while its true that he never empirically confirms it, he is right, and the bridge would blow up if he were to cross it. That method works because it ignores the information in the problem description, and has us insert the relevant takeaway without any of the confusing stuff directly into its prior. Are you really willing to say: Yup, thats basically the solution to counterfactuals, just a bit of formalism left to work out?
So I don't see how we can be sure that PCH loses out overall. LCH has to exploit PCH -- but if LCH tries it, then we're seemingly in a situation where LCH has to sell for PCH's prices, in which case it suffers the loss I described in the OP.
So I've reread the logical induction paper for this, and I'm not sure I understand exploitation. Under 3.5, it says:
On each day, the reasoner receives 50¢ from T, but after day t, the reasoner must pay $1 every day thereafter.
So this sounds like before day t, T buys a share every day, and those shares never pay out - otherwise T would receive $t on day t in addition to everything mentioned here. Why?
In the version that I have in my head, theres a market with PCH and LCH in it that assigns constant price to the unactualised bet, so neither of them gain or lose anything with their trades on it, and LCH exploits PCH on the actualised ones.
But the special bundled contract doesn't go to zero like this, because the conditional contract only really pays out when the condition is satisfied or refuted.
So if I'm understanding this correctly: The conditional contract on (a|b) pays if a&b is proved, if a&~b is proved, and if ~a&~b is proved.
Now I have another question: how does logical induction arbitrage against contradiction? The bet on a pays $1 if a is proved. The bet on ~a pays $1 if not-a is proved. But the bet on ~a isn't "settled" when a is proved - why can't the market just go on believing its .7? (Likely this is related to my confusion with the paper).
My proposal is essentially similar to that, except I am trying to respect logic in most of the system, simply reducing its impact on action selection. But within my proposed system, I think the wrong 'prior' (ie distribution of wealth for traders) can make it susceptible again.I'm not blocking Troll Bridge problems, I'm making the definition of rational agent broad enough that crossing is permissible. But if I think the Troll Bridge proof is actively irrational, I should be able to actually rule it out. IE, specify an X which is inconsistent with PA.
My proposal is essentially similar to that, except I am trying to respect logic in most of the system, simply reducing its impact on action selection. But within my proposed system, I think the wrong 'prior' (ie distribution of wealth for traders) can make it susceptible again.
I'm not blocking Troll Bridge problems, I'm making the definition of rational agent broad enough that crossing is permissible. But if I think the Troll Bridge proof is actively irrational, I should be able to actually rule it out. IE, specify an X which is inconsistent with PA.
What makes you think that theres a "right" prior? You want a "good" learning mechanism for counterfactuals. To be good, such a mechanism would have to learn to make the inferences we consider good, at least with the "right" prior. But we can't pinpoint any wrong inference in Troll Bridge. It doesn't seem like whats stopping us from pinpointing the mistake in Troll Bridge is a lack of empirical data. So, a good mechanism would have to learn to be susceptible to Troll Bridge, especially with the "right" prior. I just don't see what would be a good reason for thinking theres a "right" prior that avoids Troll Bridge (other than "there just has to be some way of avoiding it"), that wouldn't also let us tell directly how to think about Troll Bridge, no learning needed.
So your social experience is different in this respect?
I've never experienced this example in particular, but I would not expect such a backlash. Can you think of another scenario with non-moral advice that I have likely experienced?