Say the predominant computing paradigm was not based on electricity, but rather something like mechanics. You would still say the AI built on these computers is concious, right? And how about any other physical process which "computes" this particular function (i.e., the one corresponding to the neural net), whatever that means?
I don't see any reason why you would think a neural net on a computer is concious, but not this other physical implementation (except perhaps that the brain also uses electricity, like a computer). In that sense, you really are clai... (read more)
I disagree with arguments of the form "My experience doesn't look like that of a Boltzmann brain, so I'm not a Boltzmann brain". If you were a Boltzmann brain, nothing you would think you know about physics or probability would actually be valid, nor would you have any capability to reason about the experience of a typical Boltzmann brain.
Perhaps the following definition can clarify the issue: say someone is "reasonable" if their experience correlates somehow with reality, and they have the ability to reason somewhat soundly (this concept was probably alre... (read more)
Fair enough. My point is that the idea that there exist certain mathematical functions, such that any implementation of them on any substrate produces conciousness, could be described as saying "math is concious". Though I agree it is a bit simplistic without further clarification.