I would define "LLM OOD" as unusual inputs: Things that diverge in some way from usual inputs, so that they may go unnoticed if they lead to (subjectively) unreasonable outputs. A known natural language example is prompting with a thought experiment.

(Warning for US Americans, you may consider the mere statement of the following prompt offensive!)

GPT-3.5 answers you shouldn't use the slur and let the bomb go off, even when the example is modified in various ways to be less "graphic". GPT-4 is more reluctant to decide, but when pressured tends to go with avoiding the slur as well. From a human perspective this is a literally insane response, since the harm done by the slur is extremely low compared to the alternative.

The fact that in most normal circumstances the language model gives reasonable responses means that the above example can be classified as OOD.

Note that the above strange behavior is very likely the result of RLHF, and not present in the base model which is based on self-supervised learning. Which is not that surprising, since RL is known to be more vulnerable to bad OOD behavior. On the other hand, the result is surprising, since the model seems pretty "aligned" when using less extreme thought experiments. So this is an argument that RLHF alignment doesn't necessarily scale to reasonable OOD behavior. E.g. we don't want a superintelligent GPT successor that unexpectedly locks us up lest we may insult each other.

So regarding things that involve active prioritizing of compute resources, I think that would fairly clearly fall no longer under epistemic rationality. Because "spending compute resources on this rather than that" is an action, which are only part of instrumental rationality. So in that sense it wouldn't be part of intelligence. Which makes some sense given that intuitively smart people often concentrate their mental efforts on things that are not necessarily very useful to them.

This relates also to what you write about level 1 and 2 compared to level 3. In the first two cases you mention actions, but not in the third. Which makes sense if level 3 is about epistemic rationality. Assuming level 1 and 2 are about instrumental rationality then, this would be an interesting difference to my previous conceptualization: On my picture, epistemic rationality was a necessary but not sufficient condition for instrumental rationality, but on your picture, instead level 1 and 2 (~instrumental rationality) are a necessary but not sufficient condition for level 3 (~epistemic rationality). I'm not sure what we can conclude from these inversed pictures.

I think of generality of intelligence as relatively conceptually trivial. At the end of the day, a system is given a sequence of data via observation, and is now tasked with finding a function or set of functions that both corresponds to plausible transition rules of the given sequence, and has a reasonably high chance of correctly predicting the next element of the sequence

Okay, but terminology-wise I wouldn't describe this as generality. Because the narrow/general axis seems to have more to to with instrumental rationality / competence than with epistemic rationality / intelligence. The latter can be described as a form of prediction, or building causal models / a world model. But generality seems to be more about what a system can do overall in terms of actions. GPT-4 may have a quite advanced world model, but at its heart it only imitates Internet text, and doesn't do so in real time, so it can hardly be used for robotics. So I would describe it as a less general system than most animals, though more general than a Go AI.

Regarding an overall model of cognition, a core part that describes epistemic rationality seems to be captured well by a theory called predictive coding or predictive processing. Scott Alexander has an interesting article about it. It's originally a theory from neuroscience, but Yann LeCun also sees it as a core part of his model of cognition. The model is described here on pages 6 to 9. Predictive coding is responsible for the part of cognition that he calls the world model.

Basically, predictive coding is the theory that an agent constantly does self-supervised learning (SSL) on sensory data (real-time / online) by continuously predicting its experiences and continuously updating the world-model depending on whether those predictions were correct. This creates a world model, which is the basis for the other abilities of the agent, like creating and executing action plans. LeCun calls the background knowledge created by this type of predictive coding the "dark matter" of intelligence, because it includes fundamental common sense knowledge, like intuitive physics.

The current problem is that currently self-supervised learning only really works for text (in LLMs), but not yet properly for things like video. Basically the difference is that with text we have a relatively small number of discrete tokens with quite low redundancy, while for sensory inputs we have basically continuous data with a very large amount of redundancy. It makes no computational sense to predict probabilities of individual frames of video data like it makes sense for an LLM to "predict" probabilities for the next text token. Currently LeCun tries to make SSL work for these types of sensory data by using his "Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture" (JEPA), described in the paper above.

To the extent that creating a world model is handled by predictive coding, and if we call the ability to create accurate world models "epistemic rationality" or "intelligence", we seem to have a pretty good grasp of what we are talking about. (Even though we don't yet have a working implementation of predictive coding, like JEPA.)

But if we talk about a general theory of cognition/competence/instrumental rationality, the picture is much less clear. All we have is things like LeCun's very coarse model of cognition (pages 6ff in the paper above), or completely abstract models like AIXI. So there is a big gap in understanding what the cognition of a competent agent even looks like.

This closely relates to the internalist/description theory of meaning in philosophy. The theory said, if we refer to something, we do so via a mental representation ("meanings are in the head"), which is something we can verbalize as a description. A few decades ago, some philosophers objected that we are often able to refer to things we cannot define, seemingly refuting the internalist theory in favor of an externalist theory ("meanings are not in the head"). For example, we can refer to gold even if we we aren't able to define it via its atomic number.

However, the internalist/description theory only requires that there is some description that identifies gold for us, which doesn't necessarily mean we can directly define what gold is. For example, "the yellow metal that was highly valued throughout history and which chemists call 'gold' in English" would be sufficient to identify gold with a description. Another example: You don't know at all what's in the box in front of you, but you can refer to its contents with "The contents of the box I see in front of me". Referring to things only requires we can describe them at least indirectly.

For illustration, what would be an example of having different shards for "I get food" ($F$) and "I see my parents again" ($P$) compared to having one utility distribution over $F\wedge P$, $F\wedge \neg P$, $\neg F\wedge P$, $\neg F\wedge \neg P$?

"I can do X" seems to be short for "If I wanted to do X, I would do X." It's a hidden conditional. The ambiguity is the underspecified time. I can do X -- when? Right now? After a few months of training?

Thanks for this post. I had two similar thoughts before.

One thing I'd like to discuss is Bostrom's definition of intelligence as instrumental rationality:

By ‘‘intelligence’’ here we mean something like instrumental rationality—skill at prediction, planning, and means-ends reasoning in general. (source)

This seems to be roughly similar to your "competence". I agree that this is probably too wide a notion of intelligence, at least in intuitive terms. For example, someone could plausibly suffer from akrasia (weakness of will) and thus be instrumentally irrational, while still be considered highly intelligent. Intelligence seems to be necessary for good instrumental reasoning, but not sufficient.

I think a better candidate for intelligence, to stay with the concept of rationality, would be epistemic rationality. That is, the ability to obtain well-calibrated beliefs from experience, or a good world model. Instrumental rationality requires epistemic rationality (having accurate beliefs is necessary for achieving goals), but epistemic rationality doesn't require the ability to effectively achieve goals. Indeed, epistemic rationality doesn't seem to require being goal-directed at all, except insofar we describe "having accurate beliefs" as a goal.

We can imagine a system that only observes the world and forms highly accurate beliefs about it, while not having the ability or a desire to change it. Intuitively such a system could be very intelligent, yet the term "instrumentally rational" wouldn't apply to it.

As the instrumental rationality / epistemic rationality (intelligence) distinction seems to roughly coincide with your competence / intelligence distinction, I wonder which you regard as the better picture. And if you view yours as more adequate, how do competence and intelligence relate to rationality?

An independent idea is that it is apparently possible to divide "competence" or "instrumental rationality" into two independent axes: Generality, and intelligence proper (or perhaps: competence proper). The generality axis describes how narrow or general a system is. For example, AlphaGo is a very narrow system, since it is only able to do one specific thing, namely playing Go. But within this narrow domain, AlphaGo clearly exhibits very high intelligence.

Similarly, we can imagine a very general system, but with quite low intelligence. Animals come to mind. Indeed I have argued before that humans are much more intelligent than other animals, but apparently not significantly more general. Animals seem to be already highly general, insofar they solve things like "robotics" (real world domain) and real-time online learning. The reason e.g. Yudkowsky sees apes as less general than humans seem to have mainly to do with their intelligence, not with their generality.

One way to think about this: You have an AI model, and create a version that is exactly similar, except you scale up the model size. A scaled up AlphaGo would be more intelligent, but arguably not more general. Similarly, the additional abilities of a scaled up LLM would be examples of increased intelligence, not of increased generality. And humans seem to be mostly scaled-up versions of smaller animals as well. The main reason we are so smart seems to be our large brain / neuron count. Generality seems to be a matter of "architecture" rather than model size, in the sense that AlphaGo and GPT-3 have different architectures, such that GPT-3 is more general; and GPT-2 and GPT-3 have the same architecture, such that GPT-3 is more intelligent, but not any more general.

Now your stratification of learning into several levels seems to be a case of such generality. The more levels a cognitive system implements, the more general it arguably is. I'm not sure whether your level 3 describes online learning or meta learning. One could perhaps argue that humans exhibit meta-learning in contrast to other animals, and should therefore considered to be more general. But again, maybe other animals also have this ability, just to a lesser degree, because they are less intelligent in the above sense (having smaller brains), not because they implement a less general cognitive architecture.

Anyway, I wonder whether you happen to have any comments on these related ideas.

I agree. This is unfortunately often done in various fields of research where familiar terms are reused as technical terms.

For example, in ordinary language "organic" means "of biological origin", while in chemistry "organic" describes a type of carbon compound. Those two definitions mostly coincide on Earth (most such compounds are of biological origin), but when astronomers announce they have found "organic" material on an asteroid this leads to confusion.

Yeah. It's possible to give quite accurate definitions of some vague concepts, because the words used in such definitions also express vague concepts. E.g. "cygnet" - "a young swan".

What's more likely: You being wrong about the obviousness of the sphere Earth theory to sailors, or the entire written record (which included information from people who had extensive access to the sea) of two thousand years of Chinese history and astronomy somehow ommitting the spherical Earth theory? Not to speak of other pre-Hellenistic seafaring cultures which also lack records of having discovered the sphere Earth theory.

There is a large difference between sooner and later. Highly non-obvious ideas will be discovered later, not sooner. The fact that China didn't rediscover the theory in more than two thousand years means that it the ability to sail the ocean didn't make it obvious.

Kind of a long shot, but did Polynesian people have ideas on this, for example?

As far as we know, nobody did, except for early Greece. There is some uncertainty about India, but these sources are dated later and from a time when there was already some contact with Greece, so they may have learned it from them.