I think your question is not naive at all. Stuart_Armstrong argued for a similar point that anthropic questions should be about decision making rather than probability assigning here. However I do remember a post in lesswrong claiming he has modified his position but I couldn't find that post right now.
That said, I think ignoring probability in anthropics is not the way to go. We generally regard probability as the logical basis of rational decision making. There is no good reason why anthropic problems are different. In my opinion, focusing on decision making mitigate one problem: it forces us to state the decision objective as premises. So Halfers and Thirders can each come up with their own objectives reflecting their answers. It avoids the question of which objective is reflective of the correct probability. By perspective-based reasoning, I think the correct objective should be simple selfish goals, where the self is primitively identified I by its immediacy to subjective experience (i.e. the perspective center). And for some paradoxes such as the doomsday argument and presumptuous philosopher, converting them into decision making problem seems rather strange: I just want to know if their conclusions are right or wrong, why even ask if I care about the welfare of all potentially existing humans?
No, the translation omits too much. That roughly translates to:
吾以此知胜负矣: That's is how I know victory from defeat (in advance).
将听吾计，用之必胜，留之；将不听吾计，用之必败，去之。: (If) the general follow my advice, victory is ensured, (make him) stay. (If) the general does not follow my advice, it would lead to defeat, (make him) leave.
计利以听，乃为之势，以佐其外: Given (my) strategies are followed, create situations, to have a synergizing environment (for the strategies).
势者，因利而制权也: such situations are objective/circumstance dependent. (basically saying be flexible, resourceful)
Classical Chinese is something strange. Anybody with a middle school education can have a fairly good understanding. Yet a precise translation is difficult. The above is the best translation I can give. It shall not be regarded as error-free. But the original one definite is not complete.
I can't agree with arguments for God using Bayesian updates, e.g. the universe is fine-tuned for life. Why is the argument focused on life in the first place? Why not focus on something that doesn't exist and conclude the universe is not designed?
This argument only seems right because it looks like a self-analysis. We, humans, are life. So paying attention to it seems natural. But wouldn't the existence of oneself be a prerequisite of self-analysis? From our perspective, finding the universe compatible with our existence is guaranteed. Just like I am guaranteed to find myself exist. The fact that any tiny fluctuation in history would be causing me not to be born does not mean my existence is chosen by god.
My position has been the same. It starts from one assumption: treat perspectives as fundamental axioms. Then reasoning from different perspectives would not be mixed, indexicals are perspective-based thus primitively identified. So we would not treat I or now as the result of some imaginary random sampling, which has lead to the anthropic debate of SSA and SIA. It has been laid out in the first-post you replied to.
You say I do not respond to issues you raised. It appears I simply cannot do so. Because every time I choose to provide a detailed explanation I got comments such as “but you are not arguing, you are just asserting” or “that is not a substantive argument”, or “I deny that what you say”. You just give judgments without getting into where you think is wrong. And when you do try to get into the reasoning, you didn’t even care what I wrote, like saying I assumed Beauty knows she’s not the clone while I clearly stated the opposite.
If you don’t know what my theory would predict, then give me some scenarios or thought experiments and make me answer them. If you do not understand something I said, make me clarify. I would like to answer them because it helps to explain my position and outline our disagreement. (Btw, the first-person perspective is primitively given simply means you instinctively know which person you are, because you are experiencing everything from its viewpoint.) But by keep dismissing my effort like above it just seems you are not interested in that. You just want to argue your position is the better one.
Regarding the MWI post. If MWI does not require perspective-independent reality. Then what is the universal wave function describing? Sure, we generally accept this objective reality. And if an interpretation suggests otherwise it is usually deemed its burden to provide such a metaphysics (e.g. like participatory realism by QBism). Sean Carrol regards this as a reason to favor or default to the MWI. I argued if Thomas Nagel’s 3 Steps of how we get the idea of objectivity is correct, then perspective-independent objectivity itself is an assumption. The response I get is that you deny my argument. That’s it. What can I possibly say after that? You want me to understand your model of MWI. But when I followed-up your statement that some CI can be considered a special version of MWI and explained why I think that is not possible, I get no feedback from you...
You say I am not pointing to SIA supporters having different opinions as you. Because you said you don’t care. And I find it hard to believe when you say you do not know any SIA supporters disagree with your position. For starters, Katja, who brought up SIA doomsday actually argued SIA is preferable to SSA due to perspective disagreements. Michael Titelbaum, a thirder, who give many strong arguments against halfers, listed naive confirmation of MWI as a problem. Your position that SIA is the “natural choice” and paradox free is a very strong claim. ( If you are that confident, maybe make a post about it?) Regarding your framework of solving the paradoxes….what is the framework? You gave every single problem a specific explanation. The framework I see is that your version of SIA is problem-free, counter-intuitive conclusions are always due to something else.
Granted, for open problems like SB or QM it is nearly impossible to convince each other. The productive thing to do would be to try to understand the counter-party’s logic and find out the root of the disagreement. That is why I ended our earlier discussion by making a list of our different positions. So while we may not agree with each other, at least we understand our different assumptions that lead to the disagreement. But looking back at your comments I just realize that is not what you are after. You are here to win. Well, I can’t keep up with this. So…you win. And as always, you will have the final word.
Ike, please don’t take this the wrong way, but with every exchange between us ending with your verdict, I find “attempt to explain, not persuade” very difficult to do.
In the above post, I explained the problem of SSA and SIA: they assume a specific imaginary selection process, and then base their answers on that, whereas the first-person perspective is primitive given. You judged it as “not substantive”.
Previously, you said SIA is the “natural setup” and with that you don’t see any paradoxes. I mentioned SIA also leads to counterintuitive conclusions such as SIA Doomsday (filter ahead), Presumptuous Philosopher, Naive confirmation of MWI and Multiverse. You laid out how could SIA avoid the paradoxical conclusions in each case. I said not all supporters of SIA would agree with you. You said you don’t care. I said each problem requires a different explanation seems ad-hoc, suggesting some underlying problem with SIA. You deemed they are not ad-hoc.
In another post, I argued that the MWI requires the basic assumption of a perspective-independent objective reality. Your entire response is “I deny that MWI requires that. In fact, all three of your postulates are incoherent, and I believe in a form of MWI that doesn't require any of them.” No explanations.
Here you first didn’t notice Beauty is cloned when Tails, now saying I claim Beauty knows she’s not the clone. I specifically said through the repetitions the first-person I might not refer to the same physical copy (just like in a single experiment). I only claim after waking up, from the first-person perspective it is clear which copy I am. Which allows further first-person repetitions.
I can’t help but feel many of your comments are purposely argumentative and low effort. I personally don’t find them constructive.
Twice as many copies for tails means in the long run any given copy is likely to be near 2/3ds tails.
Twice as many copies for tails means in the long run any given copy is likely to be near 2/3ds tails.
The keyword is “any given copy”. The debate between common camps (SSA vs SIA) is how the given copy is selected.
If at the end of the day a random copy is selected, then her expected relative frequency of Heads would be 1/3. Because every time Tails occurs, the number of copy doubles. In this model, a principle of indifference applies to all resulting copies.
Alternatively, a copy can be selected at the end of each iteration, so when the repetition finishes we end up with a chosen one. Here the expected relative frequency of the selected would be 1/2. Because even though the number of Beauty is doubled after Tails, they only have half the chance of being chosen. In this model, the principle of indifference is only applied to copies experienced the same tosses.
There is no disagreement so far. The debate is this: thirders would say the first selection model reflects Beauty’s probability while halfers may say the second selection model reflects Beauty’s probability. I am arguing they are both wrong.
Beauty does not perform any selection. The single copy is given by something else: her first-person perspective. The perspective is fundamental that cannot be logically reduced further. I am this copy, end of the story, no further explanation. So the relative frequency should be based on repeating the experiment from her first-person perspective. I.E. imagine in Beauty’s shoes: I fall asleep - I wake up, I fall asleep - I wake up…. do this again and again. Here I would experience about equal numbers of Heads and Tails. Granted, when it is Tails, there would exist another copy (consistent with the fact that according to the first selection model the result would be 1/3), but I don’t have to even consider that because from the first-person perspective it is primevally clear the other copy is not me.
In this first-person model, there is no principle of indifference among copies at all. Indexicals such as I is inherently the focus. While the indifferences mentioned earlier are based on selections from an outsider’s perspective (or a god’s eye view, or a view from nowhere if one prefers to call it). I argue because they are based on different perspectives, this uniqueness and indifference should not mix. Choose one perspective and stick with it through the entire analysis. Mix them would lead to assuming the indexical as the result of some selection process (SSA and SIA) and cause anthropic paradoxes.
That's fair. I think it would be beyond my expertise to criticize other notions of correlational non-locality. I just wanted to point once treating perspectives as fundamental, the non-locality cannot be formulated in QM. Somewhat similar to QBism's treatment of nonlocality.
The first-person experience would give equal numbers of Heads vs Tails. When the toss results in Tails, there exists another copy beside myself. So there is twice the number of copies experiencing Tails.
They can write their result on two pieces of paper and bring them together. But as long as we treat perspective as fundamental, there still won’t be any non-locality. Because the spins are perceived by actions upon a perspective center. And those actions cannot be spacelike separated. For example, if the two pieces of paper are sent to me, from my perspective all I can say is something like “since I got Alice’s result as spin up, safe to say I will get Bob’s result as spin down.” Non-local correlations like “Alice measured up, so Bob will measure down” is either a perspective switch between the two or a view from nowhere statement.
I agree that measurements are objective once made (in the sense of perspective-invariant not perspective-independent). But Alice and Bob are not analyzing the same set of measurements. Each of them from their respective perspective analyzes actions upon him/herself. Their deduction about the spins would have opposite causal arrows. But as long as we don’t switch perspectives, things would be local.