Sorted by New

Wiki Contributions


Ok. I naively thought I could trip up this system by altering the probability of being a simulation or the payout, but I can't.

SCDT successfully 1 boxes on any box 2 payout larger than $1000. SCDT successfully 1 boxes even if a single simulation is used to predict any number of actual Alices. (The scenario I worked through involved 10,000 duplicate Alices being predicted by a single Alice simulation.)

I'm thoroughly impressed by this decision theory.

It seems as if these are generic enough problems with enough past incidences to assume studies have already occurred regarding them. Do you happen to know what the existing solution to these problems are and how effective they are?

or alternatively, how harmful the problems are, and wether an imposed solution tends to be cost effective or not.

Ok. So the problem is that designing systems with accessible back-doors for nepotism is a larger hit to the effectiveness of the industry than if there were simply blatant nepotism itself, and systems weren't compromised by third parties.

Is this correct? In your (admittedly non-exauhstive) experience, in what specific ways is the industry harmed?

Ok, I think I understand what your saying.

The system needs to be designed in such a way to allow covert nepotism, as businesses desire the ability to behave nepotistical without appearing to be, and this demand is important and consistent enough for the market solution to inevitably include it. And you are also saying that nepotism isn't too harmful, and the system we'd attempt to implement should include mechanisms for nepotism.

(God I sometimes hate human behavior. ARGGH)

Is this correct? Have you communicated the correct ideas to me?

And, In what ways have business credentialing systems handled this kind of demand historically, and are similar methods applicable here?

I don't see how nepotism effects the system too horribly. Businesses are still entirely allowed to hire close friends and family despite less credentials, and any other nepotistic behavior that's counter to the purpose of profit.

The Watchdogs, however, can't just hand out certification willy nilly, because they need a universal metric for all competing businesses in a field.

If Business A makes a habit of bribing Watchdog A so Mr. CEO's sons can have the same certification as actual students (for the purpose of hiding nepotism), then Watchdog B's nepotism free selection methods will locate higher quality employees more consistently, and garner costumers from the majority of companies that are primarily interested in actual profit.

I would like to strongly voice my interest in such a service myself. I don't have spare capital to give, but I want this to happen.

I would think business wouldn't make the mistake of employing biased watchdogs. Let's look at the main incentives:

  • Businesses wan't an accurate idea of who is employable.

  • Schools of course want to appear to produce employable students.

  • Watchdogs want money.

Now, unless I'm mistaken, being bribed by schools to put them in a favorable light is a temporary bubble, liable to pop when businesses discover that they've been lied to. Watchdogs' main employers would be businesses searching for employees, as far as I'm willing to predict, and failing to successfully out-predict competing watchdogs will result in a watchdog's failure.

Fraud will happen. Humans tend to lie for short term gains. However, it's an unsustainable business model in the long run. Fear it greatly as this market is forming, but as a trend it shouldn't last.

Absolutely love this idea, just one little comment on the watchdogs.

It occurs to me now that, if one wished to be really nitpicky about who watches the watchmen, I suspect that there would be institutions testing the reliability of those meta-institutions, and so on and so forth... When does it stop? How to avoid vested interests and little cheats and manipulations pulling an academic equivalent of the AAA certification of sub-prime junk debt in 2008?

Why do the watchdogs exist? Because business produce demand for accurate measurements of employability, and are willing to pay for a service that offers that information. I'm sure if a significant number of watchdog companies exist a business will need to employ a meta-watchdog to determine which watchdog to employ, but it does eventually terminate at the employer themselves, who has to personally be the watchdog for which meta-watchdog company to employ.

And that information is easily available (albeit after some lag). Which company reliably recommends the tests that actually produce better employees?

How big is the chain of information when you're deciding which restaurant to eat at? That's perfectly analogous scenario, as far as I can tell.

For the EDM fans out there, some semi-pony themed dubstep/progressive house/electro music: http://www.youtube.com/channel/UCj5ceb5aLKALh-g6vhAcpxw

A thinking hat - like the sorting hat, only it uses your brainpower to help you solve problems.

You mean like the Lost Diadem of Ravenclaw? which may not exist in the Rationalverse, as it's potentially OP. Especially if Harry gets his hands on it.

Load More