Authors: Dylan Xu, Alek Westover, Vivek Hebbar, Sebastian Prasanna, Nathan Sheffield, Buck Shlegeris, Julian Stastny Thanks to Eric Gan and Aghyad Deeb for feedback on a draft of this post. When is a “deceptively aligned” policy capable of surviving training? Answers to this question could be useful for a number...
Thanks to Buck Shlegeris for feedback on a draft of this post. The goal-guarding hypothesis states that schemers will be able to preserve their goals during training by taking actions which are selected for by the training process. To investigate the goal-guarding hypothesis, we’ve been running experiments of the following...
This post was produced as part of the Astra Fellowship under the Winter 2024 Cohort, mentored by Richard Ngo. Epistemic status: relatively confident in the overall direction of this post, but looking for feedback! TL;DR: When are ML systems well-modeled as coherent expected utility maximizers? We apply our theoretical model...
This post was produced as part of the Astra Fellowship under the Winter 2024 Cohort, mentored by Richard Ngo. Thanks to Martín Soto, Jeremy Gillen, Daniel Kokotajlo, and Lukas Berglund for feedback. Summary Discussions around the likelihood and threat models of AI existential risk (x-risk) often hinge on some informal...
In Spring 2023, the Berkeley AI Safety Initiative for Students (BASIS) organized an alignment research program for students, drawing inspiration from similar programs by Stanford AI Alignment[1] and OxAI Safety Hub. We brought together 12 researchers from organizations like CHAI, FAR AI, Redwood Research, and Anthropic, and 38 research participants...
This post was produced as part of the Astra Fellowship under the Winter 2024 Cohort, mentored by Richard Ngo. Thanks to Martín Soto, Jeremy Gillen, Daniel Kokotajlo, and Lukas Berglund for feedback. Summary Discussions around the likelihood and threat models of AI existential risk (x-risk) often hinge on some informal concept of a “coherent”, goal-directed AGI in the future maximizing some utility function unaligned with human values. Whether and how coherence may develop in future AI systems, especially in the era of LLMs, has been a subject of considerable debate. In this post, we provide a preliminary mathematical definition of the coherence of a policy as how likely it is to have been sampled via uniform reward sampling (URS), or uniformly sampling a reward function and then sampling from the set of policies optimal for that reward function, versus uniform policy sampling (UPS). We provide extensions of the model for sub-optimality and for “simple” reward functions via uniform sparsity sampling (USS). We then build a classifier for the coherence of policies in small deterministic MDPs, and find that properties of the MDP and policy, like the number of self-loops that the policy takes, are predictive of coherence when used as features for the classifier. Moreover, coherent policies tend to preserve optionality, navigate toward high-reward areas of the MDP, and have other “agentic” properties. We hope that our metric can be iterated upon to achieve better definitions of coherence and a better understanding of what properties dangerous AIs will have. Introduction Much of the current discussion about AI x-risk centers around “agentic”, goal-directed AIs having misaligned goals. For instance, one of the most dangerous possibilities being discussed is of mesa-optimizers developing within superhuman models, leading to scheming behavior and deceptive alignment. A significant proportion of current alignment work focuses on detecting, analyzing (e.g. via analogous cas