This post is somewhat niche, and I will sometimes not give context or link relevant background. There’s a big debate that has played out in slow motion on LessWrong over the past two decades, between two broad ways of putting a measure over all possible realities (Tegmark IV): * Some...
[Epistemic status: weird philosophy] Here’s a simple argument: How do we know what exists? Well, we don’t - not for certain. Many different possible worlds are consistent with our observations. A lot of those worlds will be ones in which we are “freak observers”: coincidentally arising computations that resemble our...
[Epistemic status: rant] There’s something that annoys me about the reoccurring debates on decision theory in this corner of the internet. Take a simple blackmail scenario: > Omega, a near-perfect predictor, knows a piece of embarrassing information about you. He threatens you that he will release it to the public...
Thanks to @eigengender and especially Chris Lakin and Simon Dima for valuable comments on a draft. In this post, I will present an alternate framing[1] of LessWrong-style decision theory. I believe it should make its concrete recommendations much more palatable to people who find them absurd. Very little of the...
Here’s Holden Karnofsky: > I tend to think it’s worse than 51/49. I tend to think we’re always going to be prone to overestimate how robustly good our actions are. And the more we learn about all the galaxy-brained considerations that one should have had in one’s head, the more...
People often make arguments against “trying hard” (working very hard, pushing yourself to the brink, being intensely goal-directed, and so on) by pointing to the risks of burnout or of losing some kind of wholesomeness[1]. But there’s another, very simple argument against it that I have not seen anyone fully...